FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000

The Folly of Arms Control

Jonathan Schell on Nuclear Proliferation vs. Abolition

Out-of-Control Immigration

JAMES GOLDSBOROUGH

Africa's Crisis of Leadership

Zimbabwe as Exhibit A

ROBERT ROTBERG

A Chilean Model for Russia

JOSÉ PIÑERA

MISSILE-DEFENSE MADNESS

Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov

Plus Shoring Up the U.N. *by* William Luers
Living with Public Apathy *by* James Lindsay
A Fresh Start for Foreign Aid *by* Carol Lancaster *and*
Understanding Hugo Chávez *by* Kenneth Maxwell

$7.95 IN USA · $10.50 IN CANADA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000
VOLUME 79, NUMBER 5

Editor's Note v

Comments

The New Apathy *James M. Lindsay* 2
Americans are not isolationist; they're uninterested. So foreign policy is neglected, presidents find it hard to lead, and the noisy few trump the quiet many.

Choosing Engagement *William H. Luers* 9
The U.N.'s voluble critics fret that it threatens American sovereignty. In fact, a strengthened U.N. system will both serve America's interests and promote its ideals.

The Missile-Defense Mistake *Igor Ivanov* 15
Washington's plans for a national missile-defense system threaten the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty—the foundation of international strategic stability.

Essays

The Folly of Arms Control *Jonathan Schell* 22
Ten years after the end of the Cold War, nuclear danger is rising. Despite the end of the struggle in whose name the great nuclear arsenals were built, Washington now seeks to stop proliferation while holding on to its own arsenal indefinitely. But as nuclear restrictions falter—battered by India's and Pakistan's tests, Iraq's defiance, North Korea's missiles, and the U.S. missile-defense plan—the absence of a middle ground becomes stark. Holding on to nuclear arms is not a deterrent but a "proliferant" that goads others to join the club. Arms control has become a way of avoiding a fateful choice: a world of uncontrolled proliferation or a world with no nuclear weapons at all.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Africa's Mess, Mugabe's Mayhem *Robert I. Rotberg* 47

Venal leaders are the curse of Africa, and Robert Mugabe is a walking reminder of how much damage they can do. No mere thug like Idi Amin, the gifted Mugabe created modern Zimbabwe and then robbed it of its enormous potential. The comparatively well-run, well-off country that he inherited is now a corruption-riddled, autocratic mess sent into economic free fall by its kleptomaniacal president's whims—including tampering with elections, sending troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and hiring goons to invade white-owned farms. An indulgent world contributed to Mugabe's sense of invincibility. Instead, he and his ilk should be ostracized.

A Chilean Model for Russia *José Piñera* 62

Russia does not need a Pinochet, but it does need the Chilean economic model. For Russia to grow at self-sustaining annual rates of seven to ten percent for a decade or two—the only way it can pull itself out of poverty—it needs much more economic liberalization. Four reforms inspired by Chile's dramatic turnaround can help Russia out of its doldrums: pension privatization, tax reform, radical deregulation of coddled industries, and the replacement of the ruble with the euro. The indispensable element is not a strong four-star general but a team of determined economic policymakers who know that freedom works.

Redesigning Foreign Aid *Carol Lancaster* 74

The traditional goals of U.S. foreign aid—promoting U.S. security and fostering development in poor countries—are no longer as pressing after the Cold War. Washington must revamp its approach to aid and address new, urgent priorities: shoring up peacekeeping efforts in such places as the Middle East and the Balkans; easing the transition to globalization; tackling transnational environmental crises and diseases; and improving the quality of life for the world's neediest. This new diplomacy will not only transform U.S. aid but bolster its relevance to American interests and values in a rapidly changing world.

Out-of-Control Immigration *James Goldsborough* 89

With the U.S. economy soaring, few care that immigration to the United States is at its highest absolute levels. But what happens when the economy falls back to earth? High-tech immigrant workers are already competing with Americans for jobs, while unskilled immigrant laborers are becoming a permanent underclass. High immigration is creating imbalances in education, income distribution, employment, and welfare demands—as well as tensions between immigrants and citizens and among the federal, state, and local governments. An economic slump will mean crisis. Congress and the White House need to cut back now.

Plaintiff's Diplomacy *Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco* 102

The ever more litigious nature of American society is starting to affect an unexpected area: foreign policy. Increasing numbers of individuals, both American and foreign, are now using U.S. courts to defend their rights under international law in ways impossible just a few years ago. The plaintiffs range from Holocaust survivors to terrorist victims to the inhabitants of tropical rain forests; the defendants include multinational corporations, foreign officials, and even governments. On the one hand, the trend is bringing to justice many long thought unaccountable. On the other, it is making the tricky process of American diplomacy harder than ever.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reviews & Responses

The Long Shadow of Hugo Chávez *Kenneth Maxwell* 118
Richard Gott's *In the Shadow of the Liberator* offers a sympathetic—but unintentionally troubling—account of Venezuela's tough new leader.

Africa's Ailing Giant *Marcus Mabry* 123
This House Has Fallen brings stark new details to a familiar story: the legacy of hatred, corruption, and mismanagement that brought Nigeria to its knees.

Recent Books on International Relations 128
Lucian W. Pye on Emperor Hirohito; Stanley Hoffmann on François Mitterrand; Eliot A. Cohen on *The Greatest Threat;* Philip Zelikow on the Korean War; Kenneth Maxwell on *The Blood of Guatemala;* L. Carl Brown on *The Palestinian Hamas.*

Letters to the Editor 153
Rwanda's ambassador on the silent West; Robert E. Hunter lauds NATO expansion; Natan Shklyar on Russia's regions; and others.

Advice for the Next President *Andrew J. Goodpaster* 158
NATO's former supreme commander on the challenges of a transformed world.

Lurie's Foreign Affairs 162

The articles in Foreign Affairs *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers will sympathize with all the sentiments they find here, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* Foreign Affairs *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. We do not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, that appears in these pages. What we do accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear.*

THE EDITORS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JAMES F. HOGE, JR. *Editor*
Peter G. Peterson Chair
FAREED ZAKARIA *Managing Editor*

GIDEON ROSE *Senior Editor*

Associate Editors
WARREN BASS, HELEN FESSENDEN, JONATHAN D. TEPPERMAN

TRACI C. NAGLE *Production Editor*
LORENZ SKEETER *Production Manager*
RANAN LURIE, IB OHLSSON *Contributing Artists*
ROSEMARY HARTMAN *Assistant to the Editor*
ANN HATHAWAY COLEMAN *Assistant to the Managing Editor*
HARLAN G. COHEN *Intern*

Book Reviewers
L. CARL BROWN, ELIOT A. COHEN, RICHARD N. COOPER, GAIL M. GERHART, STANLEY HOFFMANN, G. JOHN IKENBERRY, ROBERT LEGVOLD, KENNETH MAXWELL, LUCIAN W. PYE, PHILIP ZELIKOW

DAVID KELLOGG *Publisher*

DAWN M. TYRRELL *Associate Publisher*
NANCY BARRA *Assistant to the Publisher*
CYNTHIA VOUGHT CAVONE *Circulation Manager*
NINA JOHNS *Circulation Assistant*
JOSEPH A. D'AMICO *Anthology Production Coordinator*
BILL LEDBETTER *Advertising Representative*
LEIGH ANNE YEARY *Advertising Representative*
JAMES COLLINS *Advertising Representative (Washington)*
TARA A. SULLIVAN *Advertising Assistant*

Board of Advisers
KENNETH W. DAM *Chairman*
FOUAD AJAMI, MICHAEL R. BESCHLOSS, LEE CULLUM, JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, LOUIS V. GERSTNER, JR., HENRY A. GRUNWALD, RITA E. HAUSER, JIM HOAGLAND, KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE, KIRK KRAEUTLER, JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, RODNEY W. NICHOLS, ELISABETH N. SIFTON, THEODORE C. SORENSEN, JOSHUA L. STEINER, GARRICK UTLEY, ANITA VOLZ WIEN, PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, PHILIP ZELIKOW

MANUSCRIPTS SHOULD BE SENT TO: 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021. The Editors will consider all manuscripts received but will return only materials accompanied by appropriate postage.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: Price for subscriptions, U.S. $44.00, Canada $54.00, other countries via air $79.00 per year. To subscribe, write *Foreign Affairs*, P.O. Box 420235, Palm Coast, FL 32142-0235. To resolve subscription problems, call (800) 829-5539 or e-mail foraff@palmcoastd.com.

Replacement copies are available to subscribers at no charge until the next issue is published. Thereafter, back issues are $12.00 each. GST number 127686483RT.

ADVERTISING: For rates and schedules contact the advertising department, (212) 434-9400.

Foreign Affairs is a member of The Leadership Network. For information, contact Teri Schure, Chairperson, at (212) 982-8880, ext. 110. Fax: (212) 982-6968. It is also a member of the Audit Bureau of Circulations and the Magazine Publishers of America.

REPRINTS AND PERMISSIONS: Write *Foreign Affairs*, Reader Services, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021. Fax: (212) 861-2759.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NOTICE: The contents of *Foreign Affairs* are copyrighted. To protect the magazine and its authors against unlawful copying, it is our policy, as provided under U.S. law, to move vigorously against any individual or company engaging in the reproduction or distribution of the contents, by any means, without first obtaining written permission. For prompt action on such requests, please send a fax to the Permissions Dept. at (212) 861-2759. E-mail: ForAff@email.cfr.org.

Foreign Affairs is published six times a year by the Council on Foreign Relations. © 2000.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Editor's Note

Ranan Lurie, the internationally known cartoonist, has joined *Foreign Affairs* as a regular contributor. Lurie will offer his own view on some aspect of global life in a cartoon specially drawn for the magazine. Titled "Lurie's Foreign Affairs," it will appear on the final page of each issue. From time to time, his masterful caricatures of political leaders will also accompany relevant articles.

For some 30 years, Lurie's much-honored work has appeared in newspapers, magazines, and on broadcast news programs. At various times he has been resident cartoonist for *Life*, the international editions of *Newsweek* and *Time*, *Asahi Shimbun*, and *The Times* of London. He is the most widely syndicated cartoonist in the world, as well as a painter, sculptor, author of ten books, and chief editor of *Cartoon News*, an educational bimonthly.

RANAN LURIE

Lurie joins Ib Ohlsson, a distinguished illustrator and master of graphics whose work has graced *Foreign Affairs* for the past seven years. Ohlsson also produces political and satirical cartoons for a number of publications including *The Washington Post*, and occasional color art for *The New Yorker*. For more than 30 years, his maps, informational graphics, and illustrations were *Newsweek* hallmarks.

The keen observations of these distinguished artists admirably complement the stimulating essays, comments, and reviews appearing in *Foreign Affairs*.

IB OHLSSON

James F. Hoge, Jr.
Editor

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW FROM
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT

REPAIRING THE REGIME
Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Joseph Cirincione, editor



"*Repairing the Regime* is an invaluable resource and timely contribution to the range of troubling proliferation issues and strategies for addressing them, offering a rich representation of official and well-informed NGO analyses at a time when the entire regime is at a crossroads."
—**Robert Manning**,
Council on Foreign Relations

"In *Repairing the Regime*, Joseph Cirincione has assembled a veritable who's who of international experts to explain many of the recent developments, both good and ill, concerning weapons of mass destruction. Its great strength is the combination of rigorous historical analysis with creative policy prescriptions."
—**Mitchell B. Reiss**,
Dean of International Affairs, College of William and Mary

"An important book with contributions by the world's leading authorities on proliferation and arms control. Packed with creative analysis and usable policy recommendations, *Repairing the Regime* will be of interest to scholars and practitioners alike."
—**Jessica Stern**,
author of *The Ultimate Terrorists*

This collection reflects the passionate debates of top international experts and officials in the field, including Samuel Berger, Bill Richardson, Jayantha Dhanapala, Sha Zukang, Richard Butler, and Robert Gallucci.

326 pp. / $24.99 paper 0-415-92596-7 / $85.00 cloth 0-415-92595-9.
Copublished with Routledge. To order, call Routledge at 1-800-634-7064 or visit www. routledge-ny.com

To learn more about this book and current proliferation issues, please visit the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project at
www.ceip.org/npp

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Comments

AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Demonstrators protest the return of Elián González to Cuba, Miami, January 6, 2000

In foreign policy, as in the rest of life, squeaky wheels get the grease.

The New Apathy *James M. Lindsay* 2

Choosing Engagement *William H. Luers* 9
The Missile-Defense Mistake *Igor Ivanov* 15

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Apathy

How an Uninterested Public Is Reshaping Foreign Policy

James M. Lindsay

Americans and their leaders disagree on foreign policy. Polls show that 80 percent of Americans support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but the Senate overwhelmingly rejected it. Two-thirds of Americans want to pay their country's back dues to the United Nations, but Congress took three years to appropriate the money and then demanded that the U.N. write off more than $400 million in bad debt. Nearly half of all Americans supported using ground troops in Kosovo, but the Clinton administration resisted admitting that it was even considering the option.

What explains this gap between what Americans want and what Washington does? The common answer—that politicians are misreading the public—is as mistaken as it is popular. It rests on the flawed premise that in politics, majority preferences trump all. But politicians worry less about what the public thinks about an issue than about how intensely it cares. And therein lies the great irony of the post–Cold War era: at the very moment that the United States has more influence than ever on international affairs, Americans have lost much of their interest in the world around them.

This apathetic internationalism is reshaping the politics of American foreign policy—encouraging the neglect of foreign affairs, distorting policy choices to favor the noisy few over the quiet many, and making it harder for presidents to lead. Left unchecked, these impulses will prevent the United States from capitalizing on its great power. So the most important foreign policy challenge facing the next president is not encouraging democracy in Russia, coping with a rising China, or advancing a liberal economic order. Instead, it is persuading the American people to pay more than lip service to their internationalist beliefs.

THE INTERNATIONALIST HABIT

Despite fears that Americans would turn inward when the Cold War ended, they still consistently support an internationalist foreign policy. Since 1947, the Gallup polling organization has periodically asked, "Do you think it will be best for the future of this country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay

James M. Lindsay is Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

out of world affairs?" In 1999, 61 percent of those surveyed responded that active American involvement in the world was critical—roughly in the middle of the range of responses recorded over the past 50 years.

The public's internationalist inclinations hold up when one moves from the abstract to the specific. During the Kosovo war, Gallup found that public support for "U.S. participation in NATO air strikes in Yugoslavia" reached as high as 61 percent, and the war always had more supporters than foes, despite widespread criticism of the Clinton administration's strategy. The Pew Research Center found in February that 64 percent of Americans think free trade is good for the country; 62 percent say the same about U.S. membership in the World Trade Organization. These numbers are virtually identical to those in polls taken before the failed WTO meeting in Seattle last year.

Unlike many on Capitol Hill, Americans have not embraced unilateralism. A 1998 poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that 72 percent of Americans say that the United States should not act in international crises without its allies' support. This multilateralist preference also carries over to support for international organizations, which most Americans, as polls consistently show, want to strengthen, not weaken.

Moreover, the American public's internationalist attitudes span all parts of the country and key demographic groups. Despite fears that "Generation X" would turn its back on the world because it came of age after the Cold War, polls show it to be as internationalist, if not more so, than the World War II generation. And nothing in the polls suggests that isolationism or unilateralism has much appeal.

ELIANATION

Why, then, has the public's embrace of internationalism not translated into greater political support in Washington for American engagement abroad? The answer lies in a basic rule of politics: What really counts is not how many people line up on each side of an issue but how intensely each side holds its opinions. Politicians know that opposing impassioned voters may mean looking for a new job, so silent majorities get ignored. In politics, as in the rest of life, squeaky wheels get the grease.

Consider the saga of Elián González. Roughly two out of three Americans favored sending the six-year-old back to Cuba to live with his father. But while many politicians raced to the cameras to demand that Elián be allowed to stay in the United States, few argued publicly for returning him to Cuba—because the minority of Americans who backed Elián's Miami relatives cared passionately enough about the issue to reward their friends and punish their enemies. By contrast, the majority that favored returning Elián to Cuba was unlikely to remember the boy in six months, let alone use the voting booth to punish politicians who favored letting him stay.

Intensity is crucial to the politics of foreign policy today because the public's commitment to internationalism has ebbed over the past decade. During the Cold War, foreign affairs almost always topped the country's political agenda. Gallup regularly found that 10 to 20 percent—and sometimes even more—of those polled named a foreign policy issue as the most important problem facing the United States. But

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

today most Americans dismiss foreign policy as relatively unimportant. Only two to three percent name foreign policy concerns as the most important problem facing the country, and Americans have trouble identifying foreign issues that concern them. When the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations asked people in 1998 to name the "two or three biggest foreign-policy problems facing the United States today," the most common response by far, at 21 percent, was "don't know."

The "don't know"s predominate because fewer Americans follow foreign affairs. In February 1999, as the Rambouillet summit convened, Pew found that only one in nine Americans said they followed news about Kosovo "very closely." By comparison, one in six said they closely followed the news of Joe DiMaggio's death. Or take the Senate's rejection of the CTBT, which *The New York Times* likened to the Senate's 1920 defeat of the Versailles Treaty: immediately after the CTBT vote, Pew found that half of those surveyed admitted they had heard nothing about it.

Americans ignore much of what happens overseas because they see little at stake. In September 1997, Pew asked 2,000 Americans how much impact other parts of the world had on the United States. Solid majorities answered "very little," even when asked about America's allies. (About 60 percent said that western Europe had little or no impact on their lives.)

These poll numbers all jibe with what people at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue know firsthand: Americans endorse internationalism in theory but seldom do anything about it in practice. Americans may have wanted to pay their U.N. debt, but few wrote to Congress demanding action. Similarly, most Americans supported the CTBT, but they did not descend on Washington in busloads to save it. Americans approach foreign policy the way they approach physical fitness—they understand the benefits of being in good shape, but they still avoid exercise.

THE WASTELAND

Apathetic internationalism is reshaping American foreign policy in three ways. First, it encourages politicians, who naturally gravitate toward issues that matter to the public, to neglect foreign policy. Of course, foreign affairs still matter after the Cold War, but the political credit that once came with handling them has faded. President Bush discovered this when he was attacked in 1992 for being too interested in foreign affairs and defeated by a candidate who argued that the country should focus on domestic policy. Over his two terms, Bill Clinton largely delivered what he promised, and to judge by the polls, he did not suffer for it. Foreign policy remains a low priority in the 2000 campaign.

The neglect of foreign policy is, if anything, even worse on Capitol Hill. Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee have trouble recruiting members. "Foreign Relations has been kind of a wasteland," admits Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.), a staunch internationalist. "It is not a particularly strong committee to fundraise from." The House Republicans' famous "Contract with America" ignored foreign policy (save for a plug for national missile defense and a broadside against U.N. peacekeeping), and congressional Democrats have virtually purged foreign policy from their vocabulary.

Second, apathetic internationalism empowers squeaky wheels. This happens

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

partly because politicians who abandon foreign policy for greener political pastures cede power to colleagues whose interest in foreign policy arises from personal passion. As former Representative David Skaggs (D-Colo.) noted about life on Capitol Hill, "When there are a few people who will die for the issue, and nobody else gets anywhere close to that, they can have their way."

"Skaggs' Law" clearly operated during the debates over U.N. dues and the CTBT. Once the U.N. bill passed the Senate, Representative Christopher Smith (R-N.J.) linked it to aid for international family-planning programs and for two years resisted intense pressure to back down. In the CTBT case, Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) and a few colleagues lobbied fellow Republicans and pressed Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) to hold a vote. Their zeal—and the prospect that they would make Lott's life miserable if he postponed the vote—more than outweighed the fact that 24 Republican senators had publicly asked that the treaty be withdrawn.

Apathetic internationalism also favors the noisy few because it encourages politicians to cater to groups with narrow but intense preferences. That, after all, is where the political credit lies when the broader public is looking elsewhere. Indian-Americans have used their growing political clout (membership in the Congressional Indian Caucus is nearly double that of the Congressional Study Group on Germany) to block efforts to cut aid to India and persuade Congress to condemn Pakistani "aggression" in Kashmir. Human rights activists, labor unions, and environmentalists kept Clinton from winning "fast-track" negotiating authority in trade. The extreme right has turned U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions into political poison. Of course, narrow interests have always been part of American foreign policy. But without a countervailing push from the political center, they are fast becoming its defining feature.

Third, apathetic internationalism makes it harder for presidents to lead. During the early Cold War, both political savvy and policy arguments encouraged Congress to rally around the president; public rebuffs could embolden Moscow and bring punishment at the polls. Vietnam destroyed this knee-jerk support for the president, but congressional deference survived (albeit tattered) well into the 1980s. Ronald Reagan's great ally in fights over arms control, contra aid, and other issues was moderate Democrats' reluctance to defeat his policies outright. That caution partly stemmed from policy considerations—a major public defeat would weaken the president's standing abroad—but also reflected Democrats' fear that Reagan would blame them for playing politics with national security.

But in the 1990s, with no major threat to U.S. security on the horizon and with public interest waning, the costs of challenging the president plummeted. In April 1999, during the Kosovo war, the House refused to vote to support the bombing. Not to be outdone, the Senate voted down the CTBT in October even though President Clinton and 62 senators had asked that it be withdrawn. These episodes were major departures from past practice. When Congress sought to wrest control of foreign policy from the president on issues such as Vietnam, the MX missile, and contra aid, it had vocal public support. On Kosovo and the CTBT, Congress challenged Clinton even though most Americans backed his positions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The decline in congressional deference has accompanied a growing politicization of foreign policy, for the same basic reason. When the public is engaged, foreign policy is a risky way to score political points; demonizing opponents and exaggerating policy differences energizes core supporters but alienates less fervent voters. But when the public is disengaged, foreign policy becomes—to paraphrase Clausewitz—the continuation of domestic politics by other means. The temptation to use foreign policy for partisan gain is hardly restricted to members of Congress or Republicans; witness Clinton's insistence, against all available evidence, that the CTBT had fallen victim to "the new isolationists in the Republican Party." And Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) was simply being more honest than most when he pointed out an upside to a vote against the CTBT by William Roth, a Republican senator up for reelection. "Bingo!" Biden said. "That's $200,000 worth of ads."

Without denying the enmity that many congressional Republicans reserve for Clinton, Congress is not likely to start deferring again to the White House when he leaves it. Strikingly, 45 percent of current senators and 61 percent of current representatives first took office after 1992. They have known only fractious relations with the commander in chief. Resurrecting the old norms that members should defer to presidents and leave politics at the water's edge will hardly be automatic, and members are certainly under no pressure from the public to behave. In 1998, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that 43 percent of Americans thought that Congress' role in foreign policy was about right—the highest number recorded since the Council's quadrennial surveys began in 1974.

MALIGN NEGLECT

The consequences of apathetic internationalism—however much they please isolationists, pandering politicians, and ethnic groups relishing their newfound clout—should trouble anyone who believes that the United States must be engaged in world affairs. They are eroding America's capacity to lead and encouraging what Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers has called the "malign neglect" of U.S. global standing.

International affairs spending provides a clear case in point. Just as everyone wants to go to heaven but no one wants to die, politicians routinely deride the idea that global leadership can be had on the cheap but do little to adequately fund American diplomacy. The fiscal year 2000 budget allotted only $22.3 billion to international affairs—a 40 percent drop in real spending from the peak of the mid-1980s even though the overall federal budget is running a surplus for the first time in decades. The resulting tin-cup diplomacy is penny-wise and pound-foolish. The few tens of millions the United States will save by lowering its U.N. dues, for instance, hardly make up for the damage done to the U.N. as an instrument for U.S. foreign policy.

This myopia about what the United States needs to accomplish its goals abroad goes beyond international affairs spending. Human rights, labor, and environmental groups blocked fast-track and cost the United States the opportunity to push ahead with the trade liberalization that most Americans believe will enhance their prosperity. Narrow-minded laws like the Helms-Burton sanctions, which punish other countries for trading with Cuba, needlessly squander allied goodwill

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

while offering almost no prospect of success. How can any country sustain its foreign policy if it continually gives short shrift to its national interests?

Malign neglect also erodes the belief that the country as a whole benefits from giving the president a degree of deference in foreign affairs. Although presidents possess no monopoly on foreign policy virtue, history has shown that Congress simply cannot run foreign affairs. To be sure, Congress serves the public interest when it scrubs presidential initiatives and advances alternatives of its own. But one can have too much congressional assertiveness as well as too little. The more Congress reverses the president—especially when it does so gratuitously, as in the CTBT case—the more timid the White House will be. Moreover, presidential defeats diminish other countries' confidence in America's resolve and in the White House's ability to deliver.

Finally, malign neglect makes it easier to forget that foreign policy should be as much about shaping the world to America's liking as it is about meeting threats from abroad. America is prosperous and secure today because Cold War internationalists, with broad public support, had a vision of the world they wanted to create. Anyone searching Washington today for a similar vision will come away disappointed. Politicians focused on domestic affairs do not see the outside world as a source of opportunity; narrow interests are not looking to transform the world. Historians will look back on the first decade of the post–Cold War era as a squandered opportunity.

KEEPING THE FAITH

The key to fighting apathetic internationalism is persuading the public to act on its internationalist preferences. If politicians believe they will be rewarded for defending broad interests and penalized for tending to narrow ones, they will pay more heed to foreign policy, and squeaky wheels will lose out to a not-so-silent majority.

But how to raise the political stakes in foreign policy? A renewed threat to American security would clearly do the trick. So might a recession. Just as people appreciate the wonders of indoor plumbing only when it breaks down, tough economic times will drive home to many Americans just how much their prosperity depends on an internationalist foreign policy. When the Asian economic crisis suddenly deprived Midwestern farmers of some of their biggest markets, they and their representatives became ardent supporters of the International Monetary Fund and new markets abroad.

It would be better and less painful, of course, to raise the political stakes on foreign policy through persuasion. But who could play this role? Certainly not the public itself, and probably not Congress. Despite congressional moderates' laudable efforts to rejuvenate the political center after the CTBT fiasco, Congress' internal divisions render it incapable of articulating a clear foreign policy message.

Business, however, could do much better. It has both the resources and the incentives to mount a campaign for internationalism. Exports account for more than ten percent of the U.S. economy, and American businesses large and small sell their products abroad. Meanwhile, the malign neglect of America's global standing is undermining the international infrastructure that promotes U.S. business expansion abroad.

But if business is going to raise the political stakes on foreign policy, it must take its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

case to the country. The traditional corporate strategy of focusing on trade and working the corridors of power in Washington when a major vote approached made sense when an internationalist consensus dominated Capitol Hill. It does not work when the political case for engagement is weak and its opponents vocal. Indeed, antitrade groups redefined the terms of the debate at Seattle—and put the future of freer trade at risk—not because they had the better arguments but because they were the only ones on the playing field.

Business appears to have learned from Seattle. In the battle for permanent normal trading relations for China, for example, groups such as the Business Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce, and the American Farm Bureau mobilized executives, workers, and farmers around the country to lobby members of Congress. This grassroots approach could be broadened into a sustained campaign to remind Americans what they have at stake overseas. One initiative worth emulating and expanding is USA*Engage, a broad-based coalition of nearly 700 business and agricultural groups that opposes the proliferation of unilateral U.S. economic sanctions.

Private foundations could also pitch in by going beyond scholarly research, however important, to underwrite outreach programs to educate Americans about the importance of U.S. engagement. These efforts should be linked to similar efforts by nongovernmental organizations such as the United Nations Association and local councils on foreign relations. These education campaigns will not magically transform Americans into ardent internationalists, but they could help.

Even under the best of circumstances, however, civil society can do only so much. The ultimate responsibility for convincing the public to act on its internationalist beliefs lies with the White House. In a 500-channel world, no one can dominate the political agenda and mobilize support the way the president can. Apathetic internationalism makes it harder for presidents to lead, but it does not make it impossible. After all, Clinton scored some important foreign policy victories: enlarging NATO, ending the war in Bosnia, and securing approval for the North American Free Trade Agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the Chemical Weapons Convention, to name only the most well known. He won because, unlike in his other forays into foreign policy, he committed the full powers of his office to winning, built bipartisan coalitions in Congress, and made the case to the American public. That mix of vision and dedication—simple to sketch but difficult to do—is the recipe for future presidential leadership in foreign policy.

With Clinton's term all but over, the responsibility for persuading Americans to abandon their apathetic internationalism will lie with the next president. Both Al Gore and George W. Bush are internationalists by inclination, but their predilections are beside the point; Clinton's leanings were internationalist as well. Rather, the issue is whether the next president will devote time and political capital to persuade Congress and the public of engagement's importance. Even then, there will be no quick fix. Absent a clear and present danger, the temptation to dismiss foreign policy as a trifle will remain powerful. But the malign neglect of America's world standing will worsen badly if the next president turns out to be an apathetic internationalist.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Choosing Engagement

Uniting the U.N. with U.S. Interests

William H. Luers

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has pursued a successful international economic strategy through active engagement in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Yet it has failed to make similar commitments in the areas of politics, security, and law. It remains deeply ambivalent about the United Nations and resistant to emerging international law for various reasons: its superpower status, its tradition of "American exceptionalism," and its long history of insular attitudes toward other cultures.

Today, the United States considers itself the most powerful and the most democratic of states, committed to peace while standing ready to fight for what is right. As world powers go, it sees itself as the most benign in history. This self-image may be largely justified. Nevertheless, it is increasingly clear that U.S. interests are best served by working with other nations and international bodies to reduce the traditional security challenges. In addition, the United States must tackle the intensifying levels of brutalization against civilian populations, particularly women and children, due to ethnic conflict, mercenary leaders, and criminal gangs. Such civil strife creates millions of refugees and displaced persons and damages the health and economic well-being of many millions more. The gradual spread of these phenomena over ever larger regions will inevitably affect the United States, even if it does not directly seem to hurt American interests now.

The troubled peacekeeping efforts of recent years—from Kosovo to central Africa—signal an urgent need to improve our capacity for conflict management. A major obstacle is the current American posture. In most instances, such as Sierra Leone, the United States will not put its troops on the ground. Even worse, it wants to get by on the cheap—as amply illustrated by congressional resistance to paying the full American share of U.N. peacekeeping efforts. The next president and Congress must commit themselves to strengthening the United Nations system to handle these challenges. At the very least, they must stop scapegoating an institution that the United States is unwilling to support adequately.

WILLIAM H. LUERS is President and Chairman of the United Nations Association of the United States of America.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIXABLE FLAWS

First, however, the United Nations must honestly assess its own strengths and weaknesses. Limits on its efficiency partly stem from its multinational character. The 188 member states reduce General Assembly activities to interminable speech-making, while their demands for a quota of U.N. jobs hamper the secretary-general and other agency heads in selecting staff according to merit. But there are signs of genuine reform. A recent report from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) gives high marks to Secretary-General Kofi Annan for improving the quality of staff and putting in place effective management practices.

The U.N.'s financial weakness severely limits its capacity to respond to new challenges and prepare for unanticipated ones. At American congressional insistence, for example, the U.N. Secretariat's budget has been frozen at about $1.3 billion for the past four years. After accounting for inflation and delayed or defaulted payments by the United States and other nations, this means that the U.N. has far fewer funds to meet greatly expanded obligations.

Much of the financial weakness undermining the U.N. could be cured by a unilateral U.S. decision to pay its dues. Arrears in U.S. peacekeeping funds make up the lion's share of Washington's U.N. debt. These arrears largely result from the chronic skirmishes between the executive and the legislative branches. Both branches agree that a reduction in the U.S. assessment for peacekeeping must be achieved but differ on the strategy by which to achieve it. Despite recent efforts to improve coordination on peacekeeping needs, Congress has held up more than $200 million in peacekeeping monies for 2000 that was already in the budget that it had appropriated. Moreover, it seems likely to approve for the 2001 budget a sum substantially below what will be required for next year's higher peacekeeping costs. A large portion of the arrears ($658 million) that a Senate agreement was to settle—provided that the U.N. members met American conditions—will go to reimburse other states for their troops' role in peacekeeping operations.

The congressionally imposed conditions for payment are viewed as onerous and are unlikely to be accepted this year by many U.N. member states, despite the prodigious efforts of Richard Holbrooke, the American ambassador to the U.N. Moreover, Congress is resisting paying current funding requirements. The failure to pay all current assessments and some of the arrears raises once again the specter that the United States will automatically lose its vote in the General Assembly, placing the United States in company with "deadbeats" such as Iraq and "failed states" such as Somalia and Rwanda.

Beyond the funding issue, the most obvious shortcoming of the United Nations is its lack of standby capacity—which Congress opposes—for peacekeeping, policing, and administration in troubled regions. This has been underscored during the past year by the U.N. experiences in Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone. The Security Council must reconsider the deployment of lightly armed U.N. peacekeeping forces into civil wars, a function not foreseen by the U.N. Charter. And the secretary-general should refuse certain tasks in war-torn countries unless he is empowered to raise—on short notice—adequately armed forces, trained police cadres, and a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



CORBIS-BETTMANN

Don't tread on me: Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) speaks to the U.N. Security Council, January 20, 2000

substantial body of civil administrators. Such a refusal would force member states either to provide the U.N. with the increased capacity to respond or to acknowledge openly that they intend to do nothing to manage the snowballing crisis.

The Security Council is only as effective in conflict management as the permanent members want it to be. In the Gulf War, strong U.S. leadership led to resolute action. In Kosovo, deep divisions led NATO to avoid the Security Council altogether. In other cases, ambiguous resolutions led to confusion in execution. Without some agreed strategy among the five permanent members on how to improve the staffing, structure, and purpose of peacekeeping, the Security Council will continue to issue ambivalent or contradictory resolutions.

The various U.N. agencies that address health, food, development, and the plight of refugees and disadvantaged children are the unsung heroes of the U.N. system. Yet in the field, they have duplicated efforts and indulged in turf battles that inhibit the efficient delivery of assistance. This complication can confuse nongovernmental and governmental organizations and contribute to the reputation of U.N. ineffectiveness. In part, this competitive behavior stems from the independent mandates and separate funding of these agencies. Still, the GAO report noted progress resulting from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the secretary-general's efforts to improve coordination among U.N. agencies and to establish a strategic framework for their field operations.

Another weakness of the U.N. stems from the often-cited lack of support for the institution by the American public. Yet public opinion surveys consistently show 60 to 70 percent support for the United Nations. To be sure, public affirmation is broad, not deep, leaving the congressional field of combat too often controlled by those with strongly negative views. And serious misunderstandings persist. For example, there is a widespread public impression that the United States pays 20 percent or more of its federal budget for nonmilitary assistance programs around the world, when in fact the figure is less than 1 percent. Similarly widespread is the belief that the U.N. environment is hostile to the United States, when in fact countries voted with the United States 86 percent of the time in the General Assembly last year.

Another supposed source of weakness is the Washington mythology about "U.N. failures." American legislative and executive officials employ Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Kosovo as code words for U.N. incompetence. In most of these crises, there were U.N. management shortcomings, and the secretary-general has since published candid studies outlining some U.N. mistakes. But the Security Council's permanent members, who wrote and helped execute the resolutions calling for the peacekeeping actions, have failed to make similar revelations of their own severe shortcomings in supporting the authorized actions. Both the failures and the successes of U.N. operations need full airing so that the United Nations and its member states will be better prepared for future missions.

It is irresponsible for U.S. political leaders to blame the U.N. as if it were an independent entity with resources to carry out military action on its own. A most extreme version of this canard, voiced by Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) last January before the Security Council, warned the U.N. not to aspire to "power and authority over nation states" with itself "as the central authority of a new international order of global laws and global governance." No member state supports such "authority." The truth is that the U.N. without its member states can do nothing. Its member states provide the military, money, and human resources that define U.N. missions. The U.N., simply put, has no power or way of its own to enforce its authority over others—least of all over its most powerful member, the United States.

STARTING AFRESH

The new president, unshackled from the burden of failed interventions and former political errors, can clear the air and address such issues as unsuccessful peacekeeping strategies and unpaid bills. A truly bold president could also launch fresh initiatives. An early order of business will be to determine with other states what assignments the U.N. should undertake (peacekeeping and humanitarian relief) and those that should be handled by others (wars). The U.N.'s peacekeeping capabilities should then be strengthened by such measures as the building of a command and control operation, standby police and military units, development of trained administrators and experts for nation-building, and training facilities. A special regime for enforcement—drawing on well-trained regional forces under U.N. authority—will

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be needed for regions where civil wars threaten to become chronic, such as Africa and the Balkans. The complexity of these tasks is daunting and unprecedented. It is little wonder that these issues have given rise to discord—all the more reason for strong American leadership.

With Congress, the next U.S. president should also develop a phased process for achieving payment of annual dues within 30 days of assessment rather than delaying them until year's end. The United States would thereby set the norm for other nations (that have begun to imitate its ruinously bad habit of delaying payments) and greatly improve the U.N. system's cash flow. As a quid pro quo with Congress, the president would pledge to work with the secretary-general to encourage reforms already instituted within the Secretariat and other agencies and to improve management training and coordination with nongovernmental organizations and the private sector.

Another innovative step would be to assign the policy and budgetary relations with the U.N. specialized agencies to their respective U.S. government departments rather than to the State Department. For example, responsibility for the World Health Organization (WHO) should rest with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which already has a highly developed relationship with WHO. The U.S. portion of the WHO's funding would then be included in the HHS annual budget. The same model would apply to other agencies and departments. The resulting structure would strengthen the ability of U.S. government departments to improve the work of their international counterpart agencies. Closer collaboration also would provide incentive for prompt dues payments.

A parallel, if controversial, innovation would be to reassign major responsibility for U.S. support of U.N. peace operations from the State Department to the Defense Department. This switch would give priority to a professional military evaluation of when and how to enter a conflict or postconflict zone, while the Pentagon would form a closer working relationship with international partners doing the hard work of conflict management. The State Department, no doubt unhappy at such a change, would still retain responsibility for U.S. decisions in the U.N. Security Council. The Pentagon would be responsible for executing missions involving U.S. personnel and cover the U.S. share out of its budget.

The new president also needs to take a fresh look at sanctions. The applications of sanctions, as foreseen by the U.N. Charter, have been more effective when imposed for specific purposes, with support from all U.N. member states. Sanctions by the United States alone or in league with a few allies have for the most part only punished innocent civilians without deposing tyrannical rulers. Such sanctions have often contributed to corruption and bred popular hostility against the sanctioners within the targeted societies. U.S. leadership could contribute to a more refined and selective approach to this controversial means of exerting international pressure on offending or criminal governments.

In addition, the new president should lead a review of the major international treaties and conventions that the United States has thus far failed to sign or to ratify—treaties establishing an international criminal court, banning land mines, and approving a comprehensive

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nuclear test ban, and conventions dealing with children's rights and discrimination against women, for example. A strengthened U.S. relationship with the U.N. does not imply complete agreement with everything U.N. member states do. But these global treaty regimes embody values and priorities important to Americans. Participation in them increases the pressure on retrograde governments to follow suit. The ideas of democracy, respect for human rights, and observance of international law are major contributions that the United States has made to the international community. They are the cornerstone of a peaceful world. Americans should encourage them further.

For more than a decade, the United States has been seeking a postcontainment strategy for dealing with a changing world. The United Nations, meanwhile, has become an institution that is far more complex yet more open than when it was founded. Today, the secretary-general envisages a world of partnerships in which the United Nations is the umbrella for a wide variety of groups from the private sector, civil society, and governments. He has been particularly active in engaging the business community and nongovernmental organizations. These various groups will work together in global networks to find solutions to world problems.

Despite chronic woes that threaten the sustainability of some of the U.N.'s most important work, the United States has a vital interest in strengthening the U.N. system. Acting alone is not a sustainable option. Political "realists" who oppose U.S. involvement in conflicts that do not directly affect American interests often fail to see the value in building the U.N.'s capacity to manage strife around the world. In fact, a healthy and creative United Nations will diminish the pressures for direct American intervention and allow for a much broader sharing of the costs.

The U.N. is the central organization through which the United States can pursue its national interests; encourage others to take on the new challenges of peacekeeping, development, and humanitarian relief; share the burden in paying for those tasks; continue to exercise leadership in shaping decision-making on these key issues; and tap into the American proclivity for generosity and idealism. The American people are far ahead of recent U.S. administrations and congresses on these urgent matters. The next president should reconnect these American instincts with American interests by strengthening the U.N. system.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Missile-Defense Mistake

Undermining Strategic Stability and the ABM Treaty

Igor Ivanov

Among the global challenges of the twentieth century, none was more important than eliminating the danger of nuclear war. Together, Russia, the United States, and other countries substantially minimized this threat and began the process of limiting and reducing nuclear arsenals. This effort resulted from a universal recognition of the strategic stability concept, the cornerstone of which is the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Strategic stability stemmed from mutual renunciation of strategic defense systems against intercontinental ballistic missiles, which eliminated incentives for the Soviet Union and the United States to build up offensive nuclear capabilities. Both states switched instead to a policy of mutual deterrence, at reduced levels of strategic armaments. In other words, the rejection of the nuclear "shield" made the nuclear "sword" less dangerous.

With the ABM treaty as its root, a system of international accords on arms control and disarmament sprang up in the past decades. It includes the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties—SALT I and SALT II—as well as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty eliminating two classes of nuclear weapons—intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. There followed the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaties—START I and START II—the implementation of which will reduce nuclear warheads fourfold. Coming next is the drafting of START III to achieve still deeper cuts in strategic offensive arms.

Inseparable from this process is the creation of global and regional regimes of nuclear nonproliferation and the conclusion of agreements on the prohibition of nuclear tests, the elimination of chemical weapons, and the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments. These agreements, comprising the modern architecture of international security, rest on the ABM treaty. If the foundation is destroyed, this interconnected system will collapse, nullifying 30 years of efforts by the world community.

In overcoming its ideological division the world has not become more stable. The post–Cold War threats of regional conflicts, aggressive separatism, interethnic strife, international terrorism, and organized crime in conditions of globalization

---

IGOR IVANOV is Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

can be effectively met only by the concerted efforts of the world community. This is attainable, however, only when international relations, first of all among the nuclear powers, become stable and predictable. By planning to deploy a national antiballistic missile system prohibited by the ABM treaty, the United States is heading in the opposite direction. This is why such plans gravely concern Russia and many other countries, including the closest allies of the United States. Since the Cold War, the United States has not contemplated an action with such far-reaching international consequences. These consequences need to be thoroughly weighed against the hoped-for advantages of a national antiballistic missile system. Is such a system worth serious deterioration in Russia-U.S. relations, global strategic stability, and, ultimately, U.S. security?

A GAME WITH NO RULES

Washington claims that an antimissile defense system will not be directed against Russia and is a defensive measure to assure U.S. national security against new, post–Cold War threats. Why, then, must the measure be categorically opposed? After all, the United States and Russia no longer consider each other adversaries, and they face virtually the same threats and challenges, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles—the threat cited by Washington to justify deploying an antimissile defense system. Russia is no less interested than the United States is in finding an effective response to this challenge. But it is convinced that remedies should be sought together or, at a minimum, should not be made to the detriment of each other's interests. Globalization, of course, does not cancel the national interests of Russia or the United States, which do not always coincide. That is why Russia is searching for balanced and well-considered solutions that ensure the security of these two and other countries and international strategic stability as a whole, while preserving the impressive positive results accumulated in recent Russian-American relations.

Does there exist, in principle, the possibility of creating a national antiballistic missile system while preserving the 1972 ABM treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability? Lifting the ban on deployment would deprive the treaty of its essence. Some compromise modification of the ABM treaty would therefore be illusory. Another crucial element of the treaty calls for continued talks on limiting strategic offensive arms. Here, too, the gutting of its essence would have a destructive domino effect for the existing system of arms control and disarmament agreements. Thus, in accordance with the statement made when START I was signed, Russia will regard the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM treaty or the treaty's substantial violation as an exceptional circumstance giving Russia the right to withdraw from START I. In effect, a similar provision was turned into law by the Russian parliament in ratifying START II. Obviously, a direct link also exists with the drafting of START III.

If the United States unilaterally withdraws from the ABM treaty, Russia will no longer be formally bound by its obligations to reduce strategic armaments, and the very process of nuclear disarmament will be inevitably terminated, if not reversed. But Russia's concerns are by no means reduced to formalities. The capability of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Unfriendly skies: Missile defense display near the Capitol, Washington, D.C., April 1998

a national antimissile defense system to undermine Russia's nuclear deterrence is not alleviated by contentions that this system will be of a "thin" or "limited" nature. It is common knowledge that global potentials are built into the architecture of any national antimissile defense system, even at initial stages. For example, a ring of ground radar stations, capable of fulfilling antimissile defense tasks, including those being deployed in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Norway, would be able to block the trajectories of Russian ballistic missiles. Russia would be forced to respond with neutralizing measures to ensure its own security. It is admitted in the United States that even if the U.S. antimissile defense system covers the entire territory of Russia, Russia would have sufficient means to overcome it. Indeed, such possibilities do exist. This factor, among other things,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has played a substantial role in the Russian parliament's decision to ratify START II. But such neutralizing measures are an unwanted option for Russia, which is focused now on solving domestic economic problems and needs a stable international situation, not a renewed arms race.

The American experts recognize that present plans to deploy a national antimissile defense represent the initial stage only; the system will have to be further deployed and upgraded. It will acquire new infrastructure and functional tasks. So with any deployment, the genie would be out of the jar, and then it would be not the evolution of external threats but the progress of military technology in the interests of the military-industrial complex that would dictate the rules of the game—or, to be more precise, the game with no rules. The history of the Soviet-American nuclear arms race in the 1970s and 1980s is proof of this. As long as nuclear arsenals exist, Russia and the United States will not be able to do without the ABM treaty. Only on this understanding should we search for a solution to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies.

INFLATING THE THREAT

A realistic assessment of "new missile threats" would characterize them as hypothetical and not sufficient cause for sacrificing the ABM treaty. None of the "problem" states, as they are now referred to in the West, are likely to acquire missiles capable of reaching the United States in the foreseeable future. Moreover, it is doubtful that they would consider using them against the United States, either directly or through "missile blackmail." Their missile programs respond to regional uncertainties. This is why it would be more appropriate to speak of "problem regions" where a military conflict may break out, rather than "problem states." Should there be such a crisis, its settlement would require mainly political and diplomatic efforts.

Nevertheless, the creation of a national antimissile defense system would also have negative international consequences that would destabilize not only Russia-U.S. relations but others as well. China could be expected to take countermeasures. A new nuclear arms race could be expected in South Asia and other parts of the world. Europe would be affected, too. This progression would inevitably raise the question of the future of the INF treaty.

Nuclear nonproliferation would also be dangerously harmed. At the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference held in New York this past spring, many countries called for vigorous measures to cut nuclear weapons stockpiles as a necessary condition for strengthening the treaty. Further nuclear arms reductions will not happen without the ABM treaty, and thus the viability of the NPT itself would be threatened.

Clearly, little deterrent influence could be brought to bear on "problem" countries. Indeed, greater global and regional instability would basically encourage arms races, including the use of technologies that are still only hypothetical. For example, military experts warn of the danger of "suitcase" delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, which can be stealthily transported to other countries without the risk of retribution for terrorists or the need to penetrate missile defenses. The creation of a national antimissile defense system not only fails to provide an effective

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

response to missile threats but could actually create new security challenges to the United States and the world community.

A sound approach to the problem of missile proliferation starts with the recognition that it is not the cause but the effect of more serious challenges to the world community. In other words, it is necessary to treat the disease rather than its symptoms. This requires effective political and diplomatic mechanisms to govern and legally strengthen global processes that create an international atmosphere of stability and predictability. Russia and the United States must concentrate on creating such mechanisms while it is still possible to prevent and neutralize new threats.

In particular, it is important to ensure that no country feels cornered or threatened. This will only prod such a country into looking for ways to defend itself. "Problem" countries should be given a real alternative of positive engagement in global and regional security systems. Actually, this is true of all countries, not only of those the United States considers states of concern. Each should be confident that its security can be effectively ensured by political methods and rests on a solid foundation of international law. Otherwise, many countries, even the most loyal ones, will see no alternative to weapons that have the greatest deterrent potential.

Reducing missile threats requires an approach that, unlike the planned national antimissile defense system, would neither destroy the existing system of arms control agreements nor provoke offensive buildups by threatened countries. The fundamental principle must be the most active engagement of the world community in joint efforts to strengthen strategic stability.

THE ROAD AHEAD

The world community is vitally interested in further cuts in Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons. It is not coincidental that in 1999, when the problem of national missile defense was lower on the international agenda, 80 countries supported the U.N. General Assembly resolution protecting the ABM treaty. At the same time, as the NPT review conference showed, the world is closely watching Russian and U.S. nuclear disarmament.

In addition to parliamentary ratification of START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Russia has assumed an active and constructive position on START III. It is prepared to agree to a ceiling of 1,500 nuclear warheads for each party instead of the 2,000–2,500 previously agreed upon. Russia has ratified agreements reached in 1997 in New York that clearly delimited the difference between strategic and nonstrategic missile defense. These agreements, if ratified by the United States, will foster cooperative defenses against nonstrategic missiles, the threatened use of which may become relevant in the future.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to create a pan-European nonstrategic missile-defense system emerged as a logical follow-up. A number of joint steps would be required: assessment of the nature and scale of missile proliferation and possible missile threats, development of a concept of pan-European nonstrategic missile defense and a procedure for its development and deployment, and establishment of a joint early-warning center. Also part of the proposal are joint staff exercises, joint research and experiments, development of a nonstrategic missile-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defense system, and creation of nonstrategic antimissile units to protect peacekeeping forces and noncombatants.

A nonstrategic antimissile system should serve the interests of all Europe, not just one alliance. An added benefit of the Russian approach is that similar multilateral systems could be created in the future in other regions. It is also important to cooperate in creating a global missile and missile-technology control system. An international meeting of experts in Moscow in March confirmed the world's positive response to this Russian initiative. The system of global control is not an attempt to replace the Missile-Technology Control Regime (MTCR). On the contrary, it will strengthen the MTCR by providing a link between its members and nonmembers.

Finally, Russia welcomes efforts to foster constructive dialogue with the countries whose developments in this area concern the United States. In particular, the initiation of such a dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and, especially, the steps taken this year toward national reconciliation between the two Koreas demonstrate that political and diplomatic ways of resolving these concerns can have encouraging results. Russia has also been instrumental in this process, as demonstrated by the recent visit to the DPRK by President Putin.

Thus there is a real alternative to attempts to destroy strategic stability: a program of joint, constructive actions in the interests of Russian, U.S., and global security. Russia firmly believes that such a program can be implemented and that no other reasonable alternative exists.

The discussions, including bilateral meetings, between Presidents Putin and Clinton reaffirm that Russia and the United States should continue seeking mutually acceptable solutions. Despite some difficulties and disagreements, the positive development of Russia-U.S. relations should not change. Initial steps have been taken, such as the bilateral agreement to establish in Moscow the Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notification of Missile Launches. Russia believes that representatives of the European Union, China, and other countries should also be involved. More can be done jointly to prevent the proliferation of missile capabilities, including export controls on sensitive technologies. Finally, not only the parties but the entire world will benefit from Russia-U.S. cooperation on nonstrategic missile defense systems. Regional systems could be created with the participation of all interested countries that abide by the NPT and the CTBT.

The maintenance of strategic stability is not a one-time action. It requires constant attention from the world community and leadership from Russia and the United States. The importance of strategic stability for international security is so great that it must not be made subject to politics, domestic considerations, or unilateral foreign policy. This is the only way to ensure stability, prosperity, and a democratic world order in the twenty-first century.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Essays

WAYNE MILLER/MAGNUM PHOTOS

Hiroshima, 1945

Between Hiroshima and the end of the Cold War, America went from seeking to abolish nuclear arms to believing in their virtue.

The Folly of Arms Control *Jonathan Schell* 22

Africa's Mess, Mugabe's Mayhem *Robert I. Rotberg* 47
A Chilean Model for Russia *José Piñera* 62
Redesigning Foreign Aid *Carol Lancaster* 74
Out-of-Control Immigration *James Goldsborough* 89
Plaintiff's Diplomacy *Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco* 102

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Folly of Arms Control

Jonathan Schell

WHY THERE IS NO NUCLEAR MIDDLE GROUND

HISTORY OFTEN places before the world a problem whose solution lies outside the bounds of contemporary political acceptability. Such was the case, for example, in the 1930s, when the rise of Hitler posed a threat to the European democracies that they lacked the resolve to face. To check Nazi aggression, most historians now agree, the democracies would have had to oppose it early and resolutely, as Winston Churchill advocated. But Churchill's prescriptions were beyond the pale of mainstream political thinking at the time, and he was forced "into the wilderness," as he famously put it. Not until the late 1930s did his ideas win political acceptance, and by then the price of stopping Hitler was World War II.

Vietnam offers another example. In retrospect, among the many outcomes under discussion at the time, only two were really possible. One was war without end—the open, unlimited occupation of Vietnam by American forces. The other was withdrawal and defeat. But the political costs of either—on the one hand, of frankly imposing American rule on that country for an indefinite period; on the other, of "losing" Vietnam—were considered prohibitive. Deception and self-deception abounded on all sides. Those who opposed the war counseled withdrawal, but usually without admitting that this meant defeat. Those who supported the war pretended that victory was near—that light was dawning at the end of the proverbial tunnel. Only temporizing, middling policies—first, surreptitious escalation, then "Vietnamization"—that postponed the hard choice were within political bounds. The price was paid by the people of Vietnam and the United States.

JONATHAN SCHELL is the author of *The Fate of the Earth*, *The Abolition*, and *The Gift of Time*. He is a former staff writer for *The New Yorker*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



A contrast is often drawn between idealistic and realistic policies. But the choices posed by Hitler's rise and the Vietnam War were different. They were between political realism—bound hand and foot by a conventional wisdom out of touch with events—and the reality of those events, which we might call circumstantial reality. The nuclear predicament in the post–Cold War period presents the United States and the world with another choice of this kind. Once again, political reality and circumstantial reality—what Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn once called the "pitiless crowbar of events"—are colliding. The real alternatives—the ones that can actually occur—are at present found politically unacceptable, while the politically acceptable choices are all unreal.

These real alternatives are, on the one hand, the unrestricted proliferation of nuclear weapons—leading to what the late nuclear theorist Albert Wohlstetter some time ago called a "nuclear-armed crowd" and what Harvard's Graham Allison has more recently called "nuclear anarchy"—and, on the other, the abolition of nuclear weapons by international agreement. The current American policy is to try to stop proliferation while simultaneously continuing to hold on to its own nuclear arsenal indefinitely. But these objectives are contradictory. The policy based on them is the equivalent—in the context of the nuclear dilemma as it exists at the opening of the twenty-first century—of appeasement in the 1930s and surreptitious escalation and Vietnamization in the late 1960s and early 1970s. To govern is to choose. The current policy is a way of avoiding choice—

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a policy without traction in the world as it really is. Meanwhile, as in the earlier dilemmas, both the danger and the cost of dealing with it mount. For in the absence of a decision, events are drifting toward one of the real possible outcomes, namely, uncontrolled proliferation. In politics as in physics, entropy is a recipe for anarchy.

THE CRISIS OF ARMS CONTROL

THE RISE in nuclear danger is already apparent in an across-the-board crisis that has developed in the last two or three years in the regime of nuclear arms control. The fabric of nuclear arms control is woven of four main strands, each the product of decades of negotiation. These were not conceived as parts of a grand design, but over time they came to possess a certain coherence.

The first strand is the Moscow-Washington negotiations—first those that led to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), then those that have forged the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II)—to reduce the twin mountains of offensive nuclear weapons built up during the Cold War. The second strand, which is closely entwined with the first, is the attempt to rein in defensive antinuclear systems. Its centerpiece is the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, in which the United States and the Soviet Union each agreed to field no more than one limited-range anti–nuclear missile system. Defensive limits are essential for offensive limits because a defensive buildup can upset any negotiated offensive balance.

The third strand is the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), perhaps the most impressive and successful arms control treaty ever negotiated and the foundation stone of any hope for nuclear sanity in the post–Cold War world. Under its provisions, two classes of nations were created—nations without nuclear weapons that agreed to forego them, and nations that possessed them and were permitted, for a time, to go on possessing them. Today, 182 nations have ratified the NPT as non-nuclear powers, in return for which they have been given access to certain technology for nuclear energy, while five countries—the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France—belong to the NPT as nuclear powers. Four countries remain outside the treaty. Three—Israel, India, and Pakistan—have nuclear weapons, and one—Cuba—does not.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The NPT does not, however, envision a permanent two-tier system of nuclear haves and have-nots. The nuclear powers are committed under the treaty's Article VI to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

The fourth strand is the test ban negotiations—the grandfather of arms control measures, dating from the Eisenhower administration. Like the NPT, to which they are a crucial adjunct, the test ban talks are global. The Atmospheric Test Ban was signed and ratified in 1963. Its successor, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), would slow arms races since testing is considered necessary for many kinds of nuclear-arms innovations. Companion efforts are the negotiations to ban the production of fissionable materials, the negotiations to tighten restrictions on the spread of missile technology, and the calls to take nuclear weapons off of alert status.

When the Cold War ended, the prospects for a steady strengthening of all four of these strands looked better than ever. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 promised a sharp decline in nuclear danger—the more so as no new global political struggle arose to take the Cold War's place. The mere relaxation of the struggle under Mikhail Gorbachev had given new impetus to START. In the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed in 1987, all intermediate-range missiles were banned from the European theater, and under the 1991 START I agreement, strategic warheads were to be reduced to about 7,000 on each side. The START II agreement, which would reduce strategic warheads to 3,000–3,500 on each side, was signed in 1992, and the outlook for early ratification by both sides appeared favorable. The number of countries that had signed the NPT was steadily rising. A positive synergy among the different negotiations seemed to be at work. Success in START and the CTBT promised to secure and strengthen the NPT bargain; a comprehensive test ban would help put a lid on proliferation; and an end to proliferation would encourage the nuclear powers to relinquish their arsenals. The convention banning biological weapons and the negotiations to found a convention banning chemical weapons (ratified by the Senate in 1998) suggested that the world was turning slowly but surely against weapons of mass destruction in general. Above all, the direction

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was right. Taken in their entirety, the world's nuclear arsenals seemed to be caught in a tightening net of treaties and agreements that, if they did not end nuclear danger altogether, would certainly reduce it radically. Nuclear weapons began to look like a thing of the past, and they all but disappeared from public consciousness.

Ten years later, nuclear danger is growing again, and the net of restrictions is rending. India conducted five tests in May 1998, and Pakistan responded with seven, producing the world's first nuclear confrontation entirely unrelated to the Cold War. In the summer of 1999, an official commission in India, borrowing a leaf from the American playbook of the 1960s, recommended the creation and deployment of a deterrent arsenal based on a triad of forces delivering nuclear bombs from air, land, and sea. North Korea has engaged in on-again, off-again efforts to build nuclear weapons and missiles for their delivery. Saddam Hussein of Iraq, who was forced after the 1991 Gulf War to endure the presence of U.N. weapons inspectors, has thrown them out. Earlier this year, the CIA reported that it was unable to assure Americans that Iran did not already have the wherewithal for building nuclear weapons. The weapons programs in North Korea, Iraq, and Iran have alarmed Congress, which now seeks to deploy an antinuclear national missile defense (NMD) as soon as technically feasible, placing the ABM treaty in jeopardy. The United States has asked Russia to amend the treaty to permit the deployment of NMD, but Russia has refused on the ground that NMD would destabilize the offensive nuclear arms balance. The threat to the ABM treaty in turn threatens START II, whose implementation has been conditioned by Russia on the ABM treaty's integrity. A deployment of antimissile defenses in Taiwan or Japan, which the Clinton administration has discussed with those countries, could lead China to build up its offensive arms. Even the United States' closest allies, the principal members of NATO, are alarmed by the unilateral character of the American decision to deploy defenses when ready. They fear not only that the missile deployment will revive arms races with Russia and China but that the United States, feeling safe behind its shield, will leave Europe to face the renewed danger alone. Meanwhile, Russia's doubtful control over

Ten years after the Cold War ended, nuclear danger is growing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials (control to which the United States has contributed $2.3 billion per year under the Nunn-Lugar legislation) increases the danger that not merely governments but terrorist groups may obtain and use one or more nuclear weapons. Finally, in 1999, the Senate voted down the CTBT.

But the full extent of the jeopardy of arms control does not appear until the interrelationships between these reverses are considered. What if North Korea fires a ballistic missile over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean, as it did in 1998? Forthwith, the Senate votes to deploy NMD, even though it has not yet been shown to be technically feasible, and the administration announces that it will not be stopped from deployment by objections from Russia, which then draws back from implementing START II. These reverses, of course, place new stress on the NPT, whose indefinite renewal in 1995 and 2000 was explicitly conditioned on progress in nuclear disarmament and ratification of the CTBT. Meanwhile, Japan, also alarmed by the North Korean missile test, agrees to share in the expense of developing a missile-defense system, leading China to announce that if Japan (or Taiwan) should deploy such defenses, it might have to engage in an offensive buildup—something it may be in a better position to do thanks to its reported theft of American nuclear secrets pertaining to warhead miniaturization, which is a prerequisite for mounting several warheads on a single missile. That threat, of course, alarms India, which is at work on long-range missiles, and buttresses the American decision to build NMD—and so forth. In short, a single missile test by a small, poverty-stricken nation could touch off a string of consequences that places severe stress on almost every aspect of the global nuclear arms control regime. No longer does an act of nuclear escalation affect only a nearby adversary or two; its repercussions will be felt around the world. Any development of nuclear weapons or their delivery vehicles creates pressure to do likewise throughout what is now a seamless global web of actions and reactions.

WHO'S NEXT?

TEN YEARS after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the startling fact is that nuclear arms control is faring worse in the first days of the twenty-first century than it did in the last days of the Cold War.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Then, nuclear danger seemed to be declining. Now, it is on the rise. Then, nuclear arms control agreements were progressing. Now, they are at a stalemate or in danger of unraveling. How has this come about? Why has the end of the global conflict in whose name the great nuclear arsenals were built proved worse for nuclear disarmament than the conflict itself?

Several adverse forces are at work. One is simply the ever-increasing availability of nuclear technology. By convention, the word "proliferation" refers to the actual acquisition of nuclear weapons. But there is also the proliferation of the scientific and technical capabilities on which the construction of nuclear arms is based. "Nuclear capacity" refers to a country's ability to produce nuclear weapons within a definite span of time. Sweden, for example, possesses such a nuclear capacity, though it has no will to build nuclear bombs. Libya, on the other hand, has the will but not the capacity. That this sort of unrealized capacity would proliferate far beyond the number of countries that actually possess nuclear arms was inherent in the nature of nuclear weapons themselves—which are based, of course, on scientific knowledge, which by nature tends to spread. In the early 1940s, for example, only one nation possessed unrealized capacity in this sense: the United States. That is to say, although it had not yet built a bomb, there was every reason to believe that its decision to do so would bear fruit. Today, many dozens of nations have such a capacity. The State Department puts their current number at 44 and, in negotiating the now-rejected CTBT, required that it not come into force until all 44 of them had ratified it. Nuclear technology is old technology. We are in the 55th year of the nuclear age. The secret of the bomb is out; it has been published in magazines. The same holds true for missile technology and chemical and biological weapons technology.

If we think of the NPT as a dam holding back nuclear proliferation, then the spread of nuclear capacity is like water collecting behind the dam. That tide can only rise, increasing the pressure. The world's safety ultimately depends not on the number of nations that want to build nuclear weapons but cannot, but on the number that can but do not. If the spread of nuclear weapons is to be prevented over the long run, it cannot come through restrictions on nations' capacity. Instead, it must come by influencing their will, which entails the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



use of diplomatic and political means—the very means whose breakdown we are now witnessing.

A second new adverse element is the rise of antinuclear defensive technology. Antinuclear defenses have long been the wild card of nuclear policy, generating almost nonstop intellectual confusion and popular misunderstanding. Most people's visceral response to the idea of defenses in general is positive. The first duty of government is to preserve its citizens' lives, and defenses promise this. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence stood this commonsense appraisal on its head. Under that doctrine, safety depends on the absolute and unchallenged capacity of each side to annihilate the other's population—a capacity that, when recognized by all, is meant to prevent nuclear war from breaking out in the first place. By eroding this vulnerability, defenses destabilize deterrence. Furthermore, they fuel offensive-arms buildups, since a nation whose offensive power is eroded by defenses is likely to try to restore it by building up its offenses. That was why the first achievement of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks was the treaty banning all but one antiballistic missile system on each side. However sound this reasoning may have been—at least as an adjunct to the deterrence doctrine—the general public probably never grasped it. That may be why President Reagan's proposal for a Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s, although technically infeasible, enjoyed such wide popular support.

The collapse of the Soviet Union added fresh layers of confusion to this already bewildering situation. After the extraordinary expenditure of some $60 billion since the early 1980s, a modest NMD program may now have drawn somewhat closer to technical realization. Its goal, though, is to defend the United States not against Russia but against the handful of missiles that might be fired by North Korea, Iran, or some other "rogue" state. Still, Russia has protested and threatened

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to suspend implementation of START II—for even if the defenses are feasible, neither Russia nor any other country except the United States has the funds or the technical means to build them anytime soon. Antinuclear defenses are not, like nuclear bombs, old technology; they are brand new. (Indeed, they are so new that it is increasingly doubtful that they are feasible even for the United States in the near future; recent antimissile tests have proven embarrassing failures.) If, however, the United States does prove capable of building them, it will be in the position it was in with respect to nuclear weapons in 1943 or 1944—a potential monopoly position—and monopolies, almost by nature, destabilize military balances.

The United States continued its old nuclear deterrence policy even after the Cold War ended.

More important than either the spread of nuclear capacity or the invention of antinuclear defenses is a third adverse element: the decision by the nuclear powers to retain their Cold War nuclear arsenals even in the absence of the Cold War. If I carry a rifle on my shoulder during a war, it means one thing. If I continue to carry the rifle after the war has ended, it means something very different. When the Cold War ended, the United States merely continued with the policy of nuclear deterrence of the Soviet Union/Russia, accompanied by negotiated reductions. Yet this continuation—this doing nothing—constituted one of the most important decisions of the nuclear age. It quietly set a standard for the post–Cold War period.

The negotiated nuclear reductions have now approached the levels specified in START I, which was negotiated mostly with the now-defunct Soviet Union, and implementation of START II is uncertain. What is most important is that the United States, though paying occasional lip service to full nuclear disarmament, has insisted in its negotiations for a START III agreement on a lower limit of 2,500 nuclear weapons. Since no START IV has yet been discussed, the figure of 2,500 nuclear weapons represents the lowest negotiated level to which the United States has, so far, been willing to reduce its arsenal. At the same time, American officials have declared their intention to hold on to that arsenal indefinitely. In late January, for example, Russian negotiators proposed that START III require that the two sides reduce

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Experience the Power and Beauty of English...

In a course that explains the origins and history of the language you share with Geoffrey Chaucer, William Shakespeare, the King James Bible, Samuel Johnson, and Abraham Lincoln...taught on your choice of audio- or videocassettes



Do you love language in all its forms, from the unforgettable cadences of great poetry to the variegated rhythms and textures of everyday speech? Do you delight in the sheer wonder of words, and wish to learn more about the often-fascinating reasons why we speak and write the way we do? If so, you'll be utterly enthralled by **The History of the English Language**, a series brought to you by The Teaching Company.

You speak English every day, but have you ever wondered where it comes from? How it has developed? Why we spell and pronounce words as we do (and why spelling and pronunciation are often so different)? Where our accents come from? Are you aware of the roles that great books and writers—as well as ordinary people and larger historical forces—have played in giving us English as we know it today?

In the 36 intellectually challenging lectures that make up **The History of the English Language**, Professor Seth Lerer of Stanford University will give you a thorough understanding of our common language—from its origins as a Teutonic dialect through the literary and cultural achievements of its 1500-year span to the state of American speech today, when English has become *the* premier language on the planet. Prof. Lerer, who teaches English and Comparative Literature, has authored six books and more than 40 scholarly articles. His many awards for scholarship and classroom lecturing ability include Stanford's Hoagland Prize for undergraduate teaching.

Like all Teaching Company professors, he has been chosen from "the best of the best"—top-flight scholars from colleges and universities across America who have distinguished themselves with teaching that wins awards and consistently earns them high marks in the brutally honest student evaluations that are compiled about teachers on many campuses.

The payoff for The Teaching Company's exacting selection process can be seen and heard in the quality of courses such as **The History of the English Language**. You will gain a sophisticated grasp of English as an *organic* phenomenon, constantly changing according to time, place, and the innovations of human genius. Prof. Lerer will lead you to think about a set of large, intriguing concerns, including the relationship between spelling and pronunciation, the rise and spread of dialects, the role of dictionaries, the unique character of American English, and the intriguing ways in which new words have been invented and older words have changed. As he makes clear, each of these issues—still charged with meaning today—has a fascinating story behind it.

When you view or listen to this course, you will grasp immediately why Prof. Lerer's teaching has won so many accolades. He defines concepts with care, illustrates with copious examples, and speaks with passion and clarity. He will dazzle you with his gift for reading aloud, whether it be in the Old English of Caedmon, the Middle English of Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, or even the Mississippi River dialect of Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn!

Prof. Lerer has created a course with uncommonly broad appeal—a literary, historical, cultural, political, and scientific treatment of the history of our language that will tell you about the distant past, but also about how that past still shapes our present.

Come see and hear for yourself. Send for **The History of the English Language** today.

THE COURSE CURRICULUM

Part I - The Origins of English

(Lectures 1-12) Introduction to the Study of Language...The Historic Study of Language: Methods and Approaches...The Prehistory of English: The Indo-European Context...Reconstructing Meaning and Sound...Words & Worlds: Historical Linguistics & the Study of Culture...The Beginnings of English...Old English: The Anglo-Saxon Worldview...Changing Language: Did the Normans Really Conquer English?...Conquering Language: What did the Normans Do to English?...Chaucer's English...Dialect Jokes & Literary Representation in Middle English...A Multilingual World: Medieval Attitudes Toward Language Change and Variation

PART II - Making Modern English

(Lectures 13-24) The Return of English as a Standard...How We Speak: The Great Vowel Shift and the Making of Modern English...What We Say: The Expanding English Vocabulary...The Shape of Modern English: Changes in Syntax & Grammar...Renaissance Attitudes Toward Teaching English...The Language of Shakespeare (1): Drama, Grammar, and Pronunciation...The Language of Shakespeare (2): Poetry, Sound, & Sense...The Bible in English...Samuel Johnson and His *Dictionary*...New Standards in English...Semantic Change: Dictionaries and the Histories of Words...Values and Words in the 19th and 20th Centuries

PART III - English in America and Beyond

(Lectures 25-36) The Beginnings of American English...Making the American Language: From Webster to Mencken...The Rhetoric of Independence from Jefferson to Lincoln...The Language of the American Self...American Regionalism...American Dialects in Literature...The Impact of African-American English...An Anglophone World...The Language of Science: The Changing Nature of 20th- Century English...The Science of Language: The Study of Language in the 20th Century...Modern Linguistics and the Politics of Language Study...Conclusions and Provocations

Praise for The Teaching Company:

"A force in adult education."
—The New York Times

"Tapes Take Top Teachers into Homes"
—The Wall Street Journal

Order securely on-line at www.teachco.com

The Teaching Company®
7405 Alban Station Court, Suite A107
Springfield, VA 22150-2318

THE Great Courses on Tape®
from the Literature series...

To order, clip and mail .

or call toll-free:

1-800-TEACH-12

(1-800-832-2412)

or fax completed coupon to:

1-703-912-7756

(Please refer to offer code 10379)

NO-RISK MONEY-BACK GUARANTEE: If you are ever not completely satisfied with this or any Teaching Company course, just return it for a full refund of the purchase price.

Offer Code 10379

Please send me **The History of the English Language** (36 lectures, 30 minutes/lecture) in a handsome storage case and with complete lecture outlines, including a recommended reading list.

☐ Audio—**SALE!** $69.95 **Save $130!** (reg. price $199.95) + ~~$15 S&H~~

☐ Video—**SALE!** $99.95 **Save $200!** (reg. price $299.95) + ~~$15 S&H~~

*Note: Virginia residents please add 4.5% sales tax

☐ Check or Money Order enclosed

FREE SHIPPING!

☐ VISA ☐ MasterCard ☐ Discover ☐ Novus

Account Number

Signature Exp. Date

Name (please print)

Mailing Address

City/State/Zip

Phone *(If we have questions regarding your order)*

☐ **FREE CATALOG. Please send me a free copy of your current catalog (no purchase necessary).**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Fall 2000

Living With Russia
Zbigniew Brzezinski

German Reunification: The Enduring Lessons
Robert Zoellick

The Gap
Civil-Military Relations in a New Century

Eliot Cohen

Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn

Talking Turkey
Norman Stone *Graham Fuller*

Harper on *Hamilton*

McInnes on *Oakeshott*

Harries on *Wales*

Essays and Comments:

Andrew J. Bacevich, Philip Gordon, Daniel Mahoney, John Diggins Allen Hertzke and Daniel Philpott, Daniel Johnson, and *Adam Garfinkle.*

SUBSCRIBE FOR ONE YEAR (4 ISSUES FOR $26*) AND RECEIVE FRANCIS FUKUYAMA'S **"THE END OF HISTORY?"**—A 56-PAGE BOUND SPECIAL EDITION NOT AVAILABLE ON NEWSSTANDS.

- ☐ Enclosed is my check or money order
- ☐ Charge my Visa, Mastercard, or AmEx
- ☐ Bill me

*Please add $10 for postage outside the U.S. and Canada.

Name_____

Address_____

City_____

State_____ Zip_____

Card no._____ exp._____

Signature_____ Date_____

Send to: THE NATIONAL INTEREST, P.O. Box 622, Shrub Oak, NY 10588-0622, or call (800) 893-8944 or (914) 962-6297. FA0900

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their arsenals to 1,500 nuclear weapons on each side. The United States refused, insisting on keeping a minimum of 2,500. The State Department's then-spokesperson, James Rubin, said, "We can limit the nuclear danger by going down to a level of 2,000 to 2,500 without jeopardizing our interest with respect to nuclear deterrence." In sum, as a matter of actual post–Cold War policy, the United States has consistently declared its intention to remain in a condition of mutual deterrence with Russia—to preserve the capacity of each side to annihilate the other. As Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe explained, "A key conclusion of the administration's national security strategy is [that] the United States will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from action against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking nuclear advantage would be *futile.*"

Whatever one thought about nuclear arms during the Cold War, it did not necessarily follow that because Moscow and Washington had them, everyone else should, too. The double standard provisionally built into the NPT, although obviously inequitable, could be understood. Once the Soviet Union disappeared, however, the foundations of the argument shifted. The Cold War was a special circumstance irrefutably different from any other struggle on earth. Now it appears that the Western nuclear powers believed that no special circumstance was needed to justify nuclear arms. The United States was less threatened militarily than any other nation, but it insisted on retaining nuclear arsenals and switched its first-use policy from its old Cold War rival to what some policymakers called the "generic" target of merely potential dangers that might arise somewhere in the world.

This shift in rationale has been accompanied by a shift in the arsenal's global influence. The American nuclear arsenal is often referred to simply as "our deterrent." But does anyone today seriously maintain that Russia has any thought whatsoever of launching a nuclear strike against the United States and is stopped only by a fear of U.S. retaliation? On the other hand, can anyone doubt that these arsenals, both Russian and American, are a significant goad to proliferation—that they serve, in the words of Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, as a "nuclear paradigm" emulated by other powers?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PROLIFERANCE

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, there is much more reason to call the American arsenal a "proliferant" than to call it a deterrent. This is not mere word-juggling. A central lesson of deterrence theory is that the psychological effects of nuclear arms are as important as the physical ones. According to the theory, deterrence "works" when the leaderships on both sides of a nuclear standoff so deeply fear the other side's retaliation that they do not dare to strike in the first place. If the weapons are ever used, deterrence has by definition failed. What we may call "proliferance," too, is a psychological effect of nuclear weapons. Proliferance occurs when a country, fearful of a neighbor's nuclear arsenals (and in the age of the intercontinental ballistic missile, who is not, for these purposes, a neighbor?), builds one in response. The difference between deterrence and proliferance is that whereas deterrence stops nations that possess nuclear arsenals from using them, proliferance inspires nations that lack them to get them. In a sense, therefore, the two effects arrive at a common destination: the possession—but not, it is hoped, the use—of nuclear weapons.

Any number of American politicians have stated that nuclear proliferation is the greatest threat to the security of the United States today. In the post–Cold War world, the effects of proliferance are much easier to demonstrate than those of deterrence. Proliferance led India—looking over the Himalayas to China, and beyond China to Russia and the United States—to turn itself into a nuclear power, and proliferance goaded Pakistan to promptly conduct its own nuclear tests. This influence acts both by example (the "nuclear paradigm" cited by Singh) and, even more powerfully, through the direct influence of the terror that is the chief product of nuclear arsenals.

Indeed, the proliferant influence of nuclear terror has been in operation since the earliest days of the nuclear age. The clear lesson of history is that nuclear arsenals breed nuclear arsenals. Even the United States—the first nation to build the bomb—did so, in a sense, *reactively.* Franklin Roosevelt and his advisers were worried that Hitler would get the bomb first. (If there has ever been a good reason for building nuclear weapons, preventing Hitler from having a monopoly on them in the midst of a world war was it.) The Soviet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Union then built the bomb in response to the United States; China built it in response to both the United States and Russia; India built it in response to China; and Pakistan built it in response to India. (The cases of the United Kingdom and France, which already enjoyed some protection from the U.S. nuclear umbrella, are less clear. Sheer national prestige appears to have been as important as any immediate security risks. Another murkier case is Israel, which, like the United States in 1945, built its arsenal preemptively but also sought to counter conventional threats from its Arab enemies and deter them from ever dreaming of overrunning it.) Every nuclear arsenal is linked to every other nuclear arsenal in the world by these powerful ties of terror and response. And when the list of nuclear powers grows, the country in question—Iraq? Iran? North Korea? Egypt?—will probably have been inspired by the fear of some nuclear-armed foe. Deterrence is, in fact, the codification and institutionalization of this reactive cycle. Indeed, deterrence teaches that the way to avoid destruction by a rival is to possess nuclear weapons yourself. If this is not an invitation to proliferation, what would be?

Whereas in the Cold War, deterrence was the dominant effect, now proliferance is. Consider the increasing danger of nuclear terrorism. The continued possession by many nations of nuclear arms makes the diversion of nuclear materials or weapons into the hands of terrorist groups more likely. But terrorists, having no nation to lose, cannot be "deterred" by the threat of retaliation. In their case, the proliferant effect of nuclear arsenals is all, the deterrent effect nil. Conversely, the only policy that can seriously hope to sharply reduce (although not entirely eliminate) the danger of nuclear terrorism is abolition, because abolition alone can impose comprehensive global prohibitions on nuclear-weapon technology.

THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY

IN THIS SCENE of growing nuclear danger, no single actor, of course, is solely to blame. It is the essence of the new situation that the number of actors on the nuclear stage is growing. India, for example, bears a clear responsibility for nuclearizing South Asia with its May 1998 tests. But by signaling that the earth would remain nuclearized indefinitely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

even after the Cold War, Washington, Moscow, and Beijing also plainly incurred responsibility. If in the early 1990s the existing nuclear powers had committed themselves to the elimination of nuclear weapons and had by 1998 traveled some of the distance to that goal, it is hard to believe that South Asia would be engaged in a nuclear arms race today.

If, however, we invert the question and, instead of asking who is to blame for the crisis of arms control, ask which country has the greatest power to tackle the crisis, our attention must turn to the United States. Whether the situation can be retrieved at all remains an open question. But without American leadership, any effort must fail. The question of why the United States plans to hold on to its nuclear arsenal indefinitely is, accordingly, highly important. The answer must be sought at many levels—the moral, the psychological, and the cultural, as well as the political and the military—yet because of the dominant influence of the strategists in preserving the continuity of policy as the Cold War ended, the importance of nuclear strategic doctrine cannot be overlooked.

Four stages in the development of strategic thinking about nuclear abolition can be distinguished. In the first, American policy sought to head off a nuclear arms race by negotiating the abolition of nuclear weapons. In 1946, President Truman's representative for nuclear disarmament to the United Nations, Bernard Baruch, proposed that all nuclear weapons be eliminated and all nuclear technology placed under an international authority. In retrospect, the plan never had much chance. The Soviet Union was well into its own project to build the bomb (thanks in good measure to its outstanding spying on the American effort), and Stalin, according to the historian David Holloway, had no wish to barter away the Soviet Union's capacity to build a bomb before it had even tested one. Former National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy was probably right when, after examining the abolition proposals of that time, he concluded, "The bitter truth is ... that what we have just reviewed was not at any time a serious negotiation on either side."

In the second stage of the evolution of nuclear policy—during the late 1950s and the early 1960s, after both powers had developed not only atomic bombs but hydrogen bombs as well—the earlier obstacles to full nuclear disarmament were, increasingly, publicly acknowledged as insurmountable. It was no longer enough, even politically, to make fine-sounding proposals for abolition that everyone knew

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

must fail. So if nuclear disarmament was impossible, nuclear arsenals would have to be accepted for at least as long as the struggle with the Soviet Union lasted. The strategic form that that acceptance took was the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, with its teaching that the way to avoid nuclear war is to strike a nuclear balance.

In this new nuclear dispensation, there was still a role for nuclear disarmament. Its goals, however, would be different from what they had been in the time of Baruch. Instead of aiming for abolition, negotiations would seek to "stabilize" the nuclear stalemate. Accepting the inevitability of nuclear possession, these negotiations sought to diminish the possibility of *use* in two ways. First, they would mutually restrict the development of "first-strike" forces, which otherwise might tempt one side or the other to launch a nuclear war. Second, they would place a numerical, mutually agreed-upon cap on offensive nuclear weapons.

Nuclear abolition was seen not so much as difficult as undesirable.

The negotiations based on these principles were called arms control, as distinct from nuclear disarmament. The shift was presented as a victory for realism, in which the surrender of the unachievable goal of abolition prepared the ground for the more modest and achievable goals of limiting and stabilizing the nuclear balance of terror. In practice, however, the modest goals proved almost as elusive as abolition had been.

For one thing, the temptation to build first-strike forces regularly got the better of the hope for stability. Each side habitually saw itself as lagging behind. Cries of alarm and appeals to catch up—to close a "bomber gap," a "missile gap," a "throw-weight gap," a "window of vulnerability"—sounded through the halls of Congress as well as the hidden precincts of the Politburo. Nuclear terror, it turned out, was harder to control than theory had predicted. The hope for stability coexisted uneasily at best with the readiness for prompt mutual annihilation, and the very terror that was the mothers' milk of deterrence spawned nightmares that tended constantly to upset the whole arrangement. In the words of Yale's Paul Bracken, "Once the two sides understood the mechanism of deterrence, there would appear to have been little reason to keep piling up additional weapons. But that is exactly what happened: just as deterrence stabilized in the late 1960s, each side

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



began a huge building program." Not until Gorbachev came to power did significant reductions occur.

As the doctrine of deterrence became entrenched in official circles, attitudes toward nuclear disarmament underwent a subtle but deep transition. During the first two decades of the Cold War, the most intractable obstacles to abolition, in American eyes, stemmed from the totalitarian character of the Soviet Union, which both posed the global threat that justified nuclear arms and, owing to its extreme secretiveness, ruled out the kind of inspections essential to a reliable nuclear-disarmament agreement. Over time, however, the particular reference to the Soviet Union began to give way. Arguments based on the nature of the Soviet Union might be called the limited theory of the impossibility of nuclear disarmament. In the new explanation, which we might call the general theory of the impossibility of nuclear disarmament, it was not particular problems caused by Soviet totalitarianism that were cited but a set of difficulties seen as intrinsic to the nuclear dilemma, whatever regimes might be involved. Nations in general, the argument now ran, would be able to cheat on any abolition agreement; they would have good reason to cheat; they would cheat; and then they would use their sudden nuclear monopoly to bully the world.

In this more generalized view, the very fact that nuclear weapons had been invented was reason enough to believe that they could not be eliminated as long as lambs declined to lie down with lions. For even if the nuclear hardware were destroyed, the know-how would remain in people's minds, and someone would build them again. These views were expressed, to give one prominent example, in the 1983 Harvard-sponsored book *Living with Nuclear Weapons,* which posed the question, "Why not abolish nuclear weapons?" and answered simply, "Because we cannot," explaining that "mankind's nuclear innocence,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

once lost, cannot be regained." In these circumstances—now regarded as immutable—abolition was seen not so much as difficult to achieve but as actually undesirable. A world free of nuclear weapons was intrinsically a less-safe, less-stable place than a world armed with nuclear weapons. In the words of *Living with Nuclear Weapons*, "If the political pre-conditions of trust and consensus are missing, complete disarmament is inherently unstable. In a disarmed world, the first nation to acquire a few arms would be able to influence events to a much greater extent than it could in a heavily armed world. Nuclear weapons greatly magnify this effect."

As this general theory of the impossibility of nuclear disarmament won official acceptance, a change in the valuation of nuclear weapons occurred. The deeper, less-qualified embrace of deterrence (and of the nuclear arsenals the doctrine justified) opened the way to the idea that nuclear weapons, instead of being a necessary evil, were a positive benefit to the world—not so much a problem as a solution. They provided, thanks to the policy of deterrence, the only imaginable solution to themselves: they prevented nuclear war. Moreover, they prevented even conventional war—no mean achievement, considering what two world wars had done to the globe in the twentieth century.

There matters stood when the Cold War ended, opening a third stage in the development of American strategy. The policymakers might have reasoned as follows: We built up nuclear arsenals to contain the Soviet Union, whose secretive character stood in the way of nuclear disarmament, but now, with the Soviet Union gone, should we not consider the abolition of these weapons? If in 1946 the Soviet regime had been like the one in Moscow today, wouldn't Baruch's plan have had every chance of acceptance? Shouldn't something like it be possible today?

Unfortunately, what prevailed in the conventional wisdom was not the limited theory of the impossibility of nuclear disarmament but the general theory, and this has dictated a very nearly opposite response to the one sketched above. Nuclear deterrence, the policymakers said, worked during the Cold War; abolition, owing to the intrinsic nature of the nuclear dilemma, remained impossible; therefore the sensible course was to hold on to nuclear arsenals (albeit at reduced levels, in recognition of the improved political climate). Such was the conclusion of the "bottom-up" review of nuclear policy carried out in the early 1990s by the Clinton administration, and it has never been challenged

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

since. Instead of saying to themselves, "During the protracted emergency that was the Cold War, we made a calculated gamble with the survival of the human race in the name of its freedom and were lucky enough to have survived to tell the story," the policymakers in effect said, "During the Cold War, we perfected a confidence-inspiring system for the management of nuclear weapons that should serve as our model for any future contingency." If deterrence, road-tested during the great U.S.-Soviet conflict, was a proven success, then why give it up now? Didn't "the long peace" of the Cold War demonstrate that the world was better off with nuclear weapons than without them? In Undersecretary of Defense Slocombe's words, "It is a remarkable fact that for almost half a century, the U.S. and its allies faced the U.S.S.R. and its coerced auxiliaries in the division over ideology, power, culture, and the very definition of man, the state, and the world, and did so armed to the greatest extent huge sacrifice would afford, and yet did not fight a large-scale war. No one can say for sure why that success was achieved for long enough for communism to collapse of its own internal weakness. But can anyone really doubt that nuclear weapons had a role?"

If deterrence was proven a success during the Cold War, some ask, why give it up now?

Thus, at just the moment that a revolution in the international sphere seemed to call for a full-scale reappraisal of nuclear policy, the previous policy was reaffirmed with fewer reservations than ever before. Others embraced the positive role of nuclear weapons in even stronger terms. In the words of the nuclear theorist James May, "Nuclear weapons are not all that is needed to make war obsolete, but they have no real substitute." Because they "cheaply and predictably destroy whatever both sides are fighting for" and "destroy the battlefield as well as the enemy," they "are essential" for maintenance of global peace.

American thinking had come full circle. Preventing war, of course, had been the great unrealized goal of both Woodrow Wilson's beloved League of Nations and the United Nations. The new view, which might be called nuclear Wilsonianism, was that nuclear weapons could accomplish what these ambitious global institutions had not—the abolition of war (or, at least, of world war). Thus, in brief, did the United States, in the 46 years between Hiroshima and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the end of the Cold War, make the passage from abolitionism to its current profound and complacent belief in the virtue of nuclear arms.

The post–Cold War nuclear policies of the United States have been easy to misunderstand. Both President Bush and President Clinton have been given to claiming that nuclear danger is a thing of the past—that, as Clinton has said, "for the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, the children of [pick your state] are not at risk of nuclear war." Both presidents also were committed to the policy of gradual reductions. Clinton has continued to pay the lip service to abolition required by Article VI of the NPT, but as a matter of actual policy, the United States has remained committed to retaining arsenals of thousands of warheads indefinitely.

In the early 1990s, the damaging consequences of this decision were hidden. The non-Russian republics that succeeded the Soviet Union were persuaded to surrender the nuclear weapons that had wound up on their soil, and South Africa's apartheid regime, anticipating majority rule, dismantled its nuclear-weapons program. France began a series of tests but curtailed them in the face of intense public condemnation. Not until the latter half of the decade did the damage become apparent.

Under these conditions, the third stage of American strategic thinking—in which deterrence won previously unequalled support and policymakers sought to reconcile it with a policy of nonproliferation—has begun to break apart, and a fourth stage has begun to loom. In this stage, the decision between possession (justified by deterrence) and nonproliferation will have to be made. The fissures dividing the two courses are already deep and wide. They appeared, for instance, in the world's reaction to India's nuclear tests. The United States and a few other countries promptly announced sanctions. But their resolve was weak, the sanctions were soon badly eroded, and Clinton, the leader of the drive for sanctions, soon made the first state visit to India by an American president in nearly a quarter-century. The recent history of relations with Iraq tells the same story. The United States sought to prevent Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons—first by requiring Iraq to accept U.N. weapons inspectors and then by the direct use of air strikes. Iraq remained defiant, and now the international community has no reliable instruments for the achievement of its goal. The lesson is clear: Countries that possess nuclear weapons and mean to keep them

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are in an inherently weak position when they face countries determined to develop these same arms. The possessor nations not only cannot control the debate; they can scarcely get into the conversation.

NUCLEAR WILSONIANISM

IN RESPONSE to the crisis of this fourth stage, some have frankly decided to resolve the contradiction in favor of proliferation. The political scientist Kenneth Waltz, for example, has argued in detail that it is a mistake to suppose that "new nuclear states will be less responsible and capable of self-control than old ones have been." Hence, he writes, "the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared." A world "with more nuclear states" will have a more "promising future." And John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago has called for "managed proliferation" and would welcome acquisition of the bomb by Germany, Japan, and one or more eastern European countries. In the third stage of the development of nuclear strategy, deterrence was embraced, but only for a few major powers. Just as we can distinguish between a limited and a general theory of impossibility of nuclear disarmament, so we can distinguish between a limited nuclear Wilsonianism and a general nuclear Wilsonianism. The former school holds that nuclear weapons were a benefit—but only for ourselves and a few privileged friends and adversaries. The latter school, to which Waltz and Mearsheimer belong, holds that nuclear weapons are good for all who feel the need for them. A policy shift from limited nuclear Wilsonianism to general nuclear Wilsonianism would parallel the early shift from Baruch's policy of abolition to the policy of deterrence. Just as, in the earlier period, the American government, despairing of abolition, embraced the more modest goal of arms control, so now the government, in despair of repairing the broken policy of nonproliferation, would embrace global nuclearization. Giving up on a goal whose achievement it sees as impossible—nonproliferation—Washington would aim at the more modest but supposedly achievable goal of superintending a stable transition to a nuclearized world. At that point, the United States' embrace of nuclear weapons, having proceeded step by imperceptible step from 1946 down to the present, would have reached

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



its logical destination. Living with nuclear weapons would then mean living with nuclear weapons on an equal basis with all other nations that wished to have them. This position has the merit, at least, of being attainable. An international order "with more nuclear states" can certainly be achieved and is, in fact, the destination toward which the world is drifting. Doing nothing will be sufficient to bring it about.

Those, however, who find the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons (together, almost certainly, with other weapons of mass destruction) terrifying and wish to persevere in the more active and difficult policy of nonproliferation will have to accept that it is fundamentally inconsistent with nuclear possession—and then embrace nuclear abolition. A policy that seeks to marry possession with nonproliferation lacks coherence—in the first place morally, but also militarily, diplomatically, and legally. It is a policy divided against itself. Its moving parts work against each other. Its deeds rise up to knock down its words. For the adverse factors that are breaking down nuclear arms control agreements form a vicious circle. Possession by the current nuclear powers breeds proliferation by new powers; proliferation by new powers breeds defenses in the old ones and undercuts the nuclear test ban; defenses upset the balance of nuclear terror and stalemate arms control; the stalemate of arms control confirms the nuclear powers in their possession of nuclear arsenals; confirmed possession breeds proliferation; and so on.

There are, it is true, countervailing tendencies. In many parts of the world, a steady undertow of nuclear sanity has impeded and slowed what otherwise might already have been a global scramble to obtain nuclear arms. The entire continent of South America, for example, is, in accord with the treaty of Tlatelolco, free of nuclear weapons. Brazil

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Argentina—two fully nuclear-capable nations that were the last to join that treaty—proceeded quite far down the path to nuclear armament before turning back. The Cold War and its nuclear balance of terror held no attraction as a model in their eyes. They saw greater safety in the continent-wide abolition of nuclear arms. Africa and the South Pacific have made the same decision. The norm in the family of nations is to be nuclear weapon free, not nuclear armed.

Another broad tendency of the post–Cold War period—democratization—might seem to offer help in reducing nuclear danger. Over the long run, the benefits may appear, but the record so far does not, unfortunately, sustain these hopes. On the evidence, democracy offers no immunity to the nuclear temptation. The world's first nuclear power was, of course, a democracy. Today, six of the world's eight nuclear powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, India, and Israel—are democracies. The democratization of Russia, as noted, did not inspire its democratic adversary, the United States, to seek to liquidate their balance of nuclear terror. In South Asia, democratic India led the way to the nuclearization of the subcontinent.

Modest successes in one strand or another of nuclear arms control are still possible. Perhaps the Senate will reverse itself and pass the CTBT. Conceivably, Russia, yielding to financial need and U.S. pressure, will accept some modification of the ABM treaty and implement START II. Yet it is getting harder by the day to imagine, given the tight connections between possession and proliferation, that the deterioration and even collapse of the fabric of nuclear arms control can be stopped absent a commitment to abolition. The bare existence of the world's present nuclear arsenals poses the ever-present danger of unimaginable catastrophe. Amid the legitimate concern regarding proliferation, it is easy to forget that nuclear peril flows from the nations that possess nuclear weapons, not from those that don't.

DANGER AND SURVIVAL

BUT WOULD EVEN a commitment by the nuclear powers to abolition serve to stop proliferation? Or has the world, perhaps without realizing it, proceeded so far down the path of nuclearization that a reversal is impossible, as the nuclear Wilsonians argue?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BGM Kumar Foundation

Indian International Relations Grant Program

BGM Kumar Foundation announces its annual grant program to support research and development on ***India's foreign policy, international relations, international security, international economic policy, and diplomatic history***.

The grant is intended to support research and writing of a scholarly book or landmark article on an issue or area of interest to the policy community in India and globally. The focus will be on innovative work that has the potential to be of significant value to leaders, policy makers, and academic community.

Applicants must submit a research proposal no longer than ten pages to the foundation. The proposal must describe the issue or area that will be examined, explain how the project will contribute to the understanding and knowledge of policymakers globally, describe the analytical approach and sources of information, and outline a strategic plan for quality publication of the research results. Additionally, the applicant should include a curriculum vitae, applicant's relevant research and publication record, project budget and timetable. Applicant should provide three references, including their contact e-mail address and telephone number. Proposals must include a cover letter that summarizes the research.

Proposals will be evaluated based on the following criteria: (1) the relevance of potential analysis and findings to current and future India's foreign policy, international relations, international security and economic policy issues and deliberations; (2) the potential to make significant contribution globally to policymakers and academia body of knowledge through innovative work; (3) the relevant experience, research work, publication record, and professional reputation of the applicant; (4) the degree to which research questions and analytical methods are well defined; (5) the degree to which the project will develop valuable new information through field work, archival work, or other methods; (6) the likelihood of publication by a globally well recognized international affairs publisher or journal; and (7) the applicant's lack of access to other research funding sources.

An applicant must be a scholar or professional working in foreign policy, international relations, security policy, international political economy, or related areas, with relevant experience. Applicant must have a substantial track record of excellence and policy influencing work.

The foundation plans to award one or more grant of up to $10,000 each, subject to the overriding criteria of excellence. For an exceptional proposal, the foundation may consider awarding a higher grant.

The deadline for receiving the proposal is January 31, 2001. Final decision on the award, for which the foundation is the sole arbiter, will be communicated by June 30, 2001.

Proposals can be mailed to:

Birendra Kumar
BGM Kumar Foundation
P.O. Box 224
Holmdel, NJ 07733
USA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW THIS FALL FROM

THE CENTURY FOUNDATION

NEW IDEAS FOR A NEW CENTURY



HANG SEPARATELY

COOPERATIVE SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA, 1985–1994

BY LEON V. SIGAL

A CENTURY FOUNDATION BOOK
published by THE CENTURY FOUNDATION PRESS
396 pages, cloth, $24.95/£17.95, ISBN 0–87078–450–1

TO ORDER CALL 1–800–552–5450, IN DC 202–797–6258

Leon V. Sigal vividly and intelligently replays the important voices of the Cold War: Gorbachev, Reagan, Shevardnadze, Baker, Kohl, Thatcher, and others. He demonstrates the failures of the realists among American foreign policymakers to win true, cooperative security for our nation and our neighbors. Hang Separately *is an outstanding historical analysis of a time when great opportunities were lost.*

— SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON
PRESIDENT, GLOBAL SECURITY INSTITUTE

TURKEY'S TRANSFORMATION AND AMERICAN POLICY

MORTON ABRAMOWITZ, EDITOR

with chapters by Morton Abramowitz, Cengiz Çandar, Heath W. Lowry, Alan Makovsky, Ziya Önış, Philip Robins, and M. James Wilkinson



A CENTURY FOUNDATION BOOK
published by THE CENTURY FOUNDATION PRESS
295 pages, cloth, $24.95/£17.95, ISBN 0–87078–453–6

TO ORDER CALL 1–800–552–5450, IN DC 202–797–6258

Morton Abramowitz and his fellow contributors have produced a subtle and knowing and authoritative book on a country in the throes of great changes. The domestic and foreign worlds of Turkey are depicted with great skill and knowledge, so is the web of American-Turkish relations. Abramowitz . . . has been joined by some of the very best interpreters of that country. A book of balance and judgment.

— PROFESSOR *FOUAD AJAMI*
THE JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

THE CENTURY FOUNDATION *formerly the TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND*

HEADQUARTERS: 41 EAST 70TH STREET, NY, NY 10021 ◆ 212–535–4441 ◆ 1755 MASS. AVE., NW, WASHINGTON, DC 20036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Even if the will were present, the practical obstacles would be immense. Basic security policies of half a century would have to undergo authentic "bottom-up" reviews in all the great powers. The conventional balances among them would have to be readjusted all over the world. There are few areas of actual or potential regional conflict—for example, East Asia, the Middle East, South Asia—in which the consequences would not be profound. The technical and diplomatic arrangements necessary to undergird abolition would be even more complex than those surrounding current arms negotiations. The inspections regime alone would have to be a masterpiece of science, diplomacy, and statecraft.

Great nuclear powers that had committed themselves to abolition would take a dim view of proliferators.

We must distinguish, however, between the achievement of the goal—destruction of the world's very last nuclear warhead—and the commitment to the goal. To reverse proliferation and start immediately to radically reduce nuclear danger, the destruction of the last warhead is not necessary. But the commitment by the nuclear powers to do so is. Figures of 2,500 and 1,500 nuclear weapons are already on the Russian-American negotiating table. The stages below these figures should, after suitable study, be delineated. A moment should be identified at which the lesser nuclear powers would be expected to join in the negotiations and begin to draw down their own arsenals. Qualitative steps, beginning with taking nuclear arsenals off their states of alert, would be planned. The expectations that the nuclear powers—once thoroughly embarked on their historic course—had of other nations, including those otherwise inclined to proliferate, would be specified. For example, from the outset, a sort of global freeze might go into effect, under which all countries with nuclear weapons would commit themselves to a process leading to abolition, and countries without nuclear weapons would be required to persevere in their vow not to acquire them. Increasingly severe transparency, inspections, and provisions to control nuclear-weapon materials such as enriched uranium and plutonium could be negotiated promptly. The countries that had embarked on nuclear disarmament would agree on steps to take if proliferation was discovered.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Only by imagining this scene of comprehensively transformed expectations does the power of a policy of committing the world to nuclear abolition emerge—not as a remote vision but as an active force from the moment the commitment is made. Great nuclear powers that had committed themselves to nuclear abolition and taken serious steps toward that goal would have a far different attitude toward proliferators than those who plan to depend indefinitely on nuclear weapons for their ultimate security. They would possess a degree of will to enforce nonproliferation that the U.N. Security Council quite lacks at present. Under the above new conditions, a non-nuclear nation seeking openly to build a nuclear arsenal would arouse the anger and retaliation of the world. Consider again the case of Iraq. Saddam Hussein's strategy has been to kick out the U.N. inspectors at his pleasure and then play one great power off against another—for instance, Russia and France against the United States and the United Kingdom—as they attempt to reintroduce controls. Such tactics would be at an end if all of these countries had made the commitment to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear powers that had jointly agreed to abolish their arsenals and were in the midst of so doing would be planning to rely on that agreement for their security to the same extent that they now rely on their nuclear arsenals. Would they let Saddam have what they were renouncing? They would possess an implacable will, based on the most elemental national interest, to stop proliferation, and they would possess the wherewithal to do it—including, certainly, the resolve and means to defeat and overthrow the offending regime. Curiously, today, it is just because the nuclear powers rely for their security on their own nuclear arsenals that they lack the will to eliminate Saddam's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.

Is the argument circular? Does it say that countries would have the will to stop proliferation if only they had the will to stop proliferation? Not at all. Political will, where it exists, is a reality. The resolve to proceed to a world without nuclear weapons would be a dominant fact in the life of the world, from which dramatic consequences would flow long before abolition was achieved.

How, though, can the commitment by the United States and the other nuclear powers be signaled, and why should nations that lack nuclear arsenals but think they might eventually need them believe

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Learn Another Language on Your Own!



Learn to speak a foreign language fluently on your own and at your own pace with what are considered the finest in-depth courses available. Many were developed by the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of State for diplomatic personnel who must learn a language quickly and thoroughly. Emphasis is on learning to speak and to understand the spoken language. A typical course (equivalent to a college semester) includes an album of 10 to 12 audio cassettes (10 to 18 hours), recorded by native-born speakers, plus a 250-page textbook. Some of our courses:

☐ Albanian	$135	☐ German I	$185	☐ Norwegian	$135	Spanish,	
☐ Arabic, Saudi	$185	☐ German II	$155	☐ Persian	$185	☐ European	$125
☐ Egyptian	$185	☐ Greek	$185	☐ Polish	$195	☐ Latin American I	$185
☐ Moroccan	$245	☐ Hebrew	$255	Portuguese,		☐ Latin American II	$165
☐ Bulgarian	$265	☐ Hungarian	$225	☐ Brazilian	$225	☐ Swahili	$155
☐ Cantonese	$225	☐ Italian	$185	☐ European	$155	☐ Swedish	$225
☐ Catalan	$225	☐ Japanese	$185	☐ Romanian	$135	☐ Tagalog	$325
☐ Czech	$155	☐ Korean	$225	☐ Russian	$255	☐ Thai	$225
☐ Dutch	$155	☐ Latvian	$225	☐ Serbo-Croatian	$225	☐ Turkish	$225
☐ French I	$185	☐ Lithuanian	$165	☐ Shona	$225	☐ Urdu	$195
☐ French II	$215	☐ Mandarin	$185	☐ Slovak	$225	☐ Vietnamese (South)	$245

Briefer courses of 2 to 4 cassettes plus booklet:

- ☐ Azerbaijani, $55
- ☐ Cherokee, $50
- ☐ Hindi, $40
- ☐ Indonesian, $55
- ☐ Irish, $90
- ☐ Kazakh, $55
- ☐ Tibetan, $40
- ☐ Uzbek, $55
- ☐ Zulu, $22

You can order now with a full **3-week money-back guarantee.** Credit card orders **call toll-free 1-800-243-1234, toll-free fax 1-888-453-4329,** (203) 453-9794, e-mail: RX902@audioforum.com, or mail check or money order. Ask for our free 52-page *Whole World Language Catalog* with courses in 103 languages. Our 29th year.

AUDIO-FORUM®
THE LANGUAGE SOURCE
Room X902, 96 Broad St., Guilford, CT 06437

A New Leadership Model for the Twenty-First Century!

"Quite simply, the book is a masterpiece. **Will clearly [illegible] of the most seminal and exciting books about this elusive and important factor for some time to come." —Warren Bennis**



Based on extensive research analyzing the leadership styles of more than 5,000 directors and managers world-wide, *Connective Leadership* provides an innovative nine-part strategy for flourishing despite the demands of inter- and intra-organizational relationships. Written by Jean Lipman-Blumen, a noted authority on leadership, this book offers the necessary skills to move organizations, nations, and people into the new century with stellar results.

432 pp.; paper $16.95
(Formerly titled ***The Connective Edge***)

New in Paperback...

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS | Oxford Paperbacks. Call 1-800-451-7556 or visit *www.oup-usa.org*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

palgrave *Global Publishing at St. Martin's Press*

Palgrave is the new global publishing imprint at St. Martin's Press that combines the Scholarly and Reference Division with Macmillan Press (UK). Palgrave's goal is to be the *new academic publisher of choice.* For more information, visit **www.palgrave.com.**

FUELLING THE WAR
Revealing an Oil Company's Role in Vietnam
Louis Wesseling
Revealed here is the way American oil suppliers also fuelled the communist armies, and the behind-the-scenes manipulation that formed the unknown part of the Vietnam War.
2000 / 240 pp.
1-86064-457-0 / $25.00 cl.
I.B.Tauris

EAST TIMOR
The Price of Freedom
John G. Taylor
John Taylor tells the story of what happened to this island's people following President Suharto's downfall in the wake of the Asian economic crisis.
2000 / 272 pp.
1-85649-841-7 / $22.50 pb.
Zed Books

BRING DOWN THE WALLS
Lebanon's Post-War Challenge
Carole H. Dagher
"A tribute to Lebanon, a work of searching honesty that dares to look into Lebanon's future."
—Fouad Ajami,
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
2000 / 288 pp.
0-312-22920-8 / $39.95 cl.

Now in Paperback!
CUBA
Confronting the U.S. Embargo
Peter Schwab
"{Schwab's} book is a smoothly written account of the effects of the U.S. embargo."
—*Publishers Weekly*
2000 / 240 pp.
0-312-22965-8 / $16.95 pb.

JAPAN AND RUSSIA
The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999
Edited by **Gilbert Rozman**
In this collection, experts from Japan, Russia, and the US explore the chronology of bilateral relations between Japan and Russia.
2000 / 400 pp.
0-312-22877-5 / $39.95 cl.

DEATH SQUADS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
Murder With Deniability
Edited by **Bruce B. Campbell** and **Arthur D. Brenner**
Death squads have become an increasingly common feature of the modern world. This book explains not only the development of death squads, but also why they can be expected to proliferate in the 21st century.
2000 / 384 pp.
0-312-21365-4 / $45.00 cl.









palgrave
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010
1-800-221-7945, ext 270 • www.palgrave.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that commitment? Every now and then, a U.S. official will say that the United States wishes to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Remarks of this kind scarcely assure the world that the destination is in sight. Nor, of course, should they. A policy is not a dream. A policy is a plan of action that you believe can happen and that you intend to make happen. A president who intends to commit the United States to a policy of negotiating the abolition of nuclear weapons would not announce the fact in answer to a question at a press conference or in the peroration to some speech on an unrelated subject. Abolition is not a goal at which the world will arrive (to paraphrase the old saying about Britain's acquisition of its empire) through a fit of absence of mind. (Only proliferation can be achieved through absent-mindedness.) For such a commitment to be real—credible, to adapt a key word from nuclear strategy—a number of things would have to happen. A president who meant to embark on this path would have to make abolition an issue in the election campaign to acquire a public mandate. Without this, the destination could not possibly be reached in a democracy. Upon being elected, the new president would choose, among others, secretaries of state and defense who publicly agreed with the abolition policy, and would battle to win their confirmation in the Senate. The president would give a solemn address to the nation—the first of many on the subject—announcing the initiative. This president would then launch an interagency review—or perhaps, first, a presidential commission—to study the feasibility and the precise features, in all their immense complexity, of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The president would then consult with the United States' allies and approach the two next-greatest nuclear powers, Russia and China, and would, at the same time, seek bipartisan support, without which the initiative could never succeed and probably should not be launched. To paraphrase the old saying about revolution, nuclear abolition is not a tea party, and anything less than a full-scale effort backed by the nation as a whole would be stillborn.

> The path to solving the nuclear dilemma runs through U.S. politics.

The path to a solution of the nuclear dilemma passes first through domestic politics. The public must give its permission and support. As it happens, the Senate's rejection of the CTBT and a furor over NMD

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have intruded the nuclear question into the current presidential race. Governor George W. Bush of Texas has taken the initiative with a bold if vague proposal. He has made the welcome statement that "our mutual security need no longer depend on a nuclear balance of terror." Today's large arsenals, he has said, "are the expensive relics of dead conflicts. And they do nothing to make us more secure." He would cut them to an unspecified "lowest possible number." At the same time, though, he would deploy missile defenses far more ambitious than even those favored by the Clinton administration. The problem with Bush's program is that his plans for reductions collide with his plans for missile defense. He will not be able to get to his low number if missile defenses stoke nuclear buildups in Russia and China. On the Democratic side, Vice President Al Gore supports the Clinton policies—that is, pursuing reductions, but not below the floor of 2,500 nuclear warheads on the U.S. side. The problems with the Gore approach are the problems with the Clinton policy; an indefinitely held arsenal of thousands of nuclear weapons is a recipe for proliferation. The way to make sense of both positions is the same: a commitment to abolition. If Bush's "lowest possible number" is zero for all nations, his defenses will no longer be destabilizing. Whether possessed by the United States alone or, as Reagan suggested, shared with Russia and other nations, missile defenses could help safeguard a world free of nuclear weapons against secret or open nuclear re-armament. If Gore embraces zero, he will have in his hand the basis for a program that can truly deal with what he calls the greatest threat to American security, nuclear proliferation.

But even a president's intentions alone would not suffice. The nation would have to respond positively. A full-scale debate in the news media, universities, and civil society would have to ensue. Is safety to be found in nuclear arms or in their elimination? Can inspection of an abolition agreement be adequate? What should be the disposition of conventional forces—American and other? Would defense spending rise or fall? What should be done if a country violates the agreement? These and many other questions of similar importance have not been answered. They have not, in any national debate worthy of the name, even been asked.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Africa's Mess, Mugabe's Mayhem

Robert I. Rotberg

A CRISIS OF LEADERSHIP

VENAL LEADERS are the curse of Africa. If sub-Saharan Africa is "in a mess," to quote Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's founding president, it is a mess made by its leaders. To be sure, Africa has its geographical constraints, a cascade of tropical medical ills, and a complex colonial legacy. But where visionary leadership lifted Asia up out of poverty since the 1960s, too many African heads of state in the same period presided over massive declines in African standards of living while carefully enriching themselves and their cronies.

Some of Africa's current and recent leaders are capable, honest, and effective. But kleptocratic, patrimonial leaders—like President Robert Gabriel Mugabe of Zimbabwe—give Africa a bad name, plunge its peoples into poverty and despair, and incite civil wars and bitter ethnic conflict. They are the ones largely responsible for declining GDP levels, food scarcities, rising infant-mortality rates, soaring budget deficits, human rights abuses, breaches of the rule of law, and prolonged serfdom for millions—even in Africa's nominal democracies.

These authoritarians, many of whom win or manipulate elections and thereby claim a democratic façade, have proved hard to control and harder to oust; witness the Kenyan failure to vote out President

---

ROBERT I. ROTBERG is Director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and President of the World Peace Foundation. His books include *Suffer the Future: Policy Options in Southern Africa, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa,* and *The Founder: Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Daniel arap Moi and this summer's only partially successful attempt to reduce Mugabe's dominance of Zimbabwe's parliament.

The elected autocrats, sometimes termed illiberal or quasi-democrats, have built-in advantages that are hard for even popular opposition movements to overcome: incumbency; state financing for official political parties; state control of television, radio, and newspapers; friendly security forces; crackdowns on opposition rallies; control over the voter rolls; and such tricks as gerrymandering, stuffing ballot boxes, and fiddling with the election count itself. Most of all, ruling parties know how to intimidate voters, particularly semiliterate rural voters acquainted with only one ruling party since independence.

Mugabe's efforts during the weeks before Zimbabwe's June parliamentary elections (he is not up for reelection until 2002) were a depressing case in point. The Western media noticed when Mugabe sent supposed war veterans onto thousands of white-owned farms to cow rural workers and white supporters of the new opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which is headed by the union leader Morgan Tsvangirai. Hundreds of MDC supporters, black and white alike, were beaten, and several dozen were killed. Government orders that rural clinics and hospitals refuse treatment to MDC backers got less attention, as did having teachers suspected of supporting the MDC hauled from their classrooms and beaten.

The vote itself was a shambles, with doctored voter rolls and Mugabe-designed constituency boundaries finalized a mere three weeks before the election and released to the opposition only by court order. The United Nations, which led an election-monitoring effort, learned that 10 to 25 percent of registered voters were in fact dead and threw up its hands two weeks before the election. Other outside monitors had no more luck, leaving Mugabe cronies from his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), to oversee a campaign in which MDC candidates were beaten up and had their homes firebombed. A week before the election, the head of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum reported a "complete subversion of the democratic electoral process."

In a fair contest, Mugabe's record would have given the MDC plenty of political ammunition. Mugabe single-handedly destroyed his country's economic equilibrium twice in three years. In 1998, after sending

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Mugabe makes his point: Zimbabwe's president at his second inauguration, Harare, March 1996

Zimbabwean troops into the Democratic Republic of the Congo to protect President Laurent Kabila's predatory regime, Mugabe began using antiwhite rhetoric and confiscating white-owned farms while granting lavish pensions to veterans of the country's 1971–79 war. Zimbabwe's business-confidence index plunged, foreign direct investment dried up,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exchange rates plummeted, and fuel and commodity shortages became common—while the president continued to line his pockets.

A referendum last February was intended to give Mugabe the constitutional authority to take white farms without compensation. But the voters, emboldened by the fledgling efforts of the MDC and a fed-up urban civil society, decisively rebuffed the president. In response, Mugabe incited the war veterans further and refused to let the police enforce High Court injunctions against the farm invasions. This refusal to abide by the inconvenient rule of law was hardly new; the torture of two journalists in early 1999 and the kidnapping in mid-2000 of two Cuban physicians trying to defect were only two authoritarian outrages among many. Even former associates of Mugabe have been known to suffer fatal "accidents" while driving. Within State House, the shadowy Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) enforces the president's dictates and represses dissent by any and all means.

Zimbabwe's fall is particularly vexing because it has always been comparatively wealthy.

Zimbabwe's fall is hardly unique. Yet the Zimbabwe case, like the much earlier examples of Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah or Nigeria under a string of military presidents since the mid-1960s, is particularly vexing because Zimbabwe has always been comparatively wealthy. Unlike Zambia and Botswana, which rely on one primary export (copper and diamonds, respectively), Zimbabwe has almost always been able to feed itself and export tobacco, maize, gold, and minerals. It has a healthy entrepreneurial tradition of manufacturing for export and, with the Victoria Falls and many well-managed game reserves, an attractive tourist industry.

Africa's failure to thrive at the end of the last century has many causes, not least of which is mismanagement. One can pin the blame on shifts in world commodity prices, misguided World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies, civil wars, climatic disasters, unchecked population bulges, and so on. But the visible hand of individual rulers can also be discerned. And no single exemplar of failed leadership surpasses Mugabe, who has been prime minister or president of Zimbabwe since 1980. In the annals of human-made disasters in Africa, his has not yet equaled the inspired debacles of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, Idi

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EARTHSCAN
delivering sustainability

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 2000

UNEP

United Nations Environment Programme

The UN's major assessment of the state of the global environment at the start of the new millennium – uniquely comprehensive and authoritative.

GEO-2000 is the flagship publication of the world's leading environmental organization, and is based on information provided by more than 30 regional and international collaborating centers. Written in clear, non-technical language and packed with informative graphics and tables, this is the benchmark reference to the state of the global environment.

$32.50 / £20.00 paper 1 85383 588 9 • $85.00 / £50.00 cloth 1 85383 587 0 Tables, Figures, Maps, Color

WORLD WATER VISION

INCLUDES FREE CD-ROM!

MAKING WATER EVERYBODY'S BUSINESS

William J Cosgrove and Frank R Rijsberman for the World Water Council

The most comprehensive analysis ever undertaken of one of the most critical issues facing the world – the growing shortage of fresh water. The implications for health, prosperity and security are enormous. The crisis is one of management, and there are solutions. Integrated management of the world's highly complex water systems can reverse the current alarming trends.

A free CD-ROM containing all the background data, regional and sector scenarios accompanies the volume.

$19.95 / £12.95 paper 1 85383 730 X
Tables, Figures, Boxes, Maps

FUTURE POSITIVE

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Michael Edwards, Director, Governance and Civil Society, The Ford Foundation

'At last, a hard-headed but soft-hearted vision of global co-operation – respecting our differences, avoiding top-down solutions, expanding the number of voices at the table, yet moving forward together on clear goals. This is an optimistic book at a time when the global pessimists rule the intellectual roost' **Robert Reich, former US Secretary of Labor.**

$29.95 / £20.00 cloth 1 85383 6311

THE RADIATION LEGACY OF THE SOVIET NUCLEAR COMPLEX

IIASA

AN ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW

Edited by Nikolai N Egorov, Vladimir M Novikov, Frank L Parker and Victor K Popov

The first detailed account of nuclear contamination from civil and military sources in the former Soviet Union.

$85.00 / £50.00 cloth 1 85383 658 3

US ORDERS Tel: 703 661 1581 • Toll Free: 1-800-232-0223
Fax: 703 661 1501
Styluspub@presswarehouse.com • www.styluspub.com

REST OF WORLD Earthscan Publications
120 Pentonville Road, London N1 9JN, UK
Tel: +44 (0)1903 828 800 • Fax: +44 (0)20 7278 1142
earthinfo@earthscan.co.uk • www.earthscan.co.uk

The World Bank

Evaluation and Development

Robert Picciotto, *The World Bank*, Series Editor

This biannual series explores the assessment of the proper relationship between institutions and development challenges through evaluative techniques.

INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, Volume 2

Robert Picciotto and Warren van Wicklin, Volume Editors

This volume builds upon earlier studies and field work to offer a broad look at dam-building projects in six countries and to review the outcomes of Bank policy, learn from experience, and assess outside criticism.

0-7658-0018-7 (cloth) 360 pp. 2000 $39.95 / £30.95
0-7658-0683-5 (paper) 360 pp. 2000 $24.95 / £19.95

EVALUATION AND DEVELOPMENT

THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION, Volume 1

Robert Picciotto and Eduardo Wiesner, Volume editors
James D. Wolfensohn, foreword

This volume presents the role of institutions in development; institutions and governance structures; institutional development and social capital; and the implications of neoinstitutional economics for evaluation.

1-56000-370-7 (cloth) 1998 320 pp. $39.95 / £30.95
0-7658-0423-9 (paper) 1998 320 pp. $22.95 / $17.95

Visit our web site for special offers
www.transactionpub.com
*individual credit card orders only

transaction

RUTGERS—THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY, DEPT. 200011
35 BERRUE CIRCLE, PISCATAWAY, NEW JERSEY 08854
TEL: 1-888-999-6778 (U.S. ONLY) OR 732-445-1245 FAX:732-748-9801
IN THE UK—3 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON WC2E 8LU
TEL: +44 (0)20 7 240 0856 OR FAX: +44 (0)20 7 379 0609

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enigma books

20th Century

HITLER'S TABLE TALK • 1941-1944

Introductory essay and a new preface by
Hugh Trevor-Roper

ISBN 1-929631-05-7

785 pp, hardcover

$32.00



New...
OCTOBER 2000

IN STALIN'S SECRET SERVICE

by W.G. Krivitsky

With a foreword by Sam Tanenhaus, award-winning author of the biography, "Whittaker Chambers"

ISBN 1-929631-03-0

344 pp, 18 half tones, hardcover

$27.00



New...
NOVEMBER 2000

At all the best booksellers or directly from enigma books. Credit cards accepted. Phone, mail, fax or e-mail your order to:
enigma books, 580 Eighth Avenue, 21st floor, NY, NY 10018 • tel: 212.575.9100, fax: 212.575.9104, e-mail: sales@enigmabooks.com
FA1 ***www.enigmabooks.com***

enigma books

CGP The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership
国際交流基金日米センター

FUNDING FOR COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH AND DIALOGUE

The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (**CGP**) provides funding for collaborative projects that address issues of importance to US-Japan relations. We are pleased to announce new priorities in the Intellectual Exchange Programs for support of policy-relevant collaborative research and dialogue in the following fields:

Health Care and Aging

International Security

International Economics

Sustainable Development

Civil Society

For further information regarding these new priorities, the CGP Intellectual Exchange Programs, and other grant-making and fellowship opportunities, please see our website at ***<http://www.cgp.org/cgplink/>*** *or contact CGP directly.*

The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership
152 West 57th Street, 39th Floor, New York, New York 10019
Tel: (212) 489-1255, Fax: (212) 489-1344, E-mail: info@cgp.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Amin in Uganda, and Jean Fidel Bokassa in the Central African Empire. "I'm no Idi Amin," Mugabe resentfully told London's *Sunday Times* in June. Yet those three were poorly educated potentates pursuing peculiar personal visions and vendettas in countries less robust and prosperous than Zimbabwe. By contrast, the gifted Mugabe inherited a well-run, well-off territory. He robbed Zimbabwe of its potential.

THINGS FALL APART

MUGABE'S ASSESSMENT of his own abilities is not wrong; he is no mere thug like Amin. Rather, he is well-trained and capable of matching wits with many of the world's most sophisticated leaders. Mugabe was trained by Jesuit missionaries in rural Zimbabwe, became a teacher, and studied for a B.A. in English and history at the University College of Fort Hare in South Africa when it was one of the five best institutions of higher learning in sub-Saharan Africa. After graduating from Fort Hare in 1951, Mugabe taught first in Zimbabwe and then in Zambia at a teacher-training institution. Along the way, he obtained a diploma and a bachelor's degree in education from the University of South Africa and another bachelor's degree in economics from the University of London, all by correspondence. Subsequently, Mugabe taught in a teacher-training school in Ghana, from 1956 to 1960, where he met Sally Hayfron, his first wife.

Because Mugabe is genuinely talented and because Zimbabwe is a modern state that could have one of Africa's better economies and has, per capita, one of its best-educated populations, his madcap abuse has been that much more tragic. He has been fully in charge and fully aware, lording it over his party's authoritative politburo and central committee, the cabinet, and parliament.

Zimbabwe has been on an economic slide since 1995 but went into free fall in 1997. The comparatively (for Africa) wealthy country's per capita real GDP slumped in the late 1990s, from $645 in 1995 to $437 in 1999. Its real GDP growth rates tumbled from 7.3 percent in 1996 to -1 percent in 1999, with even worse shrinkage (perhaps almost -10 percent) expected for 2000. Consumer-price inflation has shot up from 22 percent in 1995 to 58.5 percent in 1999 and 80 percent in mid-2000. Zimbabwe's foreign-currency reserves were essentially exhausted in mid-2000. Its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

currency exchange rate against the U.S. dollar collapsed from 8 Zimbabwean dollars (Z$ hereafter) to $1 in 1995 to Z$23 to $1 in 1998, and then plunged to an artificially controlled level of Z$38 to $1 since mid-1999. Just after the 2000 elections, the unofficial trading rate was Z$60 to $1, and without controls, the overvalued local currency would trade at about Z$80 to $1. Domestic interest rates on treasury bills have risen to 70 percent, up from 20 percent in 1997. These stratospheric levels make nongovernmental borrowing—and thus routine commerce—increasingly difficult.

Mugabe wanted to show Nelson Mandela that he still counted.

The people of Zimbabwe are one-third poorer than they were at independence. With the onset of AIDS, their life expectancies have declined considerably, and infant mortality rates are rising rapidly. The modern look of Zimbabwe's cities belies their new poverty and the depths to which the living standards of most Zimbabweans have tumbled.

Countries cannot easily be bankrupted, but since Zimbabwe has been unable to pay its petroleum or energy bills since 1999, it is coming close. This spring, Zimbabwe could not cover the running costs and salaries of its overseas diplomatic missions. Thanks to charitable loans from Libya and Kuwait and the benevolence of South Africa, which understands the devastation that a total Zimbabwean collapse would wreak on the economy of southern Africa, Zimbabwe somehow managed in the first half of 2000 to import a dribble of fuel for cars, trucks, and tractors.

For Zimbabwean consumers, life since December 1999 has been a succession of mile-long lines: for gasoline for their cars, diesel fuel for their tractors, kerosene for heating, cooking oil, and bread. More than 60 percent of urban adults are unemployed. In an agricultural land where national self-sufficiency has been assumed except in years of dramatic drought, wheat and other staples (including the white maize that most Africans eat) have been periodically unavailable. Even local vegetables are scarce and expensive. Consumers, both urban and rural, have borne the brunt of the country's financial decay. Further shortages, fuel rationing, and damaging price controls are predicted for the last quarter of 2000.

Harare, Zimbabwe's seemingly prosperous capital, had the air in July of a modern Potemkin village. Hotels were empty, firms were going bankrupt, and tourists were absent. The sprawling city was a lifeless shell.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ordinary commerce had started to grind to a halt in the months before the June elections, particularly with the threat of farm confiscations. In May and June, when cured Virginia leaf tobacco is usually sold, nearly all of it was sitting unprocessed in barns because so many white producers had been forced off their farms.

The root of this financial meltdown is the government's failure to control its fiscal deficit, which has risen alarmingly from 8 percent of GDP in 1998 to 12 percent in 1999 and probably to as much as 20 percent in 2000. Despite promises to the IMF throughout the 1990s, Zimbabwe failed to trim its official wage bill by reducing government workers. Excess civil-service and military employment kept fiscal deficits high, but the precipitating cause of Zimbabwe's economic troubles was Mugabe's personal decision (without prior consultation with parliament, the cabinet, or his party's central committee) to send 6,000 Zimbabwean soldiers into the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1998 to bolster Kabila's government against rebels supported by Rwanda and Uganda.

Mugabe says that helping Kabila was a simple matter of aiding a fellow southern African leader in a time of need, and the 6,000 Zimbabwean troops have since swelled to 13,000. But Mugabe also wanted to show President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and President Nelson Mandela of South Africa that he still counted. Equally important, Kabila offered Mugabe, his close political cronies, and some Zimbabwean generals a chance to line their pockets with the Congo's cobalt and diamond wealth. Although Zimbabwe paid the troops, purchased the ammunition, and obtained the fuel that let Mugabe's troops help contain the rebels in eastern Congo, a few individuals are widely suspected of having received rewards from Congolese mineral concessions in exchange. Zimbabwe's distraught finance minister, nominally in charge of the government's treasury, certainly never knew how the military incursion into the Congo was to be afforded. For years, Zimbabwean finances have been run from State House, and Mugabe regularly refused to let unhappy finance ministers resign.

If sending troops to the Congo were not damaging enough, Mugabe compounded Zimbabwe's misery this year by hiring rent-a-thug "veterans" to invade 1,600 white-owned farms—more than a third of the total number of such farms—and by threatening loudly to confiscate

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

every last one of the remaining farms without compensation. Whatever moral justification there was for evicting whites from farms that had been in nonindigenous hands for 50 to 100 years after being "purchased" from Africans during the European occupation, Mugabe's bullying immediately jeopardized the employment and wages of 400,000 African farm laborers and their families, inhibited reinvestment by farmers, and chilled domestic trade and banking, which has massive loans outstanding to white farmers. Two South Africa–based construction companies scaled back their operations, and a huge sugar firm suspended fresh investments, as did the Nissan automobile company. Bata Shoes reported that its retail trade had halted. Two of Zimbabwe's largest firms warned that profits in 2000 would fall by 60 percent or more. Since the white farms produce more than half of Zimbabwe's exports and foreign-exchange earnings and since the unrest vitiated tourist earnings (which are about eight percent of annual GDP), Mugabe's actions drove a stake into the already weakened heart of his national economy.

To be clear, Africans were heartlessly pushed off the best lands in Zimbabwe by the more powerful whites. This began in the 1890s but continued well into the 1920s. These inequities, which were confirmed by a 1930 Zimbabwean commission chaired by Sir Morris Carter, relegated Africans to the less well watered, stonier, and less loamy lands of the nation. After independence, that disparity was meant to be rectified by official purchases of white-owned farms and the resettlement of truly landless African peasants. Some of that occurred, gradually, but much of the transferred farmland—especially the very best bits—somehow found its way into the hands of Mugabe's associates. The recovered lands were used as patronage spoils, and they still are. Moreover, in those cases of genuine peasant resettlement, no resources were provided to maintain irrigation facilities or other equipment. Once broken up into peasant holdings, large farms can prove inefficient and uneconomical, whatever the talents of the small farmer—especially in situations like Zimbabwe's, where the small farmers are not given title to the new landholdings. To compound the problem, the government agricultural-extension services collapsed for want of funds, cutting off a source of advice. Mugabe sowed disaster.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABSOLUTE POWER ...

HAD THE FARM INVASIONS not been just the sort of electoral ploy that Mugabe had often used before, and had the president and his cronies not been suspected by most Zimbabweans of having profited since the mid-1990s from every conceivable form of graft, the high-handedness of the past two years would not have caused so much consternation among a hitherto accepting population. Mugabe, after all, was the country's founder. But when citizens suffer and suffer, leaders can forfeit their credibility. This happened to Mugabe because of the Congo campaign and a cascade of corruption.

Tracing corruption anywhere, and particularly in the developing world, is never easy, and rumors are not fact. Still, there is no doubt that Mobutu salted billions of ill-gotten dollars in banks and properties in Switzerland and France, that Hastings Banda of impoverished Malawi built 13 large palaces throughout his nation during his 30-year reign—and that Mugabe has purchased or constructed six "mansions" in Zimbabwe in recent years. It is also a fact that Mugabe has often commandeered jets from the national airline (thus inconveniencing scheduled passengers) for state "shopping" visits abroad. He has reportedly purchased property in Europe, and he has bank accounts in all the usual overseas places. A complicated web of companies registered in the Isle of Man and the British Virgin Islands may control many of his investments.

Last October, Transparency International rated Zimbabwe the world's 45th most corrupt country, below South Africa (34th) and Poland but well above Jamaica, Turkey, Belarus, Bulgaria, Russia, Ghana (63rd), Nigeria (98th), and Cameroon (99th). According to the *Africa Competitiveness Report* for 2000, Zimbabwe is one of the very least competitive African nations, pulled down significantly in the rankings by its reputation for corruption. Zimbabwe is also listed in the same report as the African country "most needing improvement," with the most volatile exchange rate, poorest export position, and least growth in all of Africa.

No wonder. Large construction contracts, including those for Harare's new international airport, have found their way to consortia controlled by Leo Mugabe, the president's nephew. In 2000, friends of the president created a diamond-harvesting scheme in the Congo and attempted to float stock on the London market. In 1997, Mugabe lost

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

three court battles trying to prevent a local black entrepreneur from starting a successful cellular-telephone franchise; Mugabe wanted his nephew to dominate that business. (The entrepreneur became an MDC supporter and found it prudent to remain outside Zimbabwe after June's election results were announced.) Whatever the totality and truth of this circumstantial evidence, ordinary Zimbabweans in 1999 and 2000 simply rolled their eyes when questions arose about the president's corruption. He and his administration were seen as thoroughly rotten. Indeed, part of the job of the CIO is to keep tabs on the corruption of subordinates so that Mugabe always has leverage over those who have profited from their positions of public trust. Few have not.

Graft has, of course, helped block economic reform. Throughout the 1990s, advisers from the World Bank and the IMF, as well as a team from Harvard University, recommended that Zimbabwe follow Zambia's and South Africa's leads (and the Asian "tiger" model) and sell off its money-losing state-owned monopolies in such capital-intensive areas as communications and energy. Doing so would dramatically reduce government deficits; provide better, modernized, and cheaper services; create new jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities; provide infusions of cash for social services; and not tie up scarce official capital. These arguments were well received in almost all sectors of society and even within Mugabe's cabinet and central committee. Outsiders personally discussed these ideas with Mugabe. But the sale of significant state-owned enterprises proceeded glacially and without presidential enthusiasm, for three obvious reasons: state-owned concerns were sources of patronage, which Mugabe directed; the resources of state enterprises could be diverted (like the national airline) for his own use; and state-owned firms could offer contracts that Mugabe and his associates could control and from which they could (and did) profit.

In 1996, I visited the cabinet minister responsible for privatization and beseeched him to accelerate the sale and restructuring of state enterprises. "You don't need to try to persuade me," he smiled, holding up his hands. "We're all in favor of privatizing." So why wasn't it happening? The minister rolled his eyes and gestured upward. "The boss won't let us," he said. With deliberate naiveté, I asked if the cabinet were in favor. "Of course," my tutor explained. And how would the cabinet vote on the question? "It depends," he said, "on whether the ballot were open or secret."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE AUTUMN OF THE PATRIARCH

LIKE MOST OF AFRICA, Zimbabwe has structural and geographical weaknesses that go beyond poor leadership. It is landlocked, for one, and its 12 million people are burdened with one of the highest adult HIV infection rates in the world (27 percent). It also endured 90 years of white settler occupation and racist misallocation of resources, as well as a bitter civil war. But Zimbabwe's glum failure to realize its potential has much to do with the self-aggrandizement of the very man who led the nation out of white supremacist rule. In the 1960s, many Africa specialists—myself included—extolled Mugabe's clear-eyed intelligence, character, and Jesuit-instilled ascetic integrity. Mugabe's disdain for his citizens is bold, freshly arrogant, and jarring in one previously so politically acute. What went wrong? What changed?

After Ian Smith attempted to create a settler-ruled Rhodesia from 1965 to 1979, Mugabe and other Zimbabwean nationalists were severely tested. They were jailed and exiled, and their edges were honed by the determined aggression of the white settlers. Mugabe spent ten years, from 1964 to 1974, in detention. When Zimbabweans, backed by China, Cuba, Libya, Algeria, and Marxist Ethiopia, took to the bush and began an eight-year guerrilla war against Rhodesia in 1971, Mugabe emerged ascendant when his rivals struck the guerrillas as insufficiently tough. Mugabe fled Zimbabwe in 1975 and rapidly consolidated his embryonic claim to national leadership by obtaining the funds and weapons necessary to pursue the war and make combat costly for Smith's whites. Mugabe was never the field strategist, but he fueled the efforts of the guerrillas and refined their political message.

By late 1979, white Rhodesia was on the ropes, and its apartheid-minded South African friends had thrown in the towel. A British-negotiated settlement created the modern Zimbabwe. At the talks in London, Mugabe was the unquestioned leader of the team. In the subsequent 1980 election, Mugabe skillfully deployed his political troops, campaigned imaginatively throughout what was soon to become Zimbabwe, and claimed the premiership of the new country.

Zimbabwe, as an African-run, crypto-Marxist enterprise, was Mugabe's creation. Members of his ZANU-PF party were officially called "comrade." The ruling party was more powerful than the government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The nation's foreign policy was "nonaligned" and pro-Soviet. Mugabe presided over the nationalization of newspapers, the national airline, and the marketing of minerals. Hindered for seven years by the British-imposed constitution, he waited until 1987 to scrap the country's inherited parliamentary system and become executive president and unquestioned leader. (Britain said that it did not then view the inauguration of single-party rule as "an erosion of democracy.")

In the early 1990s, Mugabe's diktats became less and less subject to criticism. As Mugabe consolidated his grip on power at home and became a recognized figure abroad, he became more autocratic and avaricious. Those close to Mugabe, now 76, attribute his increasing arrogance and vanity to his age, his anxiety about being eclipsed as an African leader by Mandela after South Africa held its first democratic elections in 1994, and the waning influence of the president's then-wife, Sally. Around 1990, the president and Grace Marufu, his young secretary, became increasingly intimate, and she subsequently gave birth to his three children. (His only child with Sally died young.) After Sally herself died in 1992, Mugabe married Marufu, and the upsurge in Mugabe's caprice and greed has closely tracked her rise. Senior ZANU-PF cabinet members called her "grasping Grace"—behind her back.

Following the rule of law would hardly work to Mugabe's benefit.

The MDC's Tsvangirai has proposed a truth commission to provide a national accounting for past crimes (including the appalling Matabeleland massacres in the 1980s, in which over 20,000 opposition supporters were murdered), human rights abuses, and corruption. After the June elections, he urged Mugabe's impeachment. Mugabe's leadership decisively lost its legitimacy in the late 1990s. The unanticipated loss of the February referendum was a precursor to his party's narrow and much-questioned parliamentary victory in June, which gave 62 predominantly rural seats to ZANU-PF, 57 to the MDC, and 1 to a small opposition party.

Having received nearly half the votes cast, the MDC controls enough seats to prevent Mugabe from amending the constitution. The MDC also emerged as a new kind of African political party: it has an urban power base but also controls many of the country's rural

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

areas. Moreover, black voters elected four MDC whites, enabling the MDC to claim that it is a truly nonracial, pan-ethnic party.

By comparison, ZANU-PF kept its seat majority by winning—sometimes in a questionable manner—a succession of entirely rural Shona-speaking constituencies. The leader of the European Union monitoring team termed the election "hardly free and fair." Even within ZANU-PF, there were strident calls immediately after the election for Mugabe's resignation.

The long reach of the CIO still makes that unthinkable. Mugabe is nimble, clever enough to reform, and aware of how energized urban African publics can be. But easing toward retirement would mean moderating his cronies' greed and his own. Following the rule of law would hardly work to Mugabe's benefit.

Zimbabwe could, under revamped leadership, recover its promise with much greater ease than neighboring Zambia and Malawi after their recent traumas of corrupt, autocratic rule. The immediate challenges are formidable but less daunting than they would be in African countries with poorer human resources: bringing the troops home from the Congo, restoring law and order, stabilizing the national finances, fighting corruption, improving health and education, strengthening infrastructure, privatizing state monopolies, wooing foreign direct investment, and starting to practice good governance. But what about the fundamental leadership problems of the rest of Africa? Here, the lesson of Mugabe is richly instructive.

DESTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT

LORD ACTON'S DICTUM that "absolute power corrupts absolutely" is suggestive in the Mugabe case, but hardly conclusive. In Zimbabwe, as in so many other places in Africa since 1960, a weak civil society provided openings for autocracy; the Cold War, with its tolerance for strongmen, offered others. Zimbabwe, like many other African states, lacked an independent media to hold politicians accountable. Mugabe originally also created a party-dominated socialist state. Given the comparative prosperity of the 1980s, the absence of any real victimization of whites, and the repression and then co-optation of the main opposition party, anti-Mugabe voices were muted. Moreover,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ZANU-PF was ethnically and politically formidable. Those politicians who did oppose Mugabe and the ZANU-PF steamroller either lacked national legitimacy or were harassed and arrested. The CIO kept internal ZANU-PF dissidents in line, as did Mugabe's patronage machine. By the early 1990s, Mugabe was unassailable, and the resultant sense of entitlement engendered excesses.

The forgiving attitude of the international community also contributed to Mugabe's sense of invincibility. No one in Africa ever publicly called Mugabe to account, including its giants. Nyerere was greatly displeased when Mugabe rebuffed his plea not to send troops to the Congo. Mandela regarded Mugabe as an insufferable autocrat, and South Africa's current president, Thabo Mbeki, probably feels the same way. But no one said so publicly.

Outside of Africa, the international lending institutions always thought it better to woo Mugabe than to criticize him. Indeed, the IMF rewarded him with tranche after tranche of support. Even after Mugabe and his finance ministers refused over and over again to fulfill their bargains, even after he sent troops into the Congo, the IMF clung to engagement. The World Bank and other donors also never flagged in their support.

One recipe to curb the rise of future Mugabes is to hold strictly to conditions for help. To curb autocratic excesses, international lending institutions should use tough love: an absolute refusal to lend and donate in the absence of the rule of law, good governance, and sensible economic policy. Likewise, bilateral donors should cease supporting those who self-aggrandize or abuse human rights. Better yet, donors and international lending agencies should shun all dealings with those who breach their own national norms. There should be no state visits for the Mugabes of the world or their foreign ministers or finance ministers. Ostracism can be a powerful weapon, especially if the refusal to pursue business as usual with dictators and illiberal democrats becomes widespread.

Continuing big-power relations with the Mugabes of the world is usually excused by the term "constructive engagement." Better to retain some influence, however limited, with despots—thus runs the usual rationale. But it almost never works. Mugabe grew more and more insufferable because he could thumb his nose at the international

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lending institutions, the Commonwealth, and the big powers. No one has yet called his bluff. In May and June 2000, even Mbeki—heir to Mandela, the continent's shining light—consciously refrained from publicly criticizing Mugabe.

Good leadership in Africa should be rewarded, participatory leadership supported, and sensible economic management backed—but not bad leadership and bad policy. Mugabe's growth as an unlimited autocrat just might have been checked by enough international cold shoulders. If he had been made persona non grata abroad, especially in Europe and the United States, Zimbabwean civil society might have taken heart. So might his critics in and out of government. At the very least, the IMF and the World Bank should have abided by the letter and spirit of their own conditions. Depriving Mugabe's Zimbabwe of foreign aid because of his proclivities might have made a difference. All of those snubs were certainly worth trying. Constructive engagement, in other words, ought to be employed in Africa only sparingly and surgically.

Such prescriptions are useful but difficult and negating. One could also be proactive about Africa's leadership problem. It is now more necessary than ever to find ways to help elected African politicians themselves lead—not by working in society at large (although that is not harmful) and not by working at the grassroots (which is also useful but not sufficient). The models of modern Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa need to be offered to emerging African elected leaders through carefully tailored courses and seminars. Doing so would not be a conclusive remedy for African leadership weaknesses, but it should help limit the rise of future Mugabes and their ilk. The old ways have hardly worked.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Chilean Model for Russia

José Piñera

FREE MARKETS, FREE PEOPLE

WHAT RUSSIA NEEDED at the beginning of the twentieth century was not a Bolshevik Revolution but an American one. The tragedy of that great nation was that it got a Lenin instead of a Jefferson. Today, nearly ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's new president, Vladimir Putin, has the historic opportunity to start the freedom revolution that his country missed last century.

I had the opportunity to assess Russia's situation at the end of April, when I traveled to Moscow at the invitation of President Putin's newly appointed economic adviser, Andrei Illarionov. As a member of the team of economists that entered the Pinochet government in Chile in the 1970s to produce a free-market economic revolution and a return to democratic rule, I was inevitably asked whether Russia "needed a Pinochet" and whether the country should introduce a "Chilean economic model." My unequivocal answer was no to the first question and yes to the second.

President Putin and his government must not identify the core of the Chilean experience with its historically specific interruption of political liberties. Such a break has happened in many other nations, and in almost all cases, their generals-turned-presidents have not only been a disaster for their countries but have also left a legacy of more state intervention and corruption. I told my Russian audiences that the replicable aspect of the Chilean model is the radical, compre-

---

JOSÉ PIÑERA is President of the International Center for Pension Reform and Cochair of the Cato Institute's Project on Social Security Privatization. As Chilean Minister of Labor and Social Security from 1978 to 1980 he was responsible for the privatization of the Chilean pension system.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hensive, and sustained move toward free markets.

That model not only doubled Chile's historic rate of economic growth (to an average of 7 percent a year from 1984 to 1998) and reduced the proportion of people living in poverty from 45 percent in 1987 to 22.2 percent in 1998. It also unleashed the forces that brought liberal democracy and the rule of law. Those who argue that a nonelected legislature was necessary to accomplish those beneficial free-market reforms are not only factually wrong but also weaken the case for democracy by implying that correct public policies cannot be understood by the people and their elected representatives. Having helped "export" Chilean pension reform to ten very different countries, I can attest that the indispensable element common to these reforms was not a strong four-star general but a team of determined policymakers who knew that freedom works—and that the people would understand that concept if it were well explained.

If President Putin is convinced, as he has said he is, that economic freedom is the road to high growth, he can find such a team in Russia to implement the reforms necessary for the transition to a modern free economy and to achieve an economic and political status consistent with the nation's cultural achievements. Indeed, with a GDP smaller than Spain's (a country of 39 million people), Russia is performing far below its potential. Both the president and his 146 million compatriots are painfully aware of this.

Russia is like a giant in chains. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn expressed it best when he recently said, "The creative strengths of the people, which were repressed under the communists and still are today, could get everything moving. Millions of Russians are blocked by a wall of administrative and bureaucratic arbitrariness. They have no one to complain to, no court to protect their rights." Their enormous potential needs only to be unlocked.

RUSSIA FOUND

THE 1998 FALL of the ruble and the subsequent financial crisis prompted many to ask, "Who lost Russia?" Market reforms were often blamed for the country's turmoil. George Soros, for instance, recently claimed that "the economic reform efforts were dismal failures. ... It is exactly the market fundamentalist bias that must be held responsible

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the outcome." But that diagnosis of the Russian crisis is wrong and ignores the progress that the country has made in significant areas.

True, according to official figures, Russia's economy has shrunk an average of 5.4 percent per year since 1991. But Russia does not have a market economy. In terms of economic freedom, Russia ranks 93rd out of 123 countries surveyed, between Zambia and Bangladesh, in the latest Economic Freedom of the World report. There is no rule of law; private landowner property rights are virtually nonexistent; many businesses receive government protection; key enterprises are still largely owned by the state; minority shareholder rights are regularly violated and corporate governance rules are extremely weak; the ruble is unstable; tax rates are confiscatory; government spending is high; and Moscow's bureaucracy is larger than it was even during Soviet times. The 1998 crisis was the predictable culmination of an inconsistent mix of market and interventionist policies, some or all of which were also present in the Latin American and Asian countries that experienced crises in the 1990s. Clearly, Russia's disappointing economic performance must be attributed mainly to the lack of a coherent process of market reforms, not strict adherence to free-market policies.

In terms of economic freedom, Russia ranks 93rd out of 123 countries surveyed.

The country's difficulties are also, to an important extent, due to its 70 years of communism, a much longer and more pervasive totalitarian episode than that experienced by Eastern Europe. Despite the weight of Soviet history, the changes have been profound, and Russia today is a dramatically different country than it was in 1991. It has achieved a peaceful transition from a totalitarian state to a democracy, however imperfect—an immensely difficult task in itself, for which former President Boris Yeltsin deserves more credit than he generally receives. Russia's important advances—admittedly incomplete or flawed in execution—also include widespread privatization, price liberalization, and the opening of the economy to investment and trade. (Critics of the reformers often forget the extraordinary challenge in taking charge of an economy when the budget deficit was approaching 30 percent of the GNP, as was the case in Russia at the end of 1991.) And of course, on May 7, 2000, Russia went through the first democratic transfer of power in its 1,100-year history.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Therefore, to ask who lost Russia is inappropriate. Russia is not lost; it has taken many years and a financial crisis to achieve the preconditions—both political and economic—for further reforms. The challenge for Putin now is to introduce such reforms in a country where much of the population has developed a cynical view of capitalism—a perception resulting from the slow pace of change, the crash of the ruble, the reforms' flaws, and the consequent rise of the so-called oligarchs. Russians can be forgiven for that cynicism. They heard from many Russian and Western financial officials that their country was moving swiftly and successfully to the free market. But the reformers never did explain to the public the logic and implications of the policy changes, something essential for successful free-market reforms. In the minds of many Russians, the post-Soviet experience has only confirmed the Marxist textbook version of capitalism. A critical task for the Putin administration will be to communicate clearly and regularly with the Russian people about the purpose and importance of market reforms.

FOUR REFORMS FOR HIGH GROWTH

IN THE FIRST QUARTER of 2000, Russia experienced an official growth rate of eight percent. But such rapid growth will be short-lived. After a yearlong recession, the country is merely experiencing a bounce-back effect produced by the devaluation of the ruble and helped by high oil prices. For Russia to grow at self-sustaining rates of seven to ten percent for one or two decades—the only way that it can pull itself out of poverty and address its many problems—it must significantly increase its economic freedom. Putin made a striking statement along those lines on a recent visit to the declining industrial city of Ivanovo: "The higher the degree of economic freedom of economic entities, the higher the level of the development of the state."

Russia can achieve high growth by implementing four top-priority reforms: pension privatization, tax reform, radical deregulation, and the replacement of the ruble with the euro. The guiding concept, applied rigorously in both Chile and New Zealand during those countries' reform periods, is to eliminate the system of state-sanctioned privileges, which prevails throughout the Russian economy. In addition, to be effective, the reforms must be carried out as part of a single initiative.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A NATION OF CAPITALISTS

LETTING WORKING RUSSIANS keep their own retirement savings instead of giving them to the government would be wildly popular in Russia, as I saw at a two-hour press conference attended by some 70 journalists at the Interfax News Agency and at a meeting headed by former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov with leading legislators at the Duma (Russia's lower house of parliament). At the end of my day at the Duma, Nemtsov appeared on national television explaining to workers the benefits of holding their old-age savings in private property accounts. By the evening of the next day, my press conference had been broadcast on all the major national television stations; the following morning, it was covered in the country's newspapers.

Like those of all countries with pay-as-you-go social-security schemes, Russia's system is going broke and will have to be reformed sooner or later. Indeed, inflation has eaten away at the real value of pensioners' benefits over the years. The inadequate benefits are accompanied by social-security payroll taxes of 29 percent. This high rate raises the costs of labor and encourages unemployment, putting further pressure on the public pension program. Expenditures on social security already constitute much of the government's budget outlays. In short, the high costs and low benefits of the public pension system rob people of security in their old age and discourage overall economic growth. The longer the country postpones reform, the more difficult it will be to make the transition to a fully funded system.

The Russian government should follow the principles applied in Chile: workers should be allowed to place their retirement savings in their own accounts to be privately managed by competing firms, which would invest that money in capital markets over the working lifetimes of their clients. Giving ordinary Russians the choice of remaining in the state-run system or moving into the private system makes it more difficult for politicians to obstruct reform. (When workers were given that choice in Chile in 1981, 25 percent chose the new system within the first month alone; now 94 percent are in the private system.) New entrants to the labor force, however, should go directly into the private pension system. That will permit Russia eventually to close the door on the state-run system that politicians—

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CORBIS-BETTMANN



AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Follow the leader: Augusto Pinochet and Vladimir Putin

as has been the case in all countries—have abused for political purposes, and it will protect the private system from being undermined by a publicly managed, unfunded system. Finally, the benefits of current retirees and of those people remaining in the old system should not be altered. Such a measure is both fair and politically prudent since it, too, removes potential opposition to privatization.

Russian pension reform needs to be fitted to Russian conditions. Unfortunately, because of the 1998 crisis, the most salient feature of Russia's economic situation is a justifiable lack of trust in the nation's financial sector, which essentially no longer functions. A functioning banking sector and capital market, moreover, are hindered by the presence of a large barter economy and a lack of transparency in business transactions. Thus the primary feature of the first stage of Russian pension reform should be a strong emphasis on investments abroad in competing global index funds. Under current conditions, that would be the only way to safeguard workers' savings. Workers should also be given the choice of investing their savings in Russia, thus helping to create—with prudent gradualism—a domestic capital market.

Gaining the most from pension privatization would not only require other reforms; it would drive them. A reform that allows Russians to invest their pension savings abroad sends a powerful signal about the openness of the country's economy and about the Russian government's view that capital will be permitted to flow both ways, something that would itself encourage greater foreign investment in Russia. But the most important impact of pension reform is the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

paradigm shift it produces by creating a country of property-owning workers who favor free-market economic policies. Put simply, the rise of worker capitalism would turn Marx on his head. Done properly and accompanied by other reforms, pension reform can stimulate a virtuous cycle in which workers invest their savings in capital markets, and markets increasingly invest in Russia as both the financial and the corporate sectors develop.

Since the Republican presidential candidate, George W. Bush, has recently announced his desire to reform Social Security by introducing private retirement accounts, a new "pension reform race" between the United States and Russia—a more benign kind of race than in the past—has broken out. And in this race, Russia has a chance of "beating" the United States.

NO EXCEPTIONS

THROUGHOUT MOSCOW appear posters of the city's founder, Yuri Dolgoruky (whose nickname was the "Long-Armed" for his accumulation of land and property), extending his hand with a caption urging Russians to pay their taxes. But Russians are paying him no heed. Russian taxes are complex, high, full of exceptions, and uncollectible. Total payroll taxes reach about 39 percent, while the marginal income-tax rate for those of modest earnings is about 20 percent. In the 1999 tax year, only 3.8 million Russians filed income-tax declarations. Compliance with all the tax laws would result in an effective average tax rate of about 50 percent. Boris Federov, a former finance minister and chief tax official, explains that there is no logic or theory to the nation's tax code. The high and multiple rates discourage growth and encourage the spread of the barter economy and the informal sector, estimated to be at least 25 percent of GDP.

Russia needs a radical overhaul of its tax policy. The payroll tax could be cut in half without affecting revenues significantly. The personal income tax, which provides only 3.9 percent of the state's revenues, should be eliminated entirely. In place of those taxes, Russia should maintain only its value-added tax and apply it at a flat rate with no exceptions whatsoever. Those measures will encourage job creation, investment, and a more transparent business sector as firms

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

find compliance more reasonable than cheating. With more firms operating in the open as a result of the reduced tax burden, foreign and domestic banks will be better able to extend credit based on reliable assessments of firms' financial conditions. The simplicity of the flat value-added tax structure would go a long way toward ending the discriminatory treatment that many productive firms face, making it more difficult and less necessary for politically powerful but inefficient industries to negotiate special tax arrangements with the authorities. Those reforms should be accompanied by focusing government spending strictly and more efficiently on the poor and vulnerable, thus creating an effective safety net. In short, Moscow must move away from its "long-arm" tactics of tax collection and toward a simple but modern approach consistent with high growth.

SMASHING THE MONOPOLIES

THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY is still dominated by state-sanctioned monopolies in energy and uncompetitive industries that receive various forms of state protection. According to Yevgeni Yassin of the Higher School of Economics, some 40 percent of all Russian businesses actually lose money. Largely because the gas and electricity monopolies are forced by the government to provide low-cost services to unproductive firms, many such firms stay in business, undermining more-productive companies that do not enjoy the same support. Local governments, which have created local monopolies out of power stations and networks, have protected their industrial sector by providing this sort of subsidy.

Combined with high tax rates, the implicit subsidies create a lack of transparency in accounting practices and entail high social costs. In addition to sustaining an inefficient arrangement in which businesses largely pay each other and the government in kind rather than in cash, the Russian system breeds corruption and uneven enforcement of tax laws, since most large firms negotiate their dues to the state.

Widespread deregulation, including free entry by Russian and foreign firms into all segments of the energy sector, would help create the competitive conditions that Russia lacks. Greater competition among firms would change not only the "hard" infrastructure of the economy but also its "soft" infrastructure—accounting standards,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

legal practices, and even cultural attitudes. Were those changes to come about, of course, the financial system could operate properly by channeling savings to productive investments. Allowing firms to go bankrupt and generating incentives for competition—through, for one thing, more-transparent and less-costly transactions—is necessary to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources.

GOOD RIDDANCE TO BAD RUBLE

NEITHER RUSSIA'S financial system nor its business sector will develop to its full potential unless fundamental monetary reform is introduced. The record of the Russian central bank has been disastrous: periods of high inflation, a 75 percent devaluation of the ruble since 1998, and the collapse of the country's financial system after the central bank spent $10 billion in a failed attempt to prop up the ruble in 1998. In the 1990s, the central bank confiscated the wealth of Russians in five separate episodes of inflationary bouts, defaults, or currency control. Former Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar provides an insightful explanation of that sorry record:

> The most important impetus for currency emission was the state's inability to conduct its business in such a way that expenditures were always covered by revenues and market borrowings. ... This is the simplest and most effective of all existing taxes. ... No tax police are needed to collect it ... but it is also terribly destructive for the economy. Sooner or later it is bound to throw the nation's currency—that most important component in a delicate market mechanism—into turmoil.

Russians are understandably distrustful of the ruble and sensitive to the tremendous uncertainty created by their central bank. Already, citizens seem to have chosen to use the dollar and other foreign currencies, rather than the ruble, whenever they can.

Why not take the next logical step? For the reforms to work better, Russia should officially replace the ruble with the euro. The choice of the euro rather than the dollar makes sense, given that Russia more closely identifies with Europe than with the United States and given its closer trade ties to the continent. Better yet, the euro is not associated with any single country—most importantly not Russia's superpower rival—but is the currency of a collection of countries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The World According to BASIC BOOKS



Now in paperback

POWER AND PROSPERITY

Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships

Mancur Olson

This final work by a world-renowned economist will take its place among the classics of political economy.

"*Power and Prosperity* is an important book, written with clarity and verve. It is a great misfortune that Mancur Olson is not here to respond to the debates that it will surely provoke."
—*The Wall Street Journal*

"Olson lives. The friendly style, the crackling insights, the slap of wit... this is 100% Mancur."
—Robert Klitgaard, Dean, Rand Graduate School

Basic Books • Nov. 2000
0-465-05196-0
272 pages • $18.00 pb



Now in paperback

THE RISE OF THE VIRTUAL STATE

Wealth and Power in the Coming Century

Richard Rosecrance

A leading scholar of international relations tells why the rise of virtual economies will make military conquest obsolete.

"The best book yet on how modern capitalism is transforming international relations."
—*Foreign Affairs*

"Splendidly written, highly accessible and genuinely important."
—*Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*

Basic Books • July 2000
0-465-07142-2
288 pages • $15.00 pb

Now in paperback

A CENTURY'S JOURNEY

How the Great Powers Shape the World

Robert Pastor

"This fine set of essays should become the standard text for the comparative foreign policies of the great powers... There is nothing else like it."
—Robert Jervis, Columbia University

"An extremely thoughtful examination of great-power politics." —Thomas L. Friedman, *New York Times*

Basic Books • July 2000
0-465-05476-5
464 pages • $18.00 pb



NEW

THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL

Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else

Hernando de Soto

From the most important economist in the Third World, a revolutionary and practical plan for transforming underperforming economies—based on the forgotten history of how wealth was created in the West.

"A very great book...powerful and completely convincing."
—Ronald Coase, Nobel Laureate in Economics

"One of the few new and genuinely promising approaches...to come along in a very long time."
—Francis Fukuyama, author of *The Great Disruption*

Basic Books • September 2000
0-465-01614-6 • 320 pages • $27.50 hc



NEW

CULTURE MATTERS

How Values Shape Human Progress

Lawrence E. Harrison and **Samuel P. Huntington**

"Stunning! Harrison and Huntington have brought together essays and commentary by some two dozen scholars of the most varied fields to explore a metadiscipline that would make sense of the modern world. Only a beginning, as the editors insist. But what a way to start a century!" —Daniel Patrick Moynihan

"A thought-provoking set of papers on the role of culture in human life. *Culture Matters* will become a standard reference for those in pursuit of a comprehensive understanding of human behavior and social processes."—William Julius Wilson, Harvard University

Among the prominent scholars and journalists contributing to the volume are Francis Fukuyama, Nathan Glazer, David Landes, Seymour Martin Lipset, Orlando Patterson, Michael Porter, Jeffrey Sachs, and Richard Shweder.

Basic Books • April 2000 • 0-465-03175-7 • 384 pages • $35.00 hc

Available Wherever Books Are Sold
Or order direct:
Call: 1-800-386-5656
Fax: 1-800-449-3356

BASIC BOOKS
A member of the Perseus Books Group
10 East 53rd Street
New York, NY 10022
www.basicbooks.com

BASIC BOOKS 50 YEARS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Keesing's Record of World Events

INTERNATIONAL NEWS REPORTS
COMPLETE WORLDWIDE COVERAGE



Since 1931, *Keesing's* has been the authoritative monthly digest of worldwide political and economic events.

The editorial staff in Cambridge, England culls stories from the world's press and distills them into concise, objective reports read by subscribers in 73 countries.

Coverage includes every country, election results, and international organizations. Many events covered in *Keesing's* are unreported in any other single publication.

Keesing's Record of World Events is available as a monthly publication ($357/year) or as a 40-year archive on CD-ROM or the Internet (1960-present) from $950 a year.

FREE TRIAL
E-mail or call
800-332-3535
for a free print issue or a 30-day trial on CD-ROM or the Internet.

Keesing's Worldwide

P.O. Box 5590, Wash., DC 20016-1190 • **www.keesings.com**
301-718-8770 • Fax: 301-718-8494 • E-Mail: info@keesings.com

New From Routledge

www.routledge-ny.com

Me Against My Brother
At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda
Scott Peterson

"In chapter after chapter, the reader is drawn into the text, vicariously bearing witness to manifold crimes against humanity and also learning about the complexities of seeking solutions...poignant portraits of suffering...A terribly important book."
—Christian Science Monitor

Human Rights Horizons
The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World
Richard A. Falk

"Richard Falk boldly confronts, with careful analysis and nuanced judgements, the most important issue of our time– constructing a global morality to overcome the self-serving policies of powerful states..."
—Howard Zinn, author of *A People's History of the United States*

Preventive Diplomacy
Stopping Wars Before They Start
Second Edition
Edited by Kevin M. Cahill

In this collection Nobel prize winners, top officials, and revered thinkers explore the process of conflict prevention from humanitarian, economic, and political perspectives. Contributors include: Kofi A. Annan, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Alain Destexhe and Cyrus Vance.

At Bookstores or Call **1-800-634-7064**

ROUTLEDGE
Taylor & Francis Group

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

By itself, that relatively simple measure would provide a tremendous boost to the economy. In one stroke, Russia would adopt a serious currency, reduce interest rates, and give millions of foreign and domestic investors security in their business transactions. The move would also give people the ability to make financial plans for the future and would stimulate the creation of long-term credit markets, including mortgages, which are virtually nonexistent today.

Adopting the euro should not imply joining the European Union or adhering to EU policy standards, even though a free-trade treaty would be consistent with the larger goal of anchoring Russia in Europe (as was the case with Germany after World War II). Problems of lost seigniorage (the profit a country makes from printing its own currency) can be easily dealt with; indeed, the U.S. Congress is already considering a bill to reimburse "dollarizing" countries for reductions in seigniorage. The EU could adopt a similar measure. The lender-of-last-resort function currently performed by the central bank would not disappear; it would merely be taken over by private-sector lenders of last resort who would certainly be more effective at monitoring financial institutions than the Russian central bank has been. Finally, the increase in security and growth produced by the use of the euro would give the economy a greater ability to weather outside shocks, which in any event would be smaller than those produced by the central bank.

Use of the euro, a liberalized banking sector integrated into the international financial system, and greater domestic competition will finally enable Russians to use the world's and their own savings for productive purposes.

IT CAN BE DONE

RUSSIA'S TASK is awesome and daunting, but it is possible. In Chile we also faced seemingly insurmountable barriers to what turned out to be a breakthrough for the country. But from the beginning of the reform period, the objective was the transformation of a society based on state interventionism to one based on individual liberty and free markets. The obstacles to such radical reform can be overcome in countries in turbulent transition. Structural reform is actually much harder in more rigid societies such as those of continental Europe

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(where the "transition" to a fully common economic area may be the opportunity and catalyst for much-needed radical change in such overregulated areas as labor and social welfare).

Even though prevailing world economic policies and the ideology of the 1970s did not favor free-market ideas, Chile had a team of economists, trained at the University of Chicago and other top U.S. universities, who agreed on the need to end the country's state-dominated development approach and, even before entering government, began an educational and communications effort to spread their ideas around the country. Today, there is an international consensus on free-market policies, and Russia can introduce reform and benefit from an increasingly liberal world economy in a way that Chile initially could not.

The main obstacle to reform that Chile faced—and that Russia now faces—was the opposition from special interests whose privileges would end under the proposed new policies. Thus business leaders opposed free trade, and unions opposed a more flexible labor market. Overcoming those obstacles required a coherent economic program and direct appeals to the people. By clearly communicating the purposes, costs, and benefits of the reforms—and by emphasizing that the reforms aimed to eliminate state-sanctioned privileges not for one group but for all equally—the government rested its credibility on achieving those goals in a fair and independent way. This, in turn, made it more difficult for special interests to impose their preferences. Once the heretofore opaque process of policymaking is exposed to the daylight clarity of media and debate, it becomes obscene for entrenched interests to demand monopolies, protection, and subsidies from the state.

Although the path Putin will take is still unclear, I am cautiously optimistic about the prospects for reform. Putin was elected with more than 50 percent of the vote; he remains popular and has the political support of much of the Duma. He has appointed some experienced free-market economists as advisers and appears aware of the need for economic freedom and high growth. Information-age technological advances continue to expose Russian society to new ideas, products, and innovations, making central control of the economy increasingly difficult. And the country will benefit from its immense resource wealth and well-educated population once the proper policies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and institutions are in place. Those, of course, include the rule of law, freedom of expression, and the protection of other civil liberties.

In drawing lessons from Chile, the Putin administration must follow the basic thrust of the Chilean model, which was to devolve power to society rather than to centralize it. That unique and perhaps unexpected approach also distinguished Chile as an economic success story on a continent suffering through the "lost decade" of the 1980s. And as in present-day Mexico, economic liberalization also led to political liberalization. Moreover, the reduction of privileges, the transformation of every worker into an owner of financial capital, and the rise of economic opportunities created a wide middle-class constituency that has defended the country's free-market model under various popularly elected center-left administrations.

Change in Russia is only a matter of time. As Richard Pipes of Harvard observed a few years ago,

> Russians under thirty react very differently to the new conditions than their frightened and bewildered elders. They like the changes: they are quickly learning to swim in the turbulent waters of a free economy and looking confidently to the future that will assure them of financial independence. They display the sense of competence and self-assurance that possession and, it seems, even the anticipation of possession have been observed to bring about. And they are the Russia of tomorrow; for as Coleridge once wrote, there is "but one infallible source of political prophecy," and that is the knowledge of the principles and opinions that guide men between the ages of twenty and thirty. If this is true, there are grounds for believing that when the inevitable time comes for Russia's young to take charge, a different and much better Russia will emerge.

The future will weigh more heavily than the past. Putin can begin creating that future by removing artificial obstacles to high growth and thereby drawing on the energies of all Russians. If he moves in that direction, he will do nothing less than spark a revolution. If he does not, Russia will have to wait for the new generation to take over.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Redesigning Foreign Aid

Carol Lancaster

A WORLD TRANSFORMED

FOREIGN AID was an extremely useful tool of U.S. diplomacy during the second half of the twentieth century. It helped contain the expansion of communism in Asia, Latin America, and Africa; promoted economic and social development in those regions; and provided humanitarian relief in emergencies. Foreign aid will continue to play an important role in the twenty-first century. But its major purposes and priorities will be distinct from those of the last 50 years and will therefore require a new design for both its organization and management.

The 1990s were a decade of enormous change. The Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The pace of globalization accelerated as the revolution in communication technologies reduced barriers to international trade and investment. The number of democratic countries expanded dramatically in the former Soviet sphere, Africa, and other parts of the developing world. Although poverty remained widespread, real economic and social progress began to occur—especially in Asia and Latin America. And the capacity of many of these governments to manage their economies and open their markets to international capital became greater than at any time in recent history. In short, the traditional purposes of aid over much of the past half-century—promoting U.S. security and supporting

---

CAROL LANCASTER is Associate Professor and Director of the Master's of Science in Foreign Service program at Georgetown University. She previously served as Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. Her recent books include *Transforming Foreign Aid* and *Aid to Africa.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development in poor countries—are no longer pressing in the post–Cold War world of American dominance and new emerging markets.

These changes have left the United States the sole superpower and acknowledged world leader. They have also raised new challenges and opportunities for U.S. leadership that point to different purposes and priorities for foreign aid. Three are particularly pressing: to help preserve peace, address the challenges of globalization, and improve the quality of life of the many poor and disadvantaged throughout the world.

THE PEACEMAKER

THE MOST BASIC CHALLENGE facing the United States today is helping to preserve peace. The end of the Cold War eliminated a potential threat to American security, but it did not eliminate conflict. In 1998 alone there were 27 significant conflicts in the world, 25 of which involved violence within states. Nine of those intrastate conflicts were in sub-Saharan Africa, where poor governance has aggravated ethnic and social tensions. The ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been particularly nightmarish, combining intrastate and interstate conflict with another troubling element: military intervention driven by the commercial motives of several neighboring states. Such motives could fuel future conflicts in other weak states with valuable resources. Meanwhile, a number of other wars—in Colombia, the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Angola, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi—have reflected historic enmities or poorly resolved hostilities of the past. Intrastate conflicts are likely to continue in weakly integrated, poorly governed states, destroying lives and property, creating large numbers of refugees and displaced persons, and threatening regional security. The two interstate clashes in 1998—between India and Pakistan and Eritrea and Ethiopia—involved disputes over land and other natural resources. Such contests show no sign of disappearing. Indeed, with the spread of weapons of mass destruction, these wars could prove more dangerous than ever.

Peacemaking will therefore be an important focus of U.S. diplomacy in the twenty-first century. As in the past, the United States is likely to take a lead in conflict prevention and peacemaking in regions that have high priority but lack effective alternatives to U.S. leadership:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parts of Europe, the Middle East, countries near U.S. borders, and the Pacific Rim, especially Korea and Taiwan. Foreign aid will become more important to peacemaking diplomacy than before—as a symbol of U.S. engagement, an incentive for warring parties to negotiate peace, and a source of resources to help countries recover from the legacies of war. For example, a promise of half a billion dollars of U.S. aid was a key element in efforts by the Clinton administration to negotiate an end to the Bosnian war. The growing importance of peace aid is already evident in increases in foreign aid appropriations in 1999 and 2000, much of which was slated for peacemaking in Kosovo and the Middle East. Congress has also recently passed a large supplemental appropriation of more than $1 billion to fund such a policy in Colombia.

GETTING CONNECTED

A SECOND CHALLENGE facing America involves globalization. The growing integration of the international economy, the rapid spread of electronic technologies, and the increasing movement of people across borders have made the globe a smaller, more informed, and more interactive place. These trends promise to accelerate as technology advances and barriers to trade, investment, and travel fall. They bring the promise, if not for many the reality, of greater prosperity. They also bring the possibility of a better informed, more influential political voice for those now gaining access to the new electronic technologies.

That said, globalization carries costs as well as benefits. The costs fall into two categories. The first involves the economic and political downsides of globalization: the financial volatility evident in the Asian crisis of 1997–98, which led to severe recessions in some countries and spread the crisis to other fragile economies, and an increase in inequality within and among countries. These costs will produce discontent among globalization's "losers" and fuel political resistance to further economic liberalization.

The second cost derives from the growing importance of "transnational issues"—the spread of problems generated in one country to the populations of other countries. Examples of this type of issue include the transmission of disease (such as AIDS, drug-resistant

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tuberculosis, and cholera), global crime and terrorism, and the spread of environmental problems across borders and generations. The workings of the market will not always produce solutions to these problems; indeed, it may make them worse. Hence public action is required to deal with many of them. And where effective international organizations and regimes do not exist to address globalization's problems, the United States must take the lead in tackling them and, over the longer term, create or strengthen the international organizations that can resolve them.

For all these reasons, foreign aid will be an important tool in America's new diplomacy of globalization. First, such aid can provide the resources needed to address sudden crises, as it did primarily through multilateral banks in Asia in 1998. By funding training and advice, it can help poor countries position themselves to exploit the trade, investment, and growth opportunities that globalization offers. Furthermore, foreign aid can fund surveillance and response to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

transnational crimes and disease—for instance, through the U.S. Centers for Disease Control. Likewise, aid can support research to reduce the long-term costs of resolving global problems; developing and disseminating technologies that reduce carbon-producing gases is just one example. In tense regions of the Middle East, South Asia, and northeast Africa, it can help finance the infrastructure needed to conserve increasingly scarce water resources. Foreign aid can also serve as an incentive for governments to deal with regional problems such as transborder pollution. Finally, it can act as a symbol of U.S. engagement by addressing pressing issues and calling on other governments to do the same.

A portion of U.S. aid already addresses the costs of globalization—say, efforts to deal with the international transmission of infectious disease, or projects involving problems of global warming. But this amount is likely to rise significantly with the increasing prominence of these issues to U.S. foreign policy and to Americans as a whole. At present, however, public funding for these and other transnational issues remains relatively low compared to the size and growing severity of these problems.

FROM WEALTH TO SOFT POWER

THIS TWO-PRONGED diplomacy is fundamentally driven by U.S. interests in preserving world peace and prosperity and protecting the quality of life for Americans. However, American foreign policy has never been based on interests alone. It reflects deep-seated humanitarian values as well. If anything, the role of values in U.S. foreign policy is likely to grow as Americans become increasingly aware of the world beyond their borders, thanks to CNN and the Internet, and demand action by their government to ease human suffering. A U.S. diplomacy of values is also important in fortifying America's "soft power"—the credibility and trust that the United States can command in the world—and ensuring effective American leadership in other areas.

Four principal elements make up a U.S. diplomacy of values: providing relief in humanitarian crises; helping to promote development and reduce poverty in the poorest countries; advancing "humane

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concerns" by improving the quality of life for the neediest and most vulnerable abroad; and supporting the expansion of democracy and human rights. Foreign aid will be essential in each area.

Humanitarian relief will likely make increasing demands on U.S. aid as disasters, both human and natural, continue to proliferate. Natural disasters have been on the rise in recent years, in both number and severity. They could become even more numerous in the future as a result of climatic changes and more severe as a result of the pressure of growing populations on fragile environments.

In contrast, aid for development will be less prominent than in the past, concentrating mostly on sub-Saharan Africa and a few very poor countries in Asia and Latin America where governmental capacity and access to capital are still limited. Although more than one billion people live on a dollar per day or less, it is often forgotten how much progress has been made in southern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America over the past half-century. Life expectancy and literacy levels have risen rapidly and significantly while poverty has dropped. Governments are now far more capable of addressing their own problems than they were three or four decades ago. Along with this progress, the proportion of the world's population living in poverty has continued to decline, falling from 28 percent in 1987 to 24 percent in 1999. Furthermore, the surge in private capital over the past decade has meant that governments and private enterprises with good policies and prospects can now access additional resources from private sources. The two countries with the largest number of poor—India and China—do not require or expect much highly concessional aid to spur their development. Nor do most of the countries of Latin America. What they do need is private investment—domestic and foreign—to spur growth and the policy and institutional environments to encourage it.

Humane concerns will take a more prominent place in U.S. aid policy.

Still, a number of countries—largely in Africa—have not fared so well over the past four decades. Although they have made some progress in literacy and life expectancy (until the devastating impact of AIDS), many still lack the capacity and access to international capital to address their deepening problems of poverty. U.S. foreign aid still

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has a role to play there, but several difficult dilemmas have complicated the provision of effective aid for African development. The first involves the issue of when to provide aid and when to withhold it. For much of Africa, the core development problem has been not a lack of resources but bad politics. In many countries, policy and regulatory environments continue to discourage investors, while government institutions remain weak and often corrupt. It is noteworthy that in the 1999 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, five of the ten worst offenders were in Africa. Until the political leaderships of African countries come to value the long-term betterment of their populations over their own personal and political interests, policies will remain faulty, institutions weak, investment and growth low, and aid ineffective.

But the problem of weak institutions in Africa is also in part the responsibility of aid donors themselves. With 40 or more poorly coordinated aid agencies working in numerous African countries, pursuing their own priorities, and expecting their own separate administrative and procurement requirements to be met, the burdens of aid have overwhelmed African officials and disrupted government budgets. These multiple aid agencies urgently need far better coordination and discipline.

The primary responsibility for international leadership on development must lie with the World Bank. To its credit, it has been trying to better coordinate the different mechanisms for delivering aid. It is the one international institution with the expertise, coordination, and potential aid resources that can work for governments committed to economic and social progress. True, some critics of the Bank argue that it needs to be more focused. Others, including a number of nongovernmental organizations, argue that the Bank needs to be more accountable, especially to those it is trying to benefit. Both are right. But with appropriate reforms the World Bank can effectively serve as the primary channel for U.S. development aid in the future.

If promoting development in poor countries will have less priority in U.S. aid policy, helping disadvantaged and vulnerable groups and communities abroad to better their lives will assume a more prominent place. Indeed, it already has. But an important difference distinguishes these two goals. Development policy seeks to bring about broad-based

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic and social changes on a national level; this kind of foreign aid takes a strategic approach, removing obstacles to development and helping spur national economic and social progress. Most major aid donors produce periodic assessments of the overall development needs of particular countries and shape their interventions to fit those needs. In contrast, aid for humane concerns—directly helping vulnerable groups to improve their lives—may also help development, but its principal goal and impulse is humanitarian: to help those in need who cannot easily help themselves.

Future American administrations must support democracy abroad to reflect the values of the U.S. population.

One good example of this approach is the growing amount of U.S. bilateral aid for activities to promote child survival—for example, through inoculations, micronutrient supplements, and oral rehydration therapy. In recent years, the Republican-controlled Congress has consistently earmarked more funding for child survival programs than the Clinton administration has requested; in fiscal year 2000, spending on child survival activities was set at $715 million out of a total development assistance budget of $2 billion. Other aid-funded programs with broad bipartisan support that address humane concerns include assistance for land-mine victims and street children as well as microenterprise lending for poor women. These programs are popular in Congress and among the U.S. public because they typically deliver aid directly to those who need it—and their results can often be observed. Foreign communities also welcome them as an expression of American values, which in turn helps enhance American "soft power." And to the extent that these activities are partly funded by private American groups and involve such groups in program implementation, they also increase the knowledge and experience of Americans in foreign lands and create support for U.S. engagement abroad.

Finally, future American administrations must continue to support human rights and democracy in the world to reflect the broadly shared values of the U.S. population. Foreign aid can play a role in furthering democracy through funding elections and providing training for legislators, judges, and police forces. Assuming the trend

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of democratization continues, however, aid for this purpose is likely to decline as the basic building blocks of democracy fall into place throughout the world.

In sum, foreign aid will continue to be an essential foreign policy tool to promote U.S. interests and values abroad. Its major purposes will include peacemaking, addressing transnational issues and other challenges arising from globalization, providing humanitarian relief, and promoting "humane concerns" abroad. The first two purposes relate primarily to U.S. interests; the second two reflect U.S. values. Support for development and democracy abroad will not disappear, but they will not be among the major priorities for foreign aid spending in the decades to come.

REINVENTING GOVERNMENT, PART II

WHATEVER its priorities may be, however, the American government remains too poorly organized to effectively dispense its aid. There are at present four bilateral aid agencies: the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Peace Corps, the InterAmerican Foundation, and the African Development Foundation. A number of these agencies duplicate the activities of others. In addition, the United States contributes to six multilateral development banks, dozens of U.N. groups, and other international aid organizations. And in recent years, nearly every U.S. cabinet agency has initiated its own "foreign aid" program abroad, usually involving technical assistance to foreign governments on issues in its area of expertise.

The United States cannot redesign the entire aid landscape. It is particularly difficult to bring about changes in international aid agencies where the United States is only one member state among many. But Washington can pursue a number of reforms at home and abroad that will bring these agencies more into line with American purposes.

First, Washington must ensure that the purposes of specific aid programs match the purposes of the agencies running those programs. Hence aid for diplomatic purposes should be based in the Department of State, where it can be used to back up State's diplomacy. This would include aid for peacekeeping, transnational issues, and democratization programs. The State Department has not traditionally

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

managed large spending programs abroad, and it must acquire that capacity if it is to manage such programs in the future.

Aid for humanitarian relief—now located in the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in USAID and in the Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration in the State Department—should be combined with aid for "humane concerns" in a new aid agency, possibly a successor to USAID. These programs are distinct enough from traditional foreign policy that they should be located in an agency separate from the Department of State. The two small government aid foundations that already exist—the InterAmerican Foundation and the African Development Foundation—both support grassroots activities abroad and should be folded into this new bilateral aid agency. But the Peace Corps, with its unique focus on sending U.S. volunteers to work in poor countries, should remain independent; indeed, its strong political constituency would likely insist upon it. Altogether, these organizational changes would reduce the number of U.S. bilateral aid agencies from four to two.

Reforms are also needed on the multilateral level. U.S. development aid should be directed to the World Bank and regional development banks. But these banks should refocus on their traditional goals of economic and social development. As a number of critics have noted, these banks—especially the World Bank—currently show signs of mission creep. For example, the World Bank has recently created a program to finance the transition from war to peace, which is better undertaken by aid agencies that specialize in post-conflict relief and recovery. The bank has also begun to lend money for "cultural preservation," which replicates the work of the U.N. Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization. In fact, the World Bank and regional development banks are much better equipped to provide longer-term development financing. And the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was never intended to be an aid agency, has become one through lending on longer and softer terms to poor countries. It should return to its original mission of providing short-term lending to governments facing balance-of-payments problems. The fund's expertise lies here and plenty of demand exists for its short-term lending. With a sharper focus, it could reduce the numerous conditions associated with its bigger loans and ideally enjoy a better success rate as a result of the conditions that it does require.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finally, a portion of U.S. aid for transnational issues provided to existing international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), should be combined with an effort to ensure that these organizations get the leadership and build the capacity needed to achieve their purposes. Leadership has been a serious problem with many of these organizations in the past, and reforming the way the heads of these organizations are chosen is an important first step. The appointment of directors-general or presidents and their senior officials, often allocated to particular countries or groups of countries, needs to be made far more transparent and combined with a strict professional vetting procedure if these organizations are ever to fulfill their promise. The WHO in the 1990s was just one example of how an international organization can be seriously weakened by poor leadership that is chosen and protected by an important member state. Fortunately, its current director-general, Gro Harlem Brundtland, is an extremely capable leader who has reversed that trend.

THE BIGGER PICTURE

THREE STRATEGIES will be essential to the proper management of U.S. aid in the twenty-first century: coordination with other U.S. government departments and foreign aid agencies, collaboration with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including private corporations, and flexibility in the management of aid.

Although coordination with other foreign aid agencies operating abroad remains a challenge, Washington's growing problem lies with the multiple U.S. government agencies that provide assistance to a large number of countries. The engagement abroad of these various departments is inevitable given the effects of globalization, and these agencies could usefully bring their considerable expertise to bear on problems beyond America's borders. But this engagement also creates problems of duplication, inefficiency, and incoherence. At present, the only part of the U.S. government likely to have a comprehensive picture of all official U.S. interventions in another country is the local American embassy. Even there, ambassadors may not be fully aware of all such activities. Therefore, Washington must gather reliable data

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on exactly how much all government agencies are spending abroad, where they are putting it, and for what purposes.

Second, the United States should create effective interagency coordinating mechanisms in Washington as well as in embassies in the field to maximize the impact of all assistance abroad. Interagency coordination often resembles warfare rather than collaboration. But in this new age of "empowered teams" (i.e., teams that can make policy and allocative decisions), the government can support issue-oriented and country-oriented interagency units that decide on the funding for activities from both State and non-State agencies. A model for this might be the old interagency "PL-480 committee" made up of representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, State, and Treasury, USAID, and the Office of Management and Budget. This committee truly influenced policy and allocations involving food aid, in part because participating agencies could veto allocation decisions, forcing real negotiations among them.

One of the most exciting areas of change lies with the challenge of collaboration. Aid agencies have always worked with private entities—whether consulting firms, large corporations, universities, or other non-profit organizations—to implement their projects. But aid agencies tended to dominate these relationships, deciding on the task to be done, financing the project, and contracting with a private entity to implement it. What is new in the development business today and is likely to be a major growth area in the future is the opportunity for truly collaborative relationships between aid agencies and private entities, especially corporations, which now bring to the table their own funding and ideas. Although there is no hard data on the amount corporations spend on good works in countries where they operate, the record suggests that such funding is growing along with the opportunities for productive partnership between corporations and aid agencies. In fact, some significant collaborative efforts have already begun. For example, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations involves the World Bank, the WHO, the United Nations Children's Fund, the Gates and Rockefeller Foundations, and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, which was created in 1999 to support the development and dissemination of vaccines to protect children from preventable disease.

Although private-public collaboration in foreign aid could mean more funding for numerous beneficial activities, it also poses challenges

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the management of U.S. aid. To participate in real partnerships with corporations and other NGOs, aid agencies must be nimble and their staffs innovative and aggressive. Agencies must be able and willing to negotiate rather than command. At the same time, they must stick to their missions and priorities and maintain their accountability to Congress and the public. Traditional management practices have often been cumbersome and time-consuming, with funding for long-term projects selected and backed by U.S. officials. This approach will have to give way to a simpler, more flexible, and more collaborative management style.

THE NEW PARADIGM

WHAT ARE the new political realities affecting U.S. aid—and are they consistent with the ideas put forward here? Government policies, especially public spending programs, require coalitions of political support to sustain them. That coalition typically includes key executive-branch agencies, members of Congress, and various private groups. Public opinion also influences policies and programs, but it tends to be passive and permissive with regard to foreign aid, except when aroused by major disasters such as humanitarian crises.

During the Cold War, the foreign aid coalition was based on a "policy paradigm" with two main purposes: promoting U.S. security and political interests abroad (primarily limiting the spread of Soviet influence) and furthering development in poor countries. At the time, there was little controversy over the United States' providing aid for humanitarian relief abroad when it was required. The State Department—the key administration agency supporting foreign aid—tended to emphasize the security interests that aid could advance; the Treasury Department (which is responsible for managing U.S. participation in multilateral development banks) and USAID supported multilateral and bilateral aid for development, respectively. Aid for security purposes garnered the grudging acquiescence of the more conservative members of Congress, whereas development aid was supported by the more liberal members. This coalition was enough to pass needed aid legislation year after year. Some private groups favoring specific foreign countries and NGOs supporting particular types of aid-funded activities abroad (such as family planning) also lobbied for aid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The end of the Cold War removed one element in this policy paradigm, and the progress in much of Asia and Latin America lessened the urgency of the other. During the 1990s, therefore, aid agencies sought new tasks and rationales to fortify their relevance and support from the administration, Congress, and the public. This new uncertainty was undoubtedly a key factor contributing to mission creep.

By the end of the 1990s, however, the outlines of a new policy paradigm were beginning to emerge. Aid for security had for some time given way to aid for peacemaking—in the Middle East, the Balkans, Haiti, and elsewhere—even though the Clinton administration had not fully articulated the policy underlying the use of that aid. Washington was already beginning to allocate more aid to deal with transnational issues like the spread of infectious diseases and global warming, even though this had yet to be presented as a major rationale for foreign aid. Finally, Congress had begun to focus more bilateral aid on addressing humane concerns, specifically those involving child survival.

These three purposes—peacemaking, addressing transnational issues, and promoting child survival—have now been combined with an ongoing commitment to humanitarian relief to offer the elements of a new policy paradigm for foreign aid. This paradigm promises to reconstitute an effective constituency of policymakers and activists concerned about conflict and regional security, groups focusing on transnational issues, and many Americans whose values include helping the most needy and vulnerable abroad. In short, the transformation of U.S. foreign aid proposed here reflects the evolving politics of aid.

GETTING TO YES

ASSUMING a new administration wants to redesign foreign aid, how would it go about doing so? It should *not* create an interagency working group, ask for ideas, assign papers, try to get consensus, draft and approve legislation based on that consensus, and seek congressional support. Past experience proves that such an approach takes forever and rarely produces anything of value.

Instead, the new administration must create a small, expert working group—preferably reporting to the president—to develop a blueprint

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of its policy and the organizational changes it entails. The proposed changes should then be discussed with a small group of senior career officials of the major agencies affected. Outside experts may have a good sense of the broad direction of desired change, but they can rarely compete with career officials on the details of how policies and programs work. It is those details that can often make or break reform proposals.

Consultations and negotiations with key members of Congress are also essential. Those members include the chairs and ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Affairs Committee, and the Foreign Operations Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees of both houses. Members with interest in foreign aid, as well as leaders in both houses, should also take part. If a package of changes acceptable to these members and the administration can be put together, much of the political work behind transforming aid will already have been accomplished.

A final group then needs to be consulted: the organizations that lobby for aid and implement it abroad, such as country-focused groups and NGOs active in relief and development. Their political support is important, and many of them have detailed knowledge of how U.S. aid actually works in the field, knowledge that could strengthen the proposed changes.

The process described here should be completed in the first six months of a new administration, before political appointments are made to the agencies most affected by the changes. If major organizational changes drag on for many months, resistance to them will grow and ultimately undermine their extent or usefulness. These changes are significant and will require substantial effort on the part of any administration to implement. But they would not only transform U.S. foreign aid; they would clarify its purposes and fortify its relevance to American interests and values in a world very different from the one of the past century. The alternative would be aid programs with unclear goals, declining relevance, and inappropriate structures—all possibly leading to a collapse in political support. Such a failure would be tragic, given foreign aid's potential to promote U.S. interests and reflect U.S. values in the new century.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Out-of-Control Immigration

James Goldsborough

IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE

THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE in America has recently switched direction by about 175 degrees. Only five years ago, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (the so-called Jordan Commission) proposed to cut legal immigration by at least a third and eliminate illegal immigration through new workplace enforcement measures. The commission's recommendations were based both on critiques of the 1986 and 1990 immigration reform laws and on a growing sentiment that as America entered the twenty-first century immigration should be reduced from its record levels. This sentiment was reflected in annual Gallup polls, votes on measures such as California's Proposition 187, and studies showing new immigrants doing less well today than in previous times. It was also shown in increasing hostility toward new arrivals in immigrant-heavy states such as California, Arizona, and Florida—hostility that showed signs of spreading to other parts of the country.

Yet only five years later, immigration into the United States is at its highest absolute levels in history: more than 1.1 million annually, some 400,000 higher than the previous high-water mark of around 700,000 annually during the 1900–1920 "Great Migration" (though as a percentage of population, today's rate of immigration, 0.4 percent, is actually lower than that at the turn of the century, 0.7 percent). Despite these high numbers, Congress' interest has faded. Immigration policy today is driven by businesses that need more workers—skilled and unskilled, legal and illegal. Somehow, the process has gotten out of control.

JAMES GOLDSBOROUGH is Foreign Affairs Columnist for *The San Diego Union-Tribune.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

With U.S. unemployment at an uncommonly low four percent, economic growth around five percent per year, and personal income and consumption at their highest rates in history, Congress has forgotten the Jordan Commission's recommendations. During the annual debate on H1-B visas (temporary permits for skilled workers) two years ago, Silicon Valley executives trooped before Congress, warning of a Y2K computer disaster unless the number of H1-B visas issued each year was increased. It was doubled. This year, Silicon Valley has new arguments for raising the H1-B visa ceiling to 200,000 annually, and Congress, along with presidential contenders Al Gore and George W. Bush, is nodding in agreement. Even labor has joined the bandwagon, with the AFL-CIO announcing that it would stop opposing illegal immigrants (for taking jobs from Americans) and start organizing them (to improve conditions). As a result, the United States could soon have millions of illegal immigrants with union cards but without green cards.

Few members of Congress say that they support the open-borders philosophy of House Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-Tex.) and others, but in fact, America today has just such a policy. The result is that employment-based immigration will rise to 200,000 annually in the coming years, family-based immigration to 460,000, refugees to 125,000, "diversity" visas (permanent resident visas for people from countries with low rates of immigration to the United States) to 50,000, and illegal immigrants will continue arriving at a rate of about 300,000 annually. Business will be happy; families seeking reunification will be happy; refugees seeking asylum will be happy; strawberry and tomato prices will stay low; high-tech start-ups will pay young Indian and Chinese programmers a fraction of what they would have to pay middle-aged Americans.

Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan praised immigration in Senate hearings earlier this year, then added, "While I can hold forth on the economic benefits of immigration ... there are many, many issues ... cultural questions, issues that have bedeviled the United States for 100 years in this area." These questions are based on evidence that unskilled immigrants are being exploited, are not assimilating as well as previous immigrants, and are forming a new immigrant "underclass." Further evidence from specialists at Harvard University and the RAND Corporation suggests that skilled immigrants are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

driving down wages for America's skilled labor force and diverting resources from the education of Americans. During recent hearings on H1-B visas, Assistant Secretary of Labor Raymond Uhalde warned, "Immigration fixes undercut efforts to improve public education, create better worker retraining programs, and draw the unemployed into the labor market."

In fact, today's policies foretell many dangers. What will happen to these new immigrant workers—the vast majority of whom arrive with no skills—when the economy slows down? What will happen when the 600,000 young engineers to be admitted over the next three years (adding to an existing H1-B population of 400,000) finish their indentures at precisely the same time that American engineers—retrained through government programs funded by fees from companies that employ H1-B visa holders—start seeking employment again? As B. Lindsay Lowell of Georgetown University has pointed out in a new and exhaustive study of H1-B workers, "if not all, at least the majority" of H1-B workers intend to stay permanently in America. "We will have to create another miracle economy to absorb everybody," says Robert Bach, executive associate commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

What will happen to these new immigrant workers when the economy slows down?

But short of a new miracle, wages will fall, unemployment and welfare will rise, crime will increase, social conflicts of the kind reflected six years ago in California's Proposition 187 will again break out, Americans will call for more and higher fences along the Mexican border, more vigilante groups of the kind that now patrol the border around Douglas, Arizona, will form, and hundreds of thousands of immigrants seeking permanent residence in America will be on the streets.

Nearly two-thirds of Americans, in poll after poll, say they want illegal immigration stopped and legal immigration slowed. Immigration is running at record levels despite the recommendations of two presidential commissions (Hesburgh and Jordan), the National Academy of Sciences, the General Accounting Office, the National Research Council, and RAND's Center for Research on Immigration Policy.

To avoid an inevitable crisis, the new Congress and president should make immigration reform a high priority, starting with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jordan Commission's proposals for both legal and illegal immigration. If the past is a guide, however, Congress will either do nothing, which is bad enough, or will continue to make matters worse.

THE BEST INTENTIONS

In 1952, Congress sent President Truman the first major immigration bill since the 1920s, one that revised and extended all the flaws of earlier bills, including a quota system heavily weighted in favor of three countries—Britain, Germany, and Ireland—and a ban on East Asian immigrants. Calling the bill "alien to our national ideals and our foreign policy," Truman vetoed it. When Congress overrode his veto, Truman established the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, the report of which would become the basis for the 1965 Immigration Act, the most important immigration law in U.S. history.

It took 13 years for the commission to report and for Congress to act, but when President Johnson signed the Hart-Celler immigration bill on October 3, 1965, the United States entered a new era. The president's commission had found three major flaws in U.S. immigration law: it was based on distrust toward all aliens; it discriminated on the basis of race, creed, and color; and it ignored U.S. foreign policy interests. Hart-Celler sought to end discrimination and double the annual number of immigrants from 154,000 to 290,000—a compromise figure between the record-setting decades of 1900–1920 and the Depression years, when immigration slowed to 50,000 annually. By raising the numbers to nearly 300,000, eliminating country-of-origin quotas, and making family reunification instead of skills-based employment the guiding principle of immigration, the 1965 law promised more humanity and more equity.

Seldom has a bill had such unintended consequences. In fact, the 1965 act opened the floodgates. Family-reunification became the vehicle for tripling annual anticipated immigration. In the 1970s, the principle was applied to refugees from the Vietnam War, quickly overwhelming the quotas fixed by the 1965 law. Vietnam was followed by the Mariel boatlift in 1980, when Fidel Castro opened his prisons and hospitals and released those who would emigrate to America.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Those were the days: anti-immigrant protest, Glendale, California, June 1996

Soon after Mariel came a flood of refugees fleeing Central America's civil wars and Mexico's poverty. By the early 1980s, the United States had a full-blown immigration crisis.

In response, Congress passed two immigration laws, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and the 1990 Immigration Act. The first reform since 1965, IRCA was a result of what its supporters

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Congress called the "grand bargain." Illegal immigrants present in 1986 who had been present since 1982 were amnestied and allowed to apply for citizenship. The law affected some three million people. At the same time, it tried to shut off the flow of illegal immigrants through so-called employers' sanctions, under which employers would be held responsible for determining who was legal and face fines if they hired illegal workers.

Employer sanctions proved a dismal failure. Congress would not include a workers' identification system in the bill to help employers distinguish between legal and illegal workers. With fake green cards, Social Security cards, and passports for sale on downtown street corners across America (and, lately, on the Internet), employers' sanctions without an alternative foolproof identification system stood no chance of stanching the flow of illegal immigrants. In 1996, the Jordan Commission would recommend creating a computer-registry system based on Social Security cards to serve as the identification system missing from IRCA. But Congress would reject that, too, in its 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. Nevertheless, on the assumption that IRCA had solved the illegal immigration problem, Congress passed a 1990 law increasing legal immigration to the record level of 825,000 per year—700,000 immigrants and 125,000 refugees.

BAD FENCES

TAKING OFFICE in 1993, President Clinton faced a political problem. California, which had voted for him, was just emerging from a recession that the state finance director had called "the worst recession since the Great Depression." With its unemployment rate at nine percent, the last thing that the state needed was a thousand illegal immigrants crossing the border at San Diego each day. California Republicans, including Governor Pete Wilson, recognized a hot issue and pinned the blame on Clinton.

The Jordan Commission—established in 1990—might have provided a long-term solution, but Clinton needed a short-term fix. The result was Operation Gatekeeper, a massive increase in money and staff for the INS and its Border Patrol, plus the construction of a border fence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reaching 14 miles inland from the Pacific. Extremists, such as San Diego area Representative Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), wanted to build a permanently patrolled, East German–style triple fence from the Pacific to the Gulf of Mexico, but Clinton would not go that far. In Texas, Operation Hold the Line—a smaller version of Gatekeeper—was also enacted.

But Gatekeeper, which is still in effect, has not reduced illegal immigration. Instead, it has shifted it from the San Diego fence region inland, toward El Centro, California, and Yuma, Arizona. Border Patrol apprehensions in the San Diego region dropped 45 percent in 1994–98 but rose 88 percent around El Centro. There was "virtually no drop in apprehensions along the whole California-Mexico border in 1994–98," according to Wayne Cornelius of the University of California, San Diego (UCSD). Gatekeeper has also made border crossing more dangerous, pushing immigrants into the deserts and mountains. Reported immigrant deaths rose from 23 in 1994 to 145 in 1999. Luis Herrera-Lasso, the Mexican consul general in San Diego, complained that one of his consulate's primary jobs had become "picking up bodies."

The rising death toll on California's border has created new tensions between the United States and Mexico.

The rising death toll on California's border—some 750 since Gatekeeper began—has created new tensions between the United States and Mexico. One of the rationales for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was that a growing Mexican economy meant fewer Mexicans crossing into the United States looking for work. But Mexico's financial crisis hit soon after NAFTA was signed, and illegal immigration continued apace. Historically, Mexico has never done anything to slow illegal emigration to the United States, regarding it as a net plus for both nations. Mexican nationals repatriate billions of dollars to Mexico each year, and Mexico argues correctly that border patrol is the responsibility of the receiving nation. Illegal border crossings from Mexico are the primary source of the five to six million illegal immigrants the INS says live in the United States today, increasing by 300,000 annually and spreading out around the nation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MISSED OPPORTUNITY

THE JORDAN COMMISSION was established in 1990 to reexamine U.S. immigration policy. Should immigration remain at historically high levels? The rationale for adding 700,000 immigrants annually during the first two decades of the past century was clear, but what was the rationale for adding 1.1 million immigrants annually in the 1990s and beyond?

Led by the late Representative Barbara Jordan (D-Tex.), who had earned a reputation for lucidity and probity in the House, the commission undertook the most exhaustive examination of immigration ever carried out in this or probably any country. In light of the surprise consequences of the 1965 and 1986 laws, its work could not have been more timely. Its mandate was to examine both legal and illegal immigration, and it found that the two were inseparable. Congress had tried to separate them in its 1986 and 1990 laws and would try again in the 1996 bills that grew out of the Jordan Commission's recommendations. Practically and intellectually, however, they cannot be separated.

How can one fix quotas for legal immigration without knowing the level of illegal immigration? The 1990 law fixed legal immigration at 825,000 because it assumed that illegal immigration had stopped with IRCA, which it had not. The Jordan Commission knew that if its recommendations on legal immigration were to be accepted, it had to come up with ways to stop illegal immigration.

Furthermore, legal and illegal immigrants cannot be separated because they are often the same people. The Census Bureau makes no attempt to distinguish between the two. According to the INS, 41 percent of illegal immigrants enter the country legally and overstay their visas. Most illegal immigrants are eventually legalized, as 3 million were with IRCA and as another 500,000 would be under a new Clinton proposal. Legal and illegal immigration are two sides of the same coin.

Congress began work on comprehensive immigration reform in 1995. The Jordan Commission's proposals, moderate and backed by the president, seemed likely to pass. In essence, they specified that legal immigration (including refugees) would be cut by a third, to 550,000 annually, to bring immigration back into line with historical levels; skills-based immigration targeting the nation's economic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

needs would be reemphasized by phasing out preferences for members of extended families (i.e., brothers and sisters); and illegal immigration would be eliminated through a computer-registry system that would verify legal job status. On the third point, virtually all immigration experts agree that if illegal immigrants are not allowed to work, they will not come. There is no evidence that people come to America to go on welfare, as proponents of California's Proposition 187 maintained. Illegal immigrants are not eligible for the most common forms of welfare—food stamps, Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), and Supplemental Security Income (though their children may be).

Legal and illegal immigration are two sides of the same coin.

The Senate Immigration Subcommittee, headed by Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.), incorporated the Jordan Commission's recommendations on legal and illegal immigration into a single bill calling for significant cuts in both skills-based and family-based immigration. When the Simpson bill reached the full Judiciary Committee, however, its chair, Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), backed by Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.), insisted that legal and illegal immigration be separated into different bills. The leading role in the separation—which everyone understood would doom the bill on legal immigration—was taken by Spencer Abraham (R-Mich.), a freshman who has never hidden his view that immigration, particularly the skills-based variety, should continue at the highest possible levels. In a bitter fight, Abraham won and Simpson lost. "Members of Congress don't want immigration reform," Simpson complained, recognizing defeat. He accused Congress of "straining the fabric of the country." Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), backed by John Kyl (R-Ariz.), accused the committee of ignoring the interests of the Western states, where most of the immigrants headed. Simpson got the message: when he left the Senate later that year (he had been planning to retire), he was replaced as subcommittee chair by Abraham.

The fruit of six years of work, the Jordan Commission's recommendations came to naught. The bill to reduce legal immigration was scuttled; the computer-registry proposal enabling employers to verify the status of workers was killed, gutting the bill on illegal immigration. The 1996 law would prove as toothless as previous laws.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UPWARD MOBILITY STALLED

So WHAT? With America at full employment, why not bring in immigrants one way or another to keep prices and wages down? How much more would strawberries cost if they were picked by unionized American farm workers? (According to some economists, such as Wallace Huffman and Alan McCunn of Iowa State University, not much more.) America has always been an immigrant nation, so why quibble over the difference between a half-million and a million more people per year? Doesn't the country need more workers to pay taxes to support an aging population? And why should it matter whether they are legal or illegal, since illegal immigrants are eventually legalized anyway?

Here is the nub of the issue: the effect of high levels of immigration on America today. In 2000, exactly one century after America opened its doors to all European comers to settle the West and realize its "manifest destiny," immigration is at record levels—despite the fact that the West no longer needs immigrants and has a serious water shortage. During debate over the Jordan proposals in 1996, California's Feinstein warned of a population and cultural "Armageddon" for her state, where one-third of all immigrants settle. California's foreign-born population, mostly Mexican, has reached 25 percent. "The overarching concern here is that contemporary Latino immigration is shifting the country's ethno-cultural balance unacceptably, potentially leading to a crisis of national identity," says UCSD's Cornelius.

California, because of its sheer numbers, gets most of the attention, but record immigration levels represent a national problem. New immigrant communities are sprouting in the South, Midwest, Southwest, and Northeast. The same difficulties of adaptation and assimilation exist across the country.

In 1997, the National Research Council, appointed by the Jordan Commission to examine the fiscal, demographic, and economic effects of immigration, presented a radically different picture from that drawn by "open-border" economists. Fiscally, the council wrote, the overall impact of high immigration might be good for Washington (even illegal immigrants pay taxes), but it was bad for state and local governments.

The council echoed what immigration specialists such as RAND's Georges Vernez, Harvard's George Borjas and the University of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

California's Phillip Martin had been saying for years. These researchers write that, unlike earlier immigrants, new immigrants are falling behind in society instead of moving up. Vernez and his coauthor, Kevin McCarthy, found that three decades of heavy immigration into California, particularly from Mexico, had given the state a disproportionately high population of unskilled and uneducated workers, aggravating the wage gap between rich and poor, native and immigrant. Borjas' work shows that, on the national level, present levels of immigration have transferred wealth from poor minorities to the wealthy. He has found a decline in the relative skills of the overall immigrant population since 1965 and "a precipitous decline relative to the trend in the national population." Immigrants, willing to accept below-average wages, drive down wages for native-born industrial and farm workers. Farm and industry owners then profit from the unnaturally low price of labor. Immigration, Borjas concludes, has become an income redistribution program: "Workers lose because immigrants drag wages down. Employers gain because immigrants drag wages down." Similarly, Martin's studies show that immigration and guest-worker programs in California have created a permanent, foreign-born, exploited underclass that depresses wages and distorts the economy by keeping farmers from investing in more productive alternatives. "Employers," he wrote, "invest in lobbying to maintain the [guest-worker] program, not in labor-saving or back-saving alternatives."

New immigrants are falling behind in society instead of moving up.

These analyses all make the same link between immigration and welfare that ordinary Californians made in passing Proposition 187, which the courts have now struck down. Around 40 percent of California's welfare dollars go to immigrant-headed (either legal or illegal) households. Wilson championed Proposition 187 because he said that illegal immigrants had no right to state money, which is technically correct. The trouble is that most of that state money went for things to which they did have the right—namely public schools, from which the Supreme Court says their children cannot be excluded, and TANF.

One of the paradoxes of America's failed immigration policy is the phenomenon known as "citizen children," the American children of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

illegal immigrants. These children, like any poor American child, are eligible for TANF. The United States, nearly alone among developed nations, grants citizenship to all children born within its borders, regardless of their parents' status. According to the Los Angeles County Welfare Department, of the 620,000 children in Los Angeles receiving food stamps and TANF, between 120,000 and 150,000 were born to parents in America illegally. An estimated half-million such children live in the United States today. For the INS, citizen children create a difficult situation: illegal immigrants can be deported (even if they rarely are), but what of their American children? Representative Brian Bilbray (R-Calif.) has introduced a bill that would end the citizen-children phenomenon (which grows out of a controversial interpretation of the 14th Amendment), but it has never come to a vote.

The panacea that Congress offers for immigration anarchy is more guest workers, skilled and unskilled. Many of the 200,000 skilled guest workers brought in on temporary H1-B visas eventually will become illegal immigrants because their expiring visas will exceed by several times the number of permanent permits issued each year. The guest farm workers bill, called AgJobs, which will come up again in the next Congress, would bring tens of thousands of unnecessary guest workers into the country. A recent General Accounting Office report found no shortage of farm labor in America, and the two California counties with the highest unemployment are Fresno and Imperial, both farm counties. The growers' intent in lobbying for these bills is simply to drive down farm wages.

Guest-worker bills are Congress' favorite kind of "reform": they create the illusion of limiting immigration without actually doing it. Immigration specialists hate guest-worker programs. "There is nothing more permanent than temporary workers," says Martin. INS Commissioner Doris Meissner explained her opposition to guest worker provisions in a 1998 bill by saying, "Contract [guest] workers are defenseless, falling prey to employers willing to pay less than market wages and to use contracts over workers to maintain silence about substandard conditions. We should not want workers who are unable to enjoy the benefits of their taxes and involve themselves and their families in the community where they live."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TAKING CONTROL

IMMIGRANTS are the source of America's population and strength. If America is not an isolationist nation, that is, at least partly, because the twentieth century revealed America's global security and economic interests. But it is also because the United States' diverse population links it to every region and continent and makes immigration a foreign policy tool. The United States is unique. American culture, like American interests, is a product of America's diversity and resonates around the world at least as much as its economic and military power.

If the United States owes its very identity to immigration, it is time to recognize the hazards of unreasonable and uncontrolled immigration. Instead of being a source of strength, upwardly spiraling immigration has begun to create imbalances in education, income distribution, employment levels, and welfare demands. It is creating tensions between immigrants and natives, between immigrant and nonimmigrant states, and among state, local, and federal governments. This shows up in English-only laws and initiatives, suits brought by several states against the federal government to recover social charges related to immigrants, and disputes among federal, state, and local law-enforcement agencies about how to apprehend, process, detain, and repatriate illegal immigrants.

Record levels of immigration are creating special burdens and tensions in states such as California, Arizona, Florida, New Jersey, and Illinois. These woes are already spilling over into other states. When the economy turns down, says Susan Martin, director of Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of International Migration, the United States can expect a national backlash against immigration "that could be greater than it was in California." If Congress and the next president do not come up with reasonable solutions along the lines proposed by the Jordan Commission, the field will be clear for the unreasonable solutions advanced by politicians such as Pete Wilson and Patrick Buchanan and discriminatory initiatives like Proposition 187.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Plaintiff's Diplomacy

Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco

UNCIVIL ACTION

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY America is one of the most litigious societies the world has ever known. Civil lawsuits in American courts are used to resolve an ever-expanding list of conflicts. But new forms of litigation can have powerful and wide-ranging consequences, both intended and unforeseen. This is especially obvious in one area long thought outside the power of domestic courts: foreign policy. Increasing numbers of individuals, including torture and terrorism victims, Holocaust survivors, and denizens of the dwindling Amazon rain forest, are now using lawsuits to defend their rights under international law. The defendants in these cases include multinational corporations, foreign government officials, and even foreign states themselves. And whoever wins, the cases are having a powerful impact on America's international relations.

U.S. courts have become the venue of choice for such suits because they offer plaintiffs the benefit of procedural mechanisms, not all available elsewhere, like the class action suit and punitive damages—not to mention the prospect of unparalleled media coverage and U.S. government involvement. The issues in these cases, from war crimes to the terms of foreign investment, have long been the subjects of treaties and diplomatic parley. But the plaintiffs who initiate them now stand at the intersection of two larger trends. On the one hand,

---

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER is J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of International, Foreign, and Comparative Law at Harvard Law School. DAVID BOSCO, a freelance journalist, is Codirector of the Harvard Seminar on Ethics and International Affairs and a third-year student at Harvard Law School.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they are the latest addition to the growing chorus of nontraditional actors who have acquired a voice in foreign affairs. On the other, they both contribute to and benefit from a growing determination to hold individuals accountable for violations of international law. Newly emboldened plaintiffs are the civil counterparts to the newly aggressive prosecutors who have pursued criminals like Augusto Pinochet and Slobodan Milošević.

"Plaintiff's diplomacy," as this new trend toward lawsuits that shape foreign policy can be called, comes in several different forms with very different implications. The first category consists of suits against individuals for grave violations of international law committed in the name of governments. These suits have the salutary effect of opening U.S. courts to foreign victims of abuse and educating American judges about global norms of human rights law.

Suits against corporations for violations of international law fall into a second category, one more likely to complicate diplomatic relations and generate pressure on governments from powerful corporate interests. Such suits are an inevitable corollary to the rising power of both civic groups and corporations in world affairs. U.S. courts may have a role to play in the larger political process as the world adjusts to the new power of such corporations. And to the extent that plaintiffs seek to relitigate the role of corporations in historic catastrophes such as the Holocaust, these cases remind new generations of history's human face. But American tribunals alone cannot and should not handle all of the underlying issues that such corporate trials raise.

The third category of litigation is even more troubling. These are suits against foreign governments authorized and encouraged by Congress and filed in an effort to achieve justice for victims of terrorism and oppression. The appalling suffering that such individuals and their families have endured demands some kind of response. Unfortunately, Congress has tried to achieve this through ill-advised changes in U.S. law, which have unsettled key U.S. allies and complicated sensitive U.S. diplomacy by undermining attempts to ease tensions with countries such as Cuba and Iran. Further steps down this road may lead to even more unpalatable outcomes: greater strains on international relations, danger to U.S. interests and assets abroad, and long-term damage to the integrity of U.S. courts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE PEOPLE'S COURT

UNTIL 20 YEARS AGO, the idea that individuals could sue or be sued in U.S. courts for violations of international law was not widely accepted. International law was thought to be a matter for states alone. This began to change in 1980 when the family of a Paraguayan citizen tortured to death by the police realized that their son's torturer had arrived in the United States. The Filartiga family's suit against the former Paraguayan cop relied on the centuries-old but almost forgotten Alien Tort Statute of 1789, which gives U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over violations "of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Although a lower court initially dismissed the case, the Carter administration wrote a brief urging the Second Circuit's Court of Appeals to take a closer look.

The appellate court decided in favor of the Filartigas, fundamentally changing the role of U.S. courts in the fight for human rights. Suddenly foreigners could be held liable for violations of international law, even if committed outside the United States and against non-Americans. Labeling torturers "enemies of all mankind," the court elaborated a vision of international law broad enough to include recent developments in human rights. The court's interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute put a powerful new tool in the hands of those hoping to hold liable violators of human rights, and a collection of new plaintiffs soon sought to make use of the ruling. Philippine nationals sued the family of ex-dictator Ferdinand Marcos for torture carried out during his rule. An Ethiopian victim likewise sued his torturer. And a group of Guatemalan peasants won a large judgment against their country's former defense minister.

Encouraged by a Reagan administration uncomfortable with this expansive new jurisprudence, however, some U.S. courts soon acted to limit the reach of *Filartiga vs. Peña Irala*. In 1986, the deeply divided Washington, D.C., Circuit Court ruled that a victim of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorism could not sue the PLO for violating international law. Three years later, the Supreme Court rejected a plaintiff's attempt to use the Alien Tort Statute to overcome the protection of sovereign immunity (the traditional doctrine that governments and their leaders cannot be sued in other countries for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ARCHIVE PHOTOS

A lawsuit waiting to happen: American hostage with Iranian captors, Tehran, 1979

carrying out their duties), limiting the statute's scope to lesser officials. Following this line of reasoning, federal courts then threw out suits against the Saudi Arabian government and Haiti's President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Nonetheless, the door that *Filartiga* opened remains ajar today. While limiting it somewhat, the Supreme Court has declined to completely overturn the *Filartiga* court's interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute. The Clinton administration has also been more receptive to these suits than its Republican predecessors. In 1993, when a group of Bosnian refugees sued Radovan Karadžić, the president of the self-declared Bosnian Serb Republic, the administration decided not to support his immunity claim. In its eventual ruling, the Second Circuit found that although Karadžić's crimes were committed "under color of law" (that is, in a quasi-governmental capacity), because he was not the head of an acknowledged government he was not protected from suit by sovereign immunity. Karadžić remained outside the United States and so the verdict was largely symbolic. Still, the court's strongly worded decision restored momentum to human rights litigation in U.S. courts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The impact of such cases has been greater in theory than in practice, however. The *Filartiga* ruling opened U.S. courts to only a very small group of foreign plaintiffs: those victims able to identify and file suit against violators of human rights not protected by sovereign immunity yet capable of committing a violation of international law. Traditionally, international law imposed obligations on states alone. Individuals and nonstate actors could not, therefore, commit violations of international law. *Filartiga* and its progeny have created an opening in this rule, but one too narrow for lawsuits against those most responsible for human rights violations abroad—namely, leaders and governments—since they tend to be protected by sovereign immunity. At the same time, the effect of these civil suits in fostering respect for human rights has been uncertain at best. The massive judgments (in the tens of millions of dollars) that the courts entered against Karadžić and others have gone unpaid. For the moment, then, the principal benefit of these suits to their plaintiffs is the public attention they generate.

The massive judgments that the courts entered against Karadžić and others have gone unpaid.

From the perspective of American jurisprudence, however, the Alien Tort Statute cases have been more beneficial. They have forced U.S. courts to grapple with developments in international law that might otherwise have received little attention—a much-needed tonic for a judicial system often lamentably out of touch with international law.

The diplomatic implications of the Alien Tort Statute suits, meanwhile, have been more limited. Most defendants—Karadžić being a notable exception—have either been bit players or major figures no longer in power. (The action against Pinochet in the United Kingdom and Spain was a criminal suit brought by government prosecutors and therefore differs from the civil cases described here.) The Karadžić suit, however, hints at the kind of diplomatic complications that future Alien Tort Statute suits might present. In deciding whether to recommend immunity for Karadžić, the Clinton administration had to balance the possible harm the suit against him might do to the ongoing negotiations over Bosnia against the public relations damage that might come from recommending immunity for someone responsible for such atrocities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Furthermore, the spate of civil wars in recent years has made deciding whether to grant immunity all the more complicated, since negotiations today often involve rebel and ethnic leaders whose status in international law is unclear. Future American administrations will have to resolve the legal and political dilemma of how to treat suits against such individuals. Still, the limits that the courts have placed on Alien Tort Statute suits make the likelihood of more serious interference with diplomacy unlikely. What minimal disruption has occurred must be set against such cases' very real value in giving a forum to those otherwise without recourse and in confronting American courts with developments in human rights law.

CATCHING THE CORPORATIONS

IF THE DIPLOMATIC impact of suits against individuals has been limited, not so the growing body of litigation against foreign and multinational corporations for violations of international law. In some cases, plaintiffs have used corporations as proxies for what are essentially attacks on government policy; because corporations do not have sovereign immunity, they are generally more vulnerable to suit. In other cases, corporations have been the actual targets but the scale of the lawsuits and the prominent nature of the claims have nonetheless ensured high-level government involvement. By targeting major corporations and business concerns, private plaintiffs have thus become a diplomatic force in their own right, forcing governments to pay attention at the highest levels.

The recent Holocaust litigation is the most visible example of this phenomenon. The suits have come in several waves. In 1996, as revelations emerged that Swiss banks might still be holding funds deposited by or stolen from the Nazis' victims, a class of plaintiffs brought suit in a U.S. federal court against several prominent banks. The lawsuit and the publicity surrounding it provoked a diplomatic furor and, eventually, an anti-American backlash in Switzerland. A former Swiss president even accused the United States of using the Holocaust to undermine Switzerland's success as a financial center. President Clinton sent then-Undersecretary of Commerce Stuart Eizenstat to mediate talks between the plaintiffs and the banks. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

settlement talks, which involved at various stages not only Eizenstat but a federal district court judge, New York Senator Alfonse D'Amato, and a number of Jewish leaders, finally produced a $1.25 billion payment.

The focus next shifted to German corporations that had used concentration camp inmates as slave labor during the war. In 1998, a group of plaintiffs sued several major German businesses in a New Jersey federal court. Once again, the suit forced the hands of governments: Eizenstat and a German counterpart set up a parallel negotiating track, and eventually both Clinton and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder intervened. Clinton sent a personal letter to Schröder in early December 1998 reminding him of the issue's importance for German-American relations. Schröder, for his part, eventually arranged a crucial contribution of almost $1 billion from the German government to the corporate fund. A key element in the final $5.1 billion settlement was a promise of protection for the corporations from future suits in U.S. courts, which the Clinton administration pledged to ensure by opposing further litigation.

Plaintiffs have used corporations as proxies for attacks on government policy.

In the past, issues such as compensation for wartime crimes would have been dealt with exclusively on a government-to-government level, excluding individuals. The plaintiffs in these cases, however, managed to bypass such an "espousal" procedure by bringing suit directly rather than simply petitioning the State Department for support. Indeed, several weeks before the final settlement was brokered by the two governments, the New Jersey court dismissed the suit, arguing that the U.S.-German government compensation agreements precluded further private claims. But by then, the court had served its purpose. Bringing suit had generated public and legal pressure on the United States and Germany. The disputes were ultimately settled through an amalgam of classic intergovernmental negotiation and private discussion, but it was litigation that put the issue on the agenda in the first place.

The attention of plaintiffs' attorneys has now turned to Japanese and Austrian corporations. On December 7, 1999—58 years to the day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor—plaintiffs filed suit against

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Japanese corporations in California courts, alleging that these firms had also used slave labor during the war. Meanwhile, a separate class of plaintiffs brought suit against several Austrian corporations on similar grounds. Both governments have sought the assistance of the U.S. State Department in dispensing with the suits, and the department recently filed a statement in court arguing that such suits against Japanese corporations are precluded by postwar treaties.

The Clinton administration and its successors should expect to continue to play an active role in mediating between plaintiffs and the foreign interests they have forced into court. True, the Eizenstat negotiations created tensions of their own: frustrated at an impasse in the talks, chief German negotiator Otto Lambsdorff chastised the American government for its tendency to "mirror the demands of class-action lawyers." But the process effectively headed off prolonged litigation that would have had a corrosive effect on important U.S. diplomatic relationships and should be a model for the future.

FORCING REFORM

SUITS BROUGHT against corporations for ongoing projects or recent activities could have an even greater impact on relations between states, and such cases have also begun to proliferate in U.S. courts. For example, a group of Burmese plaintiffs has sued the oil companies Unocal and Total for alleged complicity in the human rights violations of the Burmese government. (According to the lawsuit, the corporations acquiesced in and even supported government abuses of residents in areas of the country where a pipeline was to be built.) An important suit against Texaco for allegedly dumping tons of toxic waste in Ecuador's jungles is also pending. Meanwhile, a group of Nigerian activists has brought suit against Shell for alleged complicity in the murder of activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. An Indonesian tribal council supported by several environmental groups has brought both federal and state claims against an American mining company. And victims of perhaps the largest-ever industrial disaster—the 1984 chemical spill in Bhopal, India—have jumped on board. Frustrated by the inadequacy of a 1989 settlement negotiated between the Indian government and Union Carbide, a group of Bhopal plaintiffs filed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

suit in November 1999 in federal court in Manhattan, charging the chemical company with violations of international law.

These suits create distinct but often-conflicting pressures on governments. First are the pressures from the plaintiffs' side. It is often difficult for a government to deny diplomatic support to a lawsuit brought by its citizens against a foreign corporation, especially when their cause is a sympathetic one. Yet in most of these cases, the governments involved are of developing countries heavily dependent on foreign investment. They therefore find themselves caught in a painful bind. Public pressure and the possibility of a large payout may pull a state toward supporting a lawsuit, but the danger of scaring off future investment will tug in the other direction. Ecuador's reaction to the suit against Texaco illustrates this ambivalence. The Ecuadorian government initially supported Texaco, an important investor, as it defended itself against the claim. After an election, however, the new administration reversed the government position and submitted a brief arguing that Texaco was indeed liable for the environmental damage.

Large corporate settlements confirm that power has shifted from governments and investors to coalitions of individuals.

Regardless of the position that developing countries ultimately take, the willingness of U.S. courts to entertain these suits means that settling the disputes, rather than fighting them in court, may be the best option for the defendant corporations. Texaco, for example, is reported to have already offered a $500 million settlement to the Ecuadorian plaintiffs. Large settlements are victories for the plaintiffs and confirm that power has shifted from governments and investors to coalitions of individuals, their lawyers, and the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often crucial to organizing the lawsuits.

This newfound power might simply focus greater attention on the human rights and environmental implications of corporate investment. But successful litigation may produce another, more ambiguous outcome: de facto sanctions against states with poor environmental and human rights records. Few corporations will want to risk liability by working with countries that regularly violate international standards. Although that seems desirable, one troubling aspect is the relative

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lack of public accountability for the actors effecting this change. As Peter Spiro, a Hofstra University law professor and former State Department official, has noted, "NGO leaders have emerged as a class of modern day, nonterritorial potentates, a position rather like that commanded by medieval bishops." Another source of concern is the indiscriminate nature of these sanctions, which target rich and poor alike.

A second set of pressures brought by such suits will affect governments of both developing and developed countries, whose development policies these suits may overturn or undermine. Making decisions about economic priorities is a highly political process in all states and is highly specific. Not all countries can or should share the same goals. This idea was reflected recently by a federal appeals court that, in dismissing a claim by Indonesian plaintiffs against an American mining company, urged restraint in similar suits so that the "environmental policies of the United States do not displace environmental policies of other governments." Rulings by U.S. courts cannot substitute for the hard work of reaching consensus within foreign states on respect for human rights and responsible development.

Finally, the home governments of defendant corporations will soon feel pressure to limit the opportunities for these suits. NGOs may seek to bypass the state in favor of direct action against global corporations, but these corporations are very likely to turn to the state for protection. Corporate lobbyists will press for laws making these suits difficult or impossible to bring.

To accommodate these conflicting interests, the next U.S. administration should help craft meaningful international standards regulating corporate conduct abroad that leave corporations vulnerable to lawsuits for truly egregious conduct while providing some defense against more debatable claims. After all, when corporations are complicit in blatant violations of international law, why should they not be held accountable? States, for their part, need to remain immune for many reasons. Suing them is often just a way of suing their citizens and imposing collective guilt. But corporations with global reach and quasi-sovereign power present tempting targets. Not only do they have deep pockets, but their power to commit grave violations of human dignity and to despoil the global environment is great and often seems to render countries powerless to resist them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

National courts may indeed be the scalpel needed to cut through the tangled web of money and politics and lay bare the moral and social dimensions of global wrongdoing. As with the great civil rights crusades in the United States, however, litigation should be only one part of the answer, an initial step in a long and complicated process of reform. Courts alone should not make broad-based changes; without engaging the broader political process, they risk losing legitimacy and doing more harm than good.

THE NAME OF THE ROGUE

WHILE PLAINTIFFS and their lawyers have begun to find new ways to use U.S. courts against individual and corporate violators of international law, Congress and the White House have been wrestling over an even more vexing question: whether American citizens should be allowed to sue foreign states directly, particularly those states that support terrorism. American courts have become the battleground in a contest between an executive branch seeking to defend traditional immunity for foreign states and a Congress eager to punish rogue governments and allow constituents a means of redress.

The ground rules for this struggle were set by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), passed in 1976 to clarify and depoliticize the often-contentious process of deciding when foreign states should enjoy immunity from suit in U.S. courts. In the last several years, Congress has enacted or considered a number of changes to the FSIA that would make it easier for American citizens to sue foreign countries. A 1996 revision permitted civil suits by victims of attacks by countries the State Department had designated as supporting terrorism (a list that today includes Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria). One of the first actions brought under this provision was a suit by Stephen Flatow against Iran for the death of his daughter in Israel at the hands of a suicide bomber allegedly backed by the Iranians. In 1998, a federal district court awarded Flatow more than $250 million in damages. His victory was a hollow one, however. The Clinton administration has looked coldly on Flatow's requests for help in seizing Iranian assets; with the State Department's blessing, a federal court recently ruled that Flatow could not attach Iranian assets seized by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the United States in connection with the hostage crisis. The administration has been similarly reluctant to help secure assets in a judgment against the Cuban air force for its role in the 1996 downing of two civilian aircraft.

Unhappy with the administration's reluctance, congressional supporters of the plaintiffs have drafted legislation that would make it easier to collect judgments in such cases. Congress hopes to pressure the executive into a more assertive approach. But the case against further congressional encroachments on sovereign immunity is compelling. By weakening its sovereign-immunity laws, the United States may put its own assets and interests abroad at risk. After all, sovereign immunity is meant to be a reciprocal arrangement. With its worldwide reach, the United States would be particularly vulnerable should other countries imitate Congress and permit suits against the U.S. government abroad.

It is not clear that massive judgments against terrorist states serve U.S. interests.

Nor is it clear that massive judgments against terrorist states serve U.S. interests. The looming presence of such judgments may actually make rogue governments defensive, discouraging dialogue, engagement, political reform, and integration by these states into international legal and financial regimes. The Flatow decision, for example, came down just as President Muhammad Khatami was consolidating his pro-reform political position in Iran. Understandably, U.S. administration officials worried that the judgment might hinder rather than help his cause.

Even when Washington does decide (for strategic or moral reasons) to isolate and punish so-called terrorist states, the decision should be the result of careful deliberation by foreign policy experts, not the product of haphazard litigation. And when financial penalties are imposed on a country, the emerging consensus now favors the use of "smart" sanctions—those carefully targeted at responsible leaders and domestic groups. Massive court judgments against rogue states are clumsy weapons that, if complied with, would ultimately place the heaviest burden on the general population, not their rulers.

These "terrorist state" suits also pose another, less apparent, but just as serious danger to U.S. courts: namely, that they will become

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

politicized as they are drawn into foreign policy debates. In the wake of the Elián González furor, it is now helpful to remember how the Supreme Court handled another Cuban crisis: the post-revolution wave of Cuban expropriations of U.S. property in the 1960s. When asked in *Sabbatino vs. Banco Nacional de Cuba* to recognize the illegality of these expropriations under international law and return the proceeds from the sale of American property seized in Cuba to its rightful owner, the court declined to rule, holding that any judgment "could seriously interfere with negotiations being carried on by the executive branch." Moreover, the justices observed, "it is difficult to imagine the courts of this country embarking on adjudication in an area which touches more sensitively the practical and ideological goals of the various members of the community of nations." In an atmosphere of pervasive ideological conflict, the court chose the wise course of restraint.

That decision holds lessons for today's courts. The justices sought to avoid a precedent that would make American tribunals instruments of particular foreign policies. Yet courts that regularly adjudicate cases against "terrorist states" run the risk of becoming just such political tools. The very basis of jurisdiction over foreign states in these cases—designation by the State Department of a government as a supporter of terrorism—is itself a political decision that the court then endorses. Often foreign states do not even appear to defend themselves. In such an environment, the fairness of the proceedings becomes questionable. Judges may feel tempted to set policy from the bench, and the perception of impartiality will suffer.

These concerns must not obscure the need to compensate victims of terrorism. The suffering of Hezbollah hostages, precisely detailed in the judgments handed down in favor of Joseph Cicippio and Terry Anderson, and the enduring grief of victims' families such as the Flatows deserve attention and compensation. But the remedy should be diplomatic rather than judicial. The administration should therefore establish a fund to compensate such victims. Washington should then negotiate, at the appropriate time, for payments into this fund by the states deemed responsible for supporting terrorism—or better yet, by their leaders. There is precedent for this approach: when Chile was sued for alleged complicity in the killing of an opposition political figure in Washington, the administration

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ultimately negotiated a quiet payment from the Chilean government, independent of the judicial proceeding.

SUPERCOURTS

AMERICAN COURTS today are walking a fine line between expanding a transnational legal system capable of enforcing international law and engaging in a unilateral legal expansion that will damage long-term U.S. interests. From one perspective, the new openness of U.S. courts to suits by individuals seeking to enforce international law against foreign leaders, states, and multinational corporations reflects the continuing decentralization and democratization of foreign policy. Just as NGOs, ethnic lobbies, and other nontraditional actors are assuming important roles in certain foreign policy decisions, so too are private plaintiffs. From these shores, the process may seem a beneficial one. When traditional diplomacy proves inadequate to the task of enforcing international law and justice, plaintiffs should be able to carve out new diplomatic channels, bypassing the uncertainty of political negotiations and compensating for the weakness of international tribunals by turning to effective national courts.

But the expansion of plaintiffs' power in U.S. courts looks quite different from the perspective of other countries. The juxtaposition of this increased involvement of U.S. courts in foreign affairs with the continued American refusal to participate in bodies like the International Criminal Court creates the image of a country happy to haul foreign defendants into its own courts while stubbornly resisting even the remote possibility that its own citizens might be called to account. Viewed in this context, the successful lawsuits against the Cuban and Iranian governments, Swiss banks, and German corporations suggest that the world's sole superpower is arming itself with superpower courts. This picture understandably may threaten those uncomfortable with U.S. hegemony. In the legal sphere, as in so many other areas, the United States should be wary of the resentment its muscle-flexing produces.

Keeping U.S. courts open to legitimate claims based on violations of international law but closed to issues likely to damage the conduct of foreign policy and politicize the courts will not be easy. Such a process will require several elements. Congress should look more to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the country's long-term interests than to the short-term political gains that come from hauling foreign states into U.S. courts. The courts themselves should fulfill their obligations under international law while acknowledging the practical limits of their power. And the administration must recognize and try to contain the diplomatic implications of plaintiffs' newfound power.

U.S. courts have an important role to play in creating a truly transnational legal system that will help give substance to international legal commitments. To have value, such commitments should apply equally at home and abroad. Private plaintiffs who have suffered have a right to reframe affairs of state as injuries to individuals requiring redress. Thus governments must get used to some degree of intrusion into foreign policy.

Plaintiff's diplomacy is one of several forces changing the way policy is made in the twenty-first century. The days of backroom deals and policy elites may be fading. But the transition must be carefully managed to balance both the rewards and the dangers that plaintiff's diplomacy inevitably incurs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reviews & Responses

AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Hugo Chávez, Caracas, Venezuela, December 1998

Chávez, as Gott sees him, is a radical revolutionary who will provide the "antibodies" to combat globalization—the "disease" of the new millennium.

The Long Shadow of Hugo Chávez *Kenneth Maxwell* 118

Africa's Ailing Giant *Marcus Mabry* 123

Recent Books on International Relations 128

Letters to the Editor 153

Advice for the Next President *Andrew J. Goodpaster* 158

Lurie's Foreign Affairs 162

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Essay

The Long Shadow of Hugo Chávez

A Sympathetic Book Defends Venezuela's Strongman

Kenneth Maxwell

In the Shadow of the Liberator: The Impact of Hugo Chávez on Venezuela and Latin America. BY RICHARD GOTT. New York: Verso, 2000, 160 pp. $25.00.

Richard Gott has always been susceptible, he admits, to "the charms of Latin America's strongmen." This time he has fallen for *comandante* Hugo Chávez, the former army lieutenant colonel and two-time coup leader who was inaugurated as Venezuela's president in February 1999 with overwhelming public support. Chávez, as Gott sees him, is a radical revolutionary who will provide the "antibodies" to combat "globalization ... the disease of the new millennium."

This first major assessment of the new regime in Caracas is classic Gott: large chunks of on-the-spot reportage and selective history spiced with generous dollops of old-left rhetoric, folded into a tasty literary sandwich. His is a Manichean world where "the evil empire" is based in Washington, D.C. Gott's hero is Chávez, who follows in the tradition of the great Latin American radical nationalists: Juan Perón of Argentina, Juan Velasco of Peru, Omar Torríjos of Panama—and, of course, the ever-resilient Fidel Castro.

Gott himself has been a fixture for over 30 years among the foreign interpreters of Latin America. A British journalist who worked at the University of Chile in the 1960s, he authored a major work on the region's guerrilla movements before following Che Guevara's disastrous Bolivian campaign. More recently, he completed a fine elegy for the hinterland of South America where the Jesuits once

KENNETH MAXWELL is Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Inter-American Studies and Director of Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He reviews books on the western hemisphere for *Foreign Affairs*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ruled. He was also for a time the literary editor at *The Guardian* in London until he had to resign following allegations that he had been too cozy with Soviet agents.

Gott is always an interesting, well-informed, and engaging writer. Washington would be wise to pay attention to this account, since Chávez's radical nationalism (so fondly described by Gott) is presumably raising eyebrows in Foggy Bottom and Langley. Hence the detailed exegesis of the *comandante*'s antecedents, philosophy, and friendships takes on great importance, even if Gott himself is surprised that "the Americans have been unusually quiet about Chávez."

Chávez, according to Gott, is a pragmatic utopian, and his aim is to destroy the Washington-inspired, neo-liberal economic "fundamentalism" that has entrapped Latin America in a U.S.-dominated system of dependence. Within South America, he seeks to revive the old dream of Simón Bolívar, calling for a united Latin America based on a reunification of the five Bolivarian republics (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia). To this end, Chávez has immersed himself in Venezuelan history, rediscovering heroes with revolutionary credentials and restoring Bolívar—long criticized by Marxists—to leftist respectability.

Gott is especially intrigued by Chávez's resurrection of Bolívar's long-forgotten teacher, Simón Rodríguez. This philosopher (who was so struck by the character of Robinson Crusoe that he renamed himself Samuel Robinson) argued for a rural-based economic revolution and the integration of indigenous peoples with the descendants of black slaves. Chávez is himself a man of mixed black and Indian ancestry and a *llanero,* an inlander from the plains of central Venezuela. Gott sees this espousal of "Robinsonian" philosophy as critical to understanding Chávez's policies toward Venezuela's poor and indigenous citizens—such as his schemes to resettle the population in the interior, away from the slums of the big cities.

Chávez has surrounded himself with battle-honed leftist stalwarts and survivors of past guerrilla insurrections, many of whom also knew Gott in the 1960s. Among Chávez's inner circle is Ali Rodríguez Araque, his minister of energy and mines, a former guerrilla fighter in Falcón state in the 1960s, and a former activist in the left-wing Radical Cause party. There are also José Vicente Rangel, his foreign minister and a perennial presidential candidate of the left, and Luís Miquilena, the octogenarian former leader of the Caracas bus drivers who helped form Chávez's "Fifth Republic Movement" of civilians and soldiers, which played a key role in his presidential election. Miquilena, whom Gott admires for his "tough Leninist streak" and his attempts to "revive the tradition of socialist nationalism," became the chief political adviser to Chávez and then president of the Constituent Assembly in 1999.

Chávez's bold aspirations have already translated into significant policies. Despite the official Venezuelan commitment to the peace process in Colombia, Gott emphasizes that Chávez is on the side of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (better known by its Spanish acronym FARC), the major leftist guerrilla force in Colombia's vicious internal war. He also credits the Chávez government, and Ali Rodríguez in particular, with a radically changed policy toward the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Countries (OPEC) that aims at curbing production increases and cooperating with non-OPEC member Mexico to raise oil prices. In fact, Chávez was so pleased with Rodríguez's election as OPEC president that he has proposed a meeting in Caracas, with guests to include Saddam Hussein, Muammar al-Qaddafi, and Muhammad Khatami. If nothing else, this exquisite happening—if it ever takes place—should get Washington's attention. With the U.S. public already furious over gas prices, such a meeting would surely remind Americans of a studiously forgotten fact: Venezuela is the largest oil supplier of the United States, providing more petroleum than all Persian Gulf states combined.

SEIZING THE MOMENT

Gott sees Chávez's rise to power as a direct result of the violent rebellion in Caracas in February 1989, the *Caracazo.* This spontaneous uprising led to widespread looting and rioting before the military clamped down, killing hundreds in the process. The *Caracazo* protested the economic reforms introduced by then-President Carlos Andrés Pérez and his young, technocratic, American-trained ministers, Miguel Rodríguez and Moisés Naím. These "shock troops" of the "Washington Consensus," Gott charges, sought to open up Venezuela's statist economy and impose the draconian price increases that led to the uprising. (Of course, Pérez was not the only populist to "bait and switch" once in office; both Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alberto Fujimori in Peru also imposed harsh adjustment policies after taking office. But they succeeded, whereas Pérez totally failed.)

Three years after the *Caracazo,* the 38-year-old Chávez staged his coup. His attempt to seize the presidential palace in Caracas failed, but the takeover was so successful in other parts of the country that Chávez was permitted to appear on television after surrendering to urge his co-conspirators to also give up. His appearance gave him national prominence. "The objectives we set ourselves have not been achieved ...," he told the Venezuelan people, "for the moment *(por ahora).*" Chávez's attempt to stage a second coup from his prison cell later that year also failed. But his phrase *"por ahora"* became the battle cry for his successful assumption of power through the ballot box.

Chávez's rise coincided with the disintegration of Venezuela's democracy, which was once seen as one of the most successful and stable in Latin America. Between 1992 and 1999, the party system that had run Venezuela since the 1950s collapsed. Venezuela's two dominant parties, Democratic Action and the Christian Democrats, traditionally took more than 90 percent of the vote in presidential elections and more than 80 percent of seats in the lower house of Congress. But today, they are marginal actors with little presence outside the state and local level. Venezuela lies in totally new political territory. Why this political collapse happened is therefore a more interesting question than the emergence of Chávez—and it is not attributable only to "corruption," as Gott implies.

In this respect, Venezuela does offer at least one disturbing lesson with potentially wider implications for the Andean republics: the prospect of radical economic reform can so severely disrupt a clientelistic, patronage-driven political system that it undermines its very foundation. Venezuela is an extreme

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW FROM CAMBRIDGE

Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics

Roland Bleiker

This book examines a wide range of dissident practices, from street protests to political poetry, in an attempt to demonstrate that they are becoming an increasingly important aspect of global politics. The author draws on several case studies, including an analysis of the events that led to the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The theoretical discussions focus on how people influence the course of politics at a time when boundaries between domestic and international spheres are blurring.

Cambridge Studies in International Relations 70

0-521-77099-8	Hardback	$59.95
0-521-77829-8	Paperback	$22.95

Contesting Global Governance

Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements

Robert O'Brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte, *and* ***Marc Williams***

The contest to shape global governance is increasingly being conducted on a number of levels and among a diverse set of actors. This book argues that increasing engagement between international institutions and sectors of civil society is producing a new form of international organization. The authors study the relationship between the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organisation, and environmental, labor, and women's movements, providing a rich analysis of the institutional response to social movement pressure.

Cambridge Studies in International Relations 71

0-521-77315-6	Hardback	$54.95
0-521-77440-3	Paperback	$19.95

Available in bookstores or from

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211
Call toll-free 800-872-7423 Web site: www.cup.org
AmEx/MasterCard/VISA accepted. Prices subject to change.

EDUCATORS:

Create your own textbook with FOREIGN AFFAIRS customized anthologies.

It's easy as...

1. Choose articles from **FOREIGN AFFAIRS** and thirteen other journals to design a book specifically for your course.
2. Either search our website (www.foreignaffairs.org/envoy) for articles to include, or fax your list to our anthology coordinator at (212) 744-5407. You can also find a price quotation sheet at the website address listed above.
3. Relax. We'll have your high quality, perfect bound paperback book to you within four weeks from the time we receive your bookstore's order.

The benefits are clear:

- Your name & course on the cover
- All recent articles are available
- Add your own material
- Copyright permissions are pre-cleared
- 2 complimentary copies included
- Priced for your student's budget
- Bookstores receive a 20% discount

For more information, contact:

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Anthology Coordinator
58 East 68th Street
New York, NY 10021
1 800 716-0002
or via e-mail: ForAff@cfr.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

"There is no better example of . . . the contribution that . . . our think tanks (make to) our public policy process . . . than the Institute for International Economics."
—Lawrence Summers, US Secretary of the Treasury.

NEW FROM THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

Assessing Financial Vulnerability: An Early Warning System for Emerging Markets

Morris Goldstein, Graciela Kaminsky, and Carmen Reinhart



Ever since the European currency crises of 1992-93, the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, and especially the Asian/global crisis of 1997-98, there has been heightened interest in early warning signals of financial crises. This timely and pathbreaking study presents a comprehensive battery of empirical tests on the performance of alternative early warning indicators for emerging-market economies that should prove useful in the construction of a more effective global warning system. *Assessing Financial Vulnerability* comes on the eve of impending changes at the International Monetary Fund as that institution reexamines how it reacts to financial crises.

June 2000. 150 pages. ISBN: 0-88132-237-7. $15.95.

"I am a skeptic on the feasibility of developing early-warning indicators of financial crises. Given my skepticism, I am struck by what a convincing case the authors manage to make. Their study is careful, comprehensive and nuanced. It is the best available effort to build an 'early warning system'."—Barry Eichengreen, George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor of Economics and Political Science, University of California, Berkeley



The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis

Stephan Haggard

The Asian crisis has sparked a thoroughgoing reappraisal of current international financial norms, the policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, and the adequacy of the existing financial architecture. To draw proper policy conclusions from the crisis, however, it is necessary to understand its domestic politics. In this study, political scientist Stephan Haggard focuses on the most seriously affected countries—Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand—while also drawing lessons from those economies, such as Taiwan, that escaped the most severe distress.

Haggard focuses on the political economy of the crisis, emphasizing the longer-run problems of moral hazard and corruption, the politics of crisis management and the political consequences of severe economic downturn. Looking forward, he focuses on two critical policy issues-changes in social safety nets in the crisis countries and efforts at corporate and financial restructuring.

August 2000. 165 pages (approx.). ISBN: paper 0-88132-283-0. $17.95.

"Well-researched, carefully documented, and clearly written . . . It should prove of considerable interest to students of Asian political economy and . . . to a broader audience of economists, political scientists, and policymakers . . ."—Robert L. Ayres, Senior Social Scientist, the World Bank

11 Dupont Circle, NW * Washington, DC 20036-1207 * Tel: (800) 522-9139 * Fax (703) 661-1501 * Visit our online bookstore at www.iie.com *

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

case, but it may be joined by others. It had oil to fuel its corruption and payoffs, but so does Ecuador; old-line parties have also been undermined in Colombia and Peru—with dangerous ramifications for both countries' democratic prospects.

Still, Chávez's popularity among poorer voters is not hard to explain. By the 1990s, per capita income in Venezuela lay below its level in the 1960s; industrial wages now stand at 40 percent of what they were in the 1980s; 66 percent of the population earns less than $2 a day; and unemployment is rife. More than half of the employed population works in the informal sector. Private investment fell 25 percent during Chávez's first year in office, while the economy contracted more than seven percent and capital flight exploded despite a threefold rise in oil prices. Chávez's populist anti-oligarchy rhetoric thus finds a powerful resonance among the disadvantaged and the volatile inhabitants of the shantytowns; the poor, after all, make up more than 80 percent of the electorate. But the grim economic statistics also underline the great challenge that Chávez faces in satisfying popular demands.

Chávez has essentially dismantled Venezuela's old institutions and ratified the process through five elections. He has closed down Venezuela's Congress and Supreme Court, abolished the 1961 constitution, and renamed the country the "Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela." He has also taken time out to visit China, including Mao's tomb, where he assured his hosts that Venezuela was beginning to "stand up" just as the "Great Helmsman" had done 50 years before. He went to Havana to play baseball with Castro, declaring that he found the Cuban and Venezuelan people bathing "in the same sea of happiness." And he has blocked U.S. flights over Venezuelan airspace, preventing their surveillance of Colombian drug traffickers. All this has made him widely popular with the majority of the Venezuelan people—and vigorously hated by its elite.

THE COLONEL'S LABYRINTH

Chávez has attacked the oligarchy (much to Gott's delight), but in reality the split between the haves and the have-nots is becoming more pronounced. The oligarchy has already shifted its assets to Miami and New York, and capital flight will reach an estimated $10 billion this year—half the amount of Venezuela's annual oil income, or a quarter of the state's total revenues. The real divide now is between the voters in the shantytowns, who support Chávez, and the dwindling middle class, which opposes him. Chávez has also brought the country's nationalized oil company under strict government control. This has helped boost Chávez's spending on social programs, but the revenues still do not cover all that he promised. Then there is Chávez's plan for integrated agro-industrial projects, which would relocate much of the urban population to the countryside. Gott's approval of this "bold plan" takes on a sinister air, given that he once praised the Khmer Rouge's anti-urban policies and was among the last major leftists to condemn Pol Pot.

Gott also ignores the fact that the coalition of military and civilian backers that supported Chávez's presidential bid has frayed. Chávez has now lost the support of several of his key military fellow plotters, most notably Francisco Arias, a former military officer and an ideological leader

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the 1992 coup who previously served as governor of the oil-rich state of Zulia. Arias is the first serious rival to Chávez since the collapse of the main political parties and ran against Chávez in the postponed "mega-election" on July 30. The army, thrown into the political arena, is also beginning to fear the threat that Chávez poses to its professionalism and hierarchy. Without mediating institutions, it is also not surprising that opposition has emerged among his old supporters in the army, the Catholic Church, the business community, and the media.

Regrettably, Gott often buries the bad news that might otherwise qualify his optimistic assertions about Chávez. He first writes that the government "acted with considerable competence and speed" after last December's devastating floods and mudslides but later admits that there was public criticism of the reaction of the security forces. In fact, the mishandling of the disaster provoked the first breakup within the Chávez coterie. This divide worsened after the political police, headed by Jesús Urdaneta, were accused of torture and summary executions. Demands by Chávez's cabinet members (most notably Foreign Minister Rangel) that these charges be investigated led Urdaneta to charge that some of Chávez's civilian supporters (namely, Rangel and Miquilena) were corrupt. In turn, this provoked the split between Chávez and Arias. Urdaneta lost his job and joined Arias in the opposition. All of this happened too quickly for the publication of Gott's book, which calls Arias "the most prominent intellectual within the Chávez movement."

Gabriel García Márquez observed after meeting Chávez that he was "overwhelmed by the feeling that I had just been traveling and chatting pleasantly with two opposite men: one of whom the caprices of fate had given an opportunity to save his country; the other, an illusionist who would pass into the history books as just another despot." For now, it is difficult to see a happy outcome. Chávez has set the precedents for extraconstitutional action and armed insurrection. The plebiscatory ratification of his power grab is the stuff of dictatorship, not democracy. Without the mechanisms for democratic consensus-building and negotiated conciliation, the door is wide open for others to step in and claim they represent the popular will.

Despite Gott's enthusiasm, Chávez remains the quintessential outsider, the military *caudillo* with eclectic nationalist and leftist views like the countless Latin American autocrats of yore who supposedly disappeared with the onset of democratization and market liberalization in the 1990s. Chávez represents a step backward to the violent, personalized rule of the charismatic leader on horseback, to the disastrous legacy of his hero, Bolívar. In short, Venezuela will start the twenty-first century just where the early nineteenth century left off. And Chávez might soon find himself trapped in the labyrinth of the old Venezuelan general, so brilliantly described by García Márquez as "the headlong race between his misfortunes and his dreams."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Essay

Africa's Ailing Giant

Chaos Reigns in Nigeria

Marcus Mabry

This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria. BY KARL MAIER. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000, 327 pp. $26.00.

Africa is not in fashion these days. Most Western governments pay it scant attention, and even though crises there periodically make it into world headlines, the continent invariably sinks back into oblivion. Although Western opinion has vacillated since the end of the Cold War between Afro-pessimism and Afro-optimism—neither of which reflect reality very well—the region has received neither the sustained analysis nor the political and economic commitment that other developing regions, from Asia to eastern Europe to Latin America, have enjoyed. Marginalized as the eternally dark continent, Africa has languished under Western ignorance and prejudice and Africans' own deep sense of helplessness.

The Clinton administration has made an uneven effort to change that. Despite the president's extensive tour of the continent in 1998 and his belated success in getting a watered-down trade liberalization bill through Congress earlier this year, his pleas to pay attention to Africa have fallen mostly on deaf ears. When the administration went so far as to declare AIDS a national security issue, three former State Department chiefs of Africa policy publicly disagreed.

Africans have hardly helped matters. The "new breed" of leaders heralded by Washington just a few short years ago as the stewards of an "African Renaissance" (Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, and Paul Kagame of Rwanda) are today all embroiled in or have just

MARCUS MABRY, a former Africa Bureau Chief for *Newsweek,* is World Affairs Editor of *Newsweek*'s international edition.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

emerged from senseless wars that stretched from the Red Sea to the Atlantic. This has given Westerners yet another excuse to throw up their hands and, as Clinton said on his recent tour, wonder, "What is to be done about Africa?"

The question is a vital one, for Africa does matter—whether or not one believes that AIDS is a national security issue. Drugs and disease do not respect increasingly porous national borders and impoverished and alienated youths make willing converts to religious extremism or terrorism. Peace and stability in Africa is therefore very much in the West's own interest. Each new massacre in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, or elsewhere further weakens America's claim to lead the post–Cold War world. As numerous observers have recently argued, American power is at an all-time relative high, but its ability to lead is increasingly being questioned. Nowhere will the strength of its claim to moral leadership be more keenly judged than in its response to Africa.

Who better to detail American and European failings on the continent—and the threats they pose to international stability—than Karl Maier? A Yankee journalist long employed by British newspapers and the author of two respected books on Africa (*Angola: Promises and Lies* and *Into the House of the Ancestors: Inside the New Africa,* which details the rebirth of African civil society in the post–Cold War era), Maier has brought keen observation and a strong sense of narrative to the story of Nigeria's misery and resilience. In *This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria,* he has written a book that, like Nigeria itself, is at turns terrifying and uplifting. He relates familiar statistics on the country's angry, impoverished masses and raises the specter of a future Nigerian civil war, a horror that would dwarf the barbarous upheaval in Sierra Leone. In so doing, Maier makes it clear that the stakes are great—not just for Nigeria, but for the continent.

JUDGMENT DAYS

Nigerians called it "a coup from heaven" when, a year ago, Olusegun Obasanjo was installed as the country's democratically chosen president after almost 15 years of corrupt military rule. Nigeria and the world had breathed a collective sigh of relief that the despotic years of Sani Abacha, who died of a heart attack in June 1998, had ended in a peaceful transition.

Now Obasanjo, already famous for being Nigeria's only military dictator to ever hand over power to an elected civilian, has the chance to guide his country from the depths of underdevelopment to sound economic ground. But first he will have to tame the endemic corruption that extends from the statehouse at Aso Rock to every corner of Nigerian society. Simultaneously, he will have to navigate Nigeria's treacherous and often bloody ethnic, religious, and regional rivalries.

Since gaining independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has been buffeted by most of the ill winds known to humanity. Civil war, corruption, plague, starvation, natural disaster, greed, envy, sloth, ignorance, pestilence, and prejudice are all familiar visitors to the giant of Africa—home to one of every six or seven of the continent's inhabitants (Nigeria's exact population is unknown).

It would hardly be surprising, then, if the release of Maier's new book were greeted with a resigned shrug from the public. But that would be unfortunate.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

They haven't got a prayer: Waiting all day in a gas line, Kano, Nigeria, March 1998

The author does a laudable job of graphically illustrating the past and present divisions and missteps that have made Nigeria what it is today and threaten to unmake it tomorrow. Through interviews and brutally frank reportage, Maier shows that Nigeria could go either way under Obasanjo: down the path of real reform toward peace and prosperity, or in circles, maintaining the status quo and thereby risking civil war and violent disintegration.

This House Has Fallen catalogs with numbing repetition the scenes of poverty, violence, and ethnic unrest that its author observed throughout Nigeria during his two-year tour as the *Independent*'s Lagos bureau chief and then in many subsequent returns. The book opens with a brutal anecdote that sets the tone: Maier tries to make his way through the streets of Port Harcourt, the business capital of the oil-rich Niger Delta region, only to have his driver harassed and roughed up by gun-toting police-thugs. Yet despite such vivid storytelling, the preface and much of the first 50 pages of the book read like another long cliché of African misery and despair. There is the arrival of the naive, greenhorn reporter at the riotous Third World airport. The violent and greedy police and soldiers. The smog-choked, cacophonous streets of Lagos. The "feeding frenzy of human piranha" looting a truck at the president's inauguration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The book does ultimately improve. Maier has probably covered more terrain in Nigeria than any other Western correspondent, and in *This House Has Fallen,* the reader meets the myriad characters the journalist encountered over the years and gets to hear their views on Nigeria in their own words. Maier's interviews are his strong suite, giving voice to the voiceless—from street boys to market women—and giving a forum to the mighty generals who are largely to blame for Nigeria's unending woes.

His interview with the former strongman Ibrahim Babangida, for instance, should go down in history as one of the finest interviews of an egomaniacal Third World autocrat ever conducted. Maier deftly gives the man just enough rope to hang himself, while allowing his human side to come through intact enough to elicit unexpected empathy from readers.

The Babangida interview showcases what good journalists do best: tell a larger story through the prism of one person's experience. Babangida is a perfect candidate for this project, being the personification of the evils visited on the country and the embodiment of the vices and avarice that have wrecked modern-day Nigeria. His life is intertwined with that of his hobbled nation. As a boy, Babangida was greatly impressed by a visit to his school from a smartly dressed soldier and an officer recruiting for the colonial Nigerian armed forces. After independence, drunk with patriotism and the certainty that Nigeria would become the world's black superpower, surpassing British development and influence within a decade, Babangida enlisted. It was in the army that he began the long descent into power-lust and arrogance that would lead him to take over the reigns of the country from another military strongman (and friend) and plunge Nigeria even deeper into crisis.

HATE THY NEIGHBOR

Today Obasanjo is learning that democracy alone will not solve Nigeria's problems. Even after the return of civilian rule, the oil-rich Niger Delta remains a cauldron of ethnic violence. Although the Delta's oil provides 90 percent of Nigeria's hard-currency revenue, its people live in abject poverty. There are minimal government services and few schools—even the health clinics that some multinational oil companies have built in an effort to generate community support for their operations have no roofs. It is no wonder then that the small tribes who live in the Delta loathe Abuja (Nigeria's capital) for colluding with rich foreigners to steal their resources and deny them their due. They have good cause for such resentment, as Maier shows when he outlines how the Abacha regime plundered the country's crude oil and sold it on the domestic black market or across the border—or re-imported it to get the higher prices that foreign oil commands—and then stashed the profits in Swiss bank accounts.

That Nigeria suffers from wrenching ethnic clashes is already well known. Deep divisions were foreordained by the British decision to group more than 300 tribes into a single country and then exacerbated by corrupt centralized mismanagement. What Maier adds to the picture are the details of Nigeria's dysfunctional democracy today and the historical context for the fight between the center and the periphery. He surveys the debris of Delta villages torched by government security forces paid by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western oil companies. He travels through the remote Middle Belt to talk with elders and youths; the scarce resources and official neglect they are afforded has fueled hatred of the capital and of local ethnic rivals. And in a refreshing break with conventional wisdom, he demystifies the Ogoni activist and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa, whose 1995 execution by Abacha persuaded the Commonwealth to suspend Nigeria's membership.

Maier explains in detail how Nigeria's local and national leaders, taking a lesson from their former British masters, have used ethnicity to divide and conquer their embattled country and to enrich themselves. And in one unforgettable example, the author shows how the northern elites have used Islam to similar ends. With religion for a cudgel, northern politicians have distilled the masses' general disillusionment with Nigeria's government into Islamic fervor. Traveling with the Joint Aid Monitoring Group (Muslim men and boys empowered by the northern authorities to ensure that their fellow citizens lead clean "Muslim" lives), Maier records and recounts their misguided principles and delusions.

THE SAME OLD STORY

There is one major shortcoming to Maier's book, however: those who know Nigeria well will learn little new from it. The author's strength—the breadth and depth of his reportage—is also his weakness. The chief reason for a foreign correspondent to write a book—some might say the only reason—is that the role of privileged observer gives him or her particular insight into a country or region. But Maier offers no new insight, and his privileged access often results in stories that are neither instructive nor illustrative of any larger point.

Moreover, many of his arguments are flimsy or obvious. Even his recommendations for saving Nigerian nationhood—through decentralization, a national constitutional convention, and privatization—are well worn. Although he nods to the venerable tradition of reporter-philosophers such as Basil Davidson and Blaine Harden, his writing often reads like an undigested notebook. A journalist's book should offer something new—or at least inflammatory—to contribute to the existing body of work on a given subject.

Maier clearly has a great deal of affection for his subject: "Nigeria has proved to be by far the most confounding, frustrating, and at the same time engaging place I have ever visited." But he fails to convey the import of all the information he provides, so buried is his chronicle under heaps of hopelessness.

This House Has Fallen is worth reading for its graphic depictions of the current ethnic and regional challenges that President Obasanjo faces, particularly the growing ethnically based corps of youths being marshaled by rival, power-hungry leaders throughout the country. Anyone fascinated or appalled by the Nigerian story will not want to miss this book. But it offers frustratingly few answers for a region that needs them so desperately.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Recent Books on International Relations

Asia and the Pacific

LUCIAN W. PYE

Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. BY HERBERT P. BIX. New York: HarperTrade, 2000, 784 pp. $35.00.

This book is a rare achievement: a work that turns established knowledge upside down. Bix's detailed review of the life of Hirohito makes clear that the emperor was not a passive figurehead manipulated by war-minded militarists but an active strategic plotter of the Japanese wars of aggression—and a certifiable war criminal. His postwar denial of personal responsibility for Japan's wartime actions helped legitimize the national amnesia about what had happened during the war. From early childhood on, Hirohito was imbued with martial spirit and visions of imperial grandeur in the tradition of his grandfather, Emperor Meiji, who had expanded the empire through wars with China and Russia. Central to Hirohito's schooling was the history of great imperial conquests and technical instruction in military strategy. Hence, he took seriously his responsibilities as commander-in-chief of Japan's armed forces. Starting with the Manchurian and the Marco Polo Bridge incidents that led to full-scale war with China in 1937, Hirohito had numerous opportunities to check the army and prevent war. But he chose instead to engage in grand strategic planning, including Pearl Harbor and the campaigns into Southeast Asia. After defeat, he blatantly lied about his wartime actions and assumed the figurehead role that the Allied occupation, fearing that his removal would make the country ungovernable, wanted him to play. Bix relies on an impressive number of memoirs and diaries of high-level Japanese officials, which together present the picture of a complex man trained to be an imperialist, not a rubber stamp for Japan's ambitious militarists. The occupier of the Chrysanthemum Throne for 63 years, Hirohito was the longest-reigning emperor in the world's longest-lasting dynasty—which may soon come to an end if Crown Prince Naruhito fails to produce an heir.

Profits and Principles: Global Capitalism and Human Rights in China. BY MICHAEL A. SANTORO. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000, 241 pp. $26.00.

Now that the House has passed the China trade bill, will the promised benefits follow or will it become harder to press Beijing on human rights? This timely study, which combines rigorous economic analysis with sharp moral reasoning, spells

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

out what can and cannot be expected—and what American multinational corporations should and should not be doing in China. Santoro distinguishes between corporations attracted to China for cheap labor (i.e., for cost-minimizing reasons) and those seeking to build markets there. As sensitive to the bottom line as he is to human rights, Santoro also has useful things to say about the issues that vex CEOs dealing with China. By bringing clarity to the ongoing debate about the responsibilities of multinationals for advancing human rights, he has produced a book of interest not just to the concerned citizen but also to those currently engaged in business in China or contemplating becoming involved there.

Virtual Tibet: Searching for Shangri-la from the Himalayas to Hollywood. BY ORVILLE SCHELL. New York: Henry Holt, 2000, 340 pp. $26.00.

The Search for the Panchen Lama. BY ISABEL HILTON. New York: W. W. Norton, 2000, 336 pp. $25.95.

Both these books capture the magic of Tibet by combining personal experiences with detailed historical and religious expositions. Schell was smitten early in life with yearnings for Tibet. He first made a disillusioning visit to Lhasa and then went to the Argentine Alps, where Hollywood was filming Heinrich Harrar's *Seven Years in Tibet,* the book that had ignited Schell's youthful imagination. But for all of its magical powers of enchantment, which included reproducing Lhasa in the Andes, Hollywood was not up to preserving the illusions of Tibet. To make matters worse, as filming began it was revealed that the Austrian Harrar, a sympathetic champion of Buddhism, had in fact been a dedicated Nazi and S.S. trooper. And modern Lhasa, which until 1979 had been seen by only a handful of Western visitors, has seen its Holiday Inn overrun with foreign tourists and its streets filled with Han Chinese.

The British journalist Hilton tells a mystery tale of her secret role in the exiled Dalai Lama's scheme to get the Chinese to accept the boy he chose to be the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. The plot failed, the Chinese were alerted, and the boy and his family have not been seen since. Hilton fills out this story with an informative account of the history of Tibetan Buddhism and culture. One is left wondering whether Tibetan Buddhism will survive if the selection of the next Dalai Lama falls into the hands of the Chinese rather than those of dedicated Tibetan monks. Both Schell and Hilton bring home the tragedy of Tibet's current domination by China. The old Tibet probably could not have survived the challenges of modernity, but the authors show that the country certainly would have made a more graceful adjustment to the twenty-first century under the wise leadership of the Dalai Lama than under the Chinese gun.

Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. BY SCOTT SNYDER. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999, 213 pp. $17.50 (paper).

For some time, Washington has convinced itself that North Korea is "crazy." After carefully reviewing the record of Pyongyang's negotiating behavior, Snyder concludes that it is in fact rational—and that the North Korean negotiators have "shown remarkably consistent style,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

behavior, and objectives in their interactions with American officials." Placing negotiating behavior in the context of Korean culture, the history of the communist regime, and Kim Il Sung's leadership style, Snyder argues that Pyongyang's practice of crisis diplomacy has paid off, especially with risk-averse Washington. The combination of toughness and brinkmanship with guerrilla tactics and outright blackmail has long worked effectively to extract concessions from richer powers. Even as the advantages have worn off, Pyongyang has perpetuated Washington's fantasy of North Korea as a dangerous "rogue state"—a fantasy that calls for stupendous defensive expenditures and risks alienating the United States from its European allies and the Russians.

Political and Legal

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

Principles of Global Security. BY JOHN STEINBRUNER. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, 272 pp. $44.95 (paper, $18.95).

An important account of the transforming global security landscape. Over the last decade, Steinbruner has advanced provocative ideas of "cooperative security," which builds collaborative ties between potential adversaries to provide reassurance and lower the risks of war as an alternative or supplement to deterrence. In this book, he argues that radical shifts in security threats now demand a thorough rethinking of security principles. Globalization, population growth, rising economic inequality, and the spread of new destructive technologies are fundamentally altering what societies must do to protect themselves. Steinbruner contends that these new threats stem less from fixed places and established states than from "distributed processes"—i.e., the erosion of legal standards, the unanticipated interaction of deployed forces, and the emergence of dangerous pathogens. Although he spins out some grim scenarios of new-age global violence, he also suggests that the prospects for security hinge most on the traditional challenges of managing the American relationship with China and Russia. This thought-provoking book makes the reader ponder whether the cooperative security principles that guide American security relations with Europe and Japan could also apply to those great-power outcasts.



Containing Nationalism. BY MICHAEL HECHTER. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 240 pp. $29.95.

An elegant and sweeping account of modern nationalism. Hechter shares the view of most scholars today that nationalism is a political construction—a response to modernization and the evolution of the state rather than to deep-rooted characteristics of a society. Advancing this instrumental understanding in an innovative framework, he identifies the factors that make certain groups become agents of nationalism. Peoples have shared a sense of nationhood

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

across the centuries, but only when their self-governance is threatened and the nation seeks the protection of its own sovereignty does nationalism rear its head. Centralized states seek to consolidate territorial rule by promoting nationalism, while threatened nations try to protect themselves from such encroachments. For Hechter, this explains why nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon. Only with the rise of centralized states in the nineteenth century—made possible by industrialization and direct rule—did nationalism become necessary. To the extent that nationalist violence is based on instrumental calculations, Hechter concludes, institutions can be arranged to contain its worst excesses. The key is to decrease the demand for sovereignty among national groups by resorting to decentralized and just decision-making institutions.

The Sanctions Decade: Assessing U.N. Strategies in the 1990s. EDITED BY DAVID CORTRIGHT AND GEORGE LOPEZ. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, 274 pp. $48.00 (paper, $17.95).

A helpful guide to the sanctions debate. The United Nations has increasingly resorted to economic sanctions in response to violations of international norms such as territorial aggression, human-rights transgressions, and weapons proliferation. The scholarly consensus, however, is that coercive economic sanctions are rarely successful. This volume looks at recent episodes and finds a mixed but more successful record than most critics would admit. Sanctions made some headway with Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, and Cambodia but were less successful in Haiti, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. The authors argue that sanctions work best when they are swift, forceful, and pursued in cooperation with frontline states. Not surprisingly, comprehensive and rigorously enforced sanctions are more likely to succeed than limited unilateral actions. The authors also call for a more workable sanctions regime, offering useful recommendations for strengthening Security Council policy-making and member-state cooperation. But they only hint at what might be their most important point: even when sanctions do not achieve their narrow goal of inducing change, they are a useful symbolic tool for isolating violators of internationally accepted norms of behavior.

Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions. BY LLOYD GRUBER. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, $60.00 (paper, $19.95).

It is widely argued that international institutions facilitate cooperation between states and as such are mutually beneficial. This engaging book argues otherwise. Gruber contends that such institutions often tell us much more about the power of dominant states to impose their preferences on weaker partners than about the ability of governments to overcome obstacles to collective action and achieve joint gains. In fact, supranational agreements often force weaker states to accommodate the wishes of stronger ones by participating in institutions they intensely dislike. Exploring lengthy case studies of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Monetary System, Gruber shows how the initiating governments subtly imposed their preferred institutional arrangements on other governments, which were faced with a choice between signing on and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

being left behind. The cases also suggest that leaders sometimes seek institutional agreements to lock their successors into desired policy orientations. As such, the book provides a useful guide to the politics of recent regional economic agreements. But Gruber's more ambitious claim—that countries can be forced to accept agreements that are less welfare-enhancing than the alternatives—remains debatable.

Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements. BY ROBERT O'BRIEN, ANNE MARIE GOETZ, JAN AART SCHOLTE, AND MARC WILLIAMS. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 260 pp. $54.95 (paper, $22.95).

International economic institutions are most often studied from the perspective of the governments that created them. But global multilateral institutions—such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank—are not just tools of leading states but organizations where diverse actors meet and struggle over policy decisions. This empirically rich book attempts to capture that new complex reality. The authors argue that multilateral economic institutions increasingly need to engage well-organized nongovernmental organizations with their own agendas, which in turn transforms the character of global economic governance. Rather than being exclusively state-based, these institutions are gradually becoming models of "complex multilateralism" that practice a decentralized and pluralistic brand of governance. That said, these changes have been incremental and mostly affect decision-making rather than actual policy. Although the book offers more questions than answers, it usefully highlights the unresolved tensions between state-sponsored institutions and growing transnational civic activism.

Appeasement in International Politics. BY STEPHEN ROCK. Louisville: University Press of Kentucky, 2000, 256 pp. $29.95.

Neville Chamberlain's failure to appease Hitler in 1938 produced a seminal lesson in modern diplomacy: concessions to aggressive states invite only more aggression. In this thoughtful reconsideration, Rock argues that little evidence supports this view. Indeed, appeasement can reduce tensions and modify the demands of the aggressor. The book's insights are drawn from a range of episodes, from British appeasement of the United States at the turn of the century to Anglo-American accommodation of the Soviet Union during World War II to American engagement with North Korea under Bush and Clinton. The book offers unsurprising but sensible recommendations, including a policy approach of mixing deterrence with engagement. Simple conclusions do not emerge, although the author does show that the character and motivations of the unsatisfied state matter most in determining success or failure. Rock also does not dispute that Chamberlain's policy was doomed. But he makes the point that other aggressive states, such as North Korea, seem to have more limited ambitions than Nazi Germany—and are therefore more easily manipulated by inducements.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Economic, Social, and Environmental

RICHARD N. COOPER

The Yamato Dynasty: The Secret History of Japan's Imperial Family. BY STERLING SEAGRAVE AND PEGGY SEAGRAVE. New York: Broadway Books, 2000, 394 pp. $27.50.

Nominally a biography of the Japanese imperial family since the Meiji restoration of 1868, this sensational book really focuses on World War II, especially Emperor Hirohito's complicity in Japanese war plans in China after 1931 and in the Pacific in 1941–45. Also highlighted are the efforts by leading Japanese and American moneyed interests—with General MacArthur's approval and cooperation—to help cover up both Hirohito's wartime activities and his family's role in the extensive looting by Japanese forces during the war. The authors suggest that the extensive loot, mainly gold and gemstones, laid the basis for Japan's remarkable postwar economic recovery. Unfortunately, they fail to indicate exactly how these stolen goods (many of which remain unrecovered) could conceivably have played such a role. Some may have helped finance the emergence of the Liberal Democratic Party and its subsequent dominance of the Japanese political scene, which the authors see as thoroughly corrupt. Funds were also used, they write, to bribe the political opposition into political submission and officials into compliance. But none of this can explain the achievements of the Japanese economy, in which growth relied on continuing Japanese savings and investment, not on stolen gems. This account may, however, help explain strenuous old-guard resistance to necessary institutional changes. The book is a good read, but it drags in old rumors—such as Franklin D. Roosevelt's alleged prior knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor—without offering any new evidence or fresh Japanese sources. The full story of early postwar Japan remains to be told.

Comparative Political Economy: A Retrospective. BY CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000, 500 pp. $49.50.

This collection of previously published essays, spanning six productive decades, is vintage Kindleberger. It is erudite, informative, sometimes provocative, often charming—and handles serious issues of economic and financial management, past and present, with a light but discerning touch. The book takes up issues with contemporary relevance, ranging from financial instability through foreign trade and economic growth to provision of international public goods. Richly laced with historical anecdotes and analogies, the essays also draw judiciously on economic theory. A continuing thread throughout is the ability, or lack thereof, of economies to adapt to new technologies, foreign trade, or other changes in circumstance.

Trade, Environment, and the WTO: The Post-Seattle Agenda. BY GARY P. SAMPSON. Washington: Overseas Development Council, 2000, 152 pp. $26.95 (paper).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GATS 2000: New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization. EDITED BY PIERRE SAUVÉ AND ROBERT M. STERN. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, 544 pp. $26.95.

The failure to launch a new round of multilateral trade liberalization at the November 1999 meeting in Seattle indicates how contentious trade policy has become—and how unprepared the trade ministers were. They would have benefited from these two books. *GATS 2000* contains conference papers on how best to proceed with liberalization of international trade in services, an issue that was merely opened by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in the Uruguay Round concluded in 1994. It dissects the complex issues involved, including the extensive but varying degrees of national regulation, and contains thoughtful suggestions for the coming decade.

Another issue not fully addressed in the Uruguay Round is the rocky relationship between trade rules and environmental policy. Some environmentalists would like to use trade sanctions, which may conflict with international trade commitments, to further their environmental objectives. Sampson, a former WTO trade official, points out that the WTO requires that new concessions be reciprocated by concessions from the other side. Sympathetic to the concerns of environmentalists, he urges the negotiation of multilateral environmental agreements issue by issue, with disputes settled within the framework of those agreements; in turn, such agreements would be coordinated to harmonize with WTO rules. A thoughtful treatment of a sensitive topic.

Policies, Institutions, and the Dark Side of Economics. BY VITO TANZI. Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2000, 282 pp. $90.00.

Tanzi has been director of the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department for two decades, which has put him in contact with tax authorities in numerous countries. These essays, some previously published, focus on the practical and institutional side of fiscal affairs, especially tax policy. Much of the book concerns tax evasion, the underground economy, money laundering, corruption, and their relationship to tax policy and administration. The author is noteworthy for taking a global perspective and is especially concerned with cross-border tax incentives, evasion, and enforcement. He also addresses the roles of tax and expenditure policies in reducing income inequality. Although the book draws on the author's rich practical experience, he exercises much professional discretion when giving concrete examples of malfeasance—even when they are public knowledge—thereby rendering the text less colorful than it might have been.

From Subsistence to Exchange and Other Essays. BY PETER BAUER. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, 153 pp. $19.95.

Bauer is one of those figures who, over his long career, has shifted from the fringe of social thought to the mainstream—not because he changed his views, but because others came increasingly to accept or at least respect them. Ever the iconoclast, he questions the negative effects of population growth, the efficacy of foreign aid, European (or Western) responsibility for poverty in the "Third World" (an appellation he rightly objects to), the alleged

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

elitism of English society, and the Vatican's economic doctrine, to mention only a sample. At the same time, he insists on the importance of the market as a mechanism for exchanging goods, information, and ideas and creating new opportunities for the participants and their suppliers. Whether or not the reader agrees with his positions, they are carefully and thoughtfully argued. As such, they stimulate a clearer, if more troubled, understanding rather than comfortable acceptance of the conventional wisdom.

The New Silk Road: Secrets of Business Success in China Today. BY JOHN B. STUTTARD. New York: John Wiley, 2000, 144 pp. $24.95.

This short book is built around interviews with senior officers from 11 companies, all thriving in China, 10 of which are major multinationals whose executives have access to China's highest leaders. All express enthusiasm about their operations in China, mixed with cautious optimism about the future. Stuttard shows the variety of approaches taken as well as the common elements of these experiences: the need to cultivate personal relationships and build trust among Chinese partners and officials, the difficulty in finding suitable Chinese management, and the importance of in-house training for promising young Chinese workers. The book includes a fine overview by its author but would have benefited from interviews with smaller, lesser-known firms and those that have failed to thrive in China. Nonetheless, it can be recommended to anyone interested in doing business there.

Military, Scientific, and Technological

ELIOT A. COHEN

The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Growing Crisis of Global Security. BY RICHARD BUTLER. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000, 304 pages. $27.50.

Butler, the former head of the U.N. Special Commission that inspected and largely dismantled Iraq's weapons of mass destruction after the Gulf War, is understandably bitter about many of his former associates. From a U.N. secretary-general too ready to cave in to Saddam Hussein to a subordinate who publicized America's covert intelligence assistance, Butler found himself coping with insurmountable problems—among which the unyieldingly deceptive and hostile Iraqi dictatorship was only one. A diplomat by profession and a blunt-spoken Australian by birth and breeding, Butler presided over an effective inspection regime until it cracked apart under the strains of cunning opposition and international disagreements. The book concludes with ominous warnings about the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction and a fervent (but unrealistic) call for the United Nations to supervise and enforce the dismantling of all such arsenals.

Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France. BY ERNEST R. MAY. New York: Hill & Wang, 2000, 384 pp. $26.00.

This book shows how a campaign scrutinized by scores of highly competent historians can nonetheless yield fresh

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

insights to a scholar of the first rank. Drawing on primary and secondary sources from both sides, May argues that the fall of France resulted neither from the supposed rot of French society nor from the uniform military superiority of Germany. Instead, a variety of contingent causes were to blame for France's catastrophe in 1940: the conjunction of governmental crises, misperception of Hitler by English and French politicians, a few poor military decisions, and sheer bad luck. Unlike most historians, May does not hesitate to draw lessons—most notably, the fearful consequences of military hubris that stalked victim and (later) victor alike.

Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir. EDITED BY JASJIT SINGH. New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999, 341 pp. $31.50.

South Asia has produced its share of military history and those who write about it. Unfortunately, much of South Asia's own military literature has not made its way to Western readers. This volume, produced by a retired air commodore who directs the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, is thoroughly Indian in outlook and judgment. Bearing that in mind, the reader will nonetheless find an interesting and useful summary of the latest Indo-Pakistani war—and a war it most certainly was. Students of the subcontinent will nervously ponder the consequences suggested by the editor's confident judgment that "if India can beat a professional military force equipped with modern firepower, on the ground and at a time of Pakistan's choice, with the initiative also in its hands, with strategic and tactical surprise almost complete, then India can beat Pakistan anytime, anywhere."

Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future. BY MICHAEL D. SWAINE AND ASHLEY J. TELLIS. Santa Monica: RAND, 2000, 308 pp. $35.00 (paper, $20.00).

A sober and useful review of Chinese strategy. Apparently resting on English-language sources, this book sums up the views of RAND's chief China-watchers. One key judgment is that by 2020, China will have "many elements of a 1990s-era military inventory" in place. That may sound like a modest achievement, but the authors point out that the regional context and China's niche capabilities in certain areas (including space, information warfare, and some exotic technologies) mean that the results could be unsettling for both China's neighbors and the United States. The second and more important conclusion is that China pursues a "calculative strategy"—nonideological, restrained, and increasingly international in outlook—that will nonetheless reflect aspirations for local dominance and prestige. Neither "preemptive containment" nor "preemptive appeasement" are appropriate strategies in response. But even if the authors' preferred approach of "realistic engagement" sounds plausible, what precisely will it entail—and how will we know if it works?

A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 1937–1945. BY WILLIAMSON MURRAY AND ALLAN R. MILLETT. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, 656 pp. $35.00.

A brisk, vehement, and well-written operational history of World War II

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

drawing on English, American, and German sources, this book does not pretend to delve into the works in the many other languages that deal with the greatest conflict of the twentieth century. Rather, its strength lies in its clear focus—the conduct of military campaigns—and its sound grasp of military organization, tactics, and technology, the rudiments of which are covered in well-conceived appendices. With a deep respect for the suffering of common soldiers, the authors do not hesitate to lambaste the high commands of each of the participating nations. These two veteran military historians have produced a sharply opinionated work that rests on an unabashed belief that this was a war of good against evil—insofar as the Western powers were concerned, at any rate.

Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning. EDITED BY ROBERT C. OWEN. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2000, 541 pp. $34.00 (paper).

This product of a special study at the U.S. Air Force's chief graduate educational institution, Air University, focuses on the three weeks of air operations conducted by NATO in September 1995 against Bosnian Serb forces. That campaign was, as is now known, merely a precursor to a much larger operation four years later conducted against Serbia over Kosovo. The bumbling and indecisive application of force in 1999 rested on the assumption that the sprinkling of air strikes that caused the Serbs to give up without much of a fight in 1995 would work again. But this book, albeit useful as a study of coalition warfare, technology, and command and control, may not correct that blindness. An analysis of the simultaneous Croat ground operations in 1995 is beyond its purview, but clearly that offensive played as large or perhaps greater a role in ending the Bosnian conflict. Nonetheless, the officers who wrote these chapters have conscientiously assembled much useful material. Given their commitment to the Air Force and its way of war, they have produced a study of considerable utility and interest.

SearchMil.com.

http://www.searchmil.com

Unveiled last February by Maxbot.com, this search engine indexes more than one million pages in the ".mil" domain, one of the largest and most important parts of the Web for those interested in military affairs. The company, which has similar engines for the education and U.S. government domains, has produced a clean and simple engine free of distracting ads that offers a fast response to queries. That feature and its "cached" pages—the engine keeps its own computer copies of the pages it has indexed—make this an extremely useful tool for defense researchers.

The United States

PHILIP ZELIKOW

MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero. BY STANLEY WEINTRAUB. New York: Free Press, 2000, 385 pp. $27.50.

Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War. BY RICHARD C. THORNTON. Washington: Brassey's, 2000, 447 pp. $29.95.

The 50th anniversary of the outbreak of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Korean War is a suitable time for reflection, and these two new books do just that. Weintraub's excellent account tracks the opening and conduct of the war on the American side until spring 1951, after the front stabilized and President Truman fired his supreme commander in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur. As a campaign book, it is well written for the general reader yet still offers solid scholarship. Weintraub, a Korean war veteran, has a perceptive eye for action and makes clear-eyed judgments that are generally damning to MacArthur—and to the high command in Washington. Although he is less knowledgeable about the wider strategic context, Weintraub has read enough to get by.

Thornton, in contrast, puts the larger strategic context of the Korean War at the center of his study of the interactions of Stalin, Mao, and Truman. Using much of the new evidence, he offers careful analysis of their plans. This approach is commendable and often acutely perceptive in detail. But Thornton overreaches in his interpretations of all three major actors. He sees Stalin deliberately entrapping Mao in a war to stop a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement that Mao supposedly wanted. He has the Truman administration welcoming Chinese intervention to justify its program for American rearmament. Poor Mao himself is cast as the victim, the "odd man out" of the title. But none of these big conclusions withstand scrutiny.

Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis. BY WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN, JR. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, 242 pp. $29.95.

Jimmy Carter became president intending to pull American troops out of South Korea and push its authoritarian government toward genuine democracy. He failed on both counts. Indeed, the United States is often accused of complicity in the brutal 1980 suppression of a student uprising at Kwangju. Gleysteen, Carter's ambassador to South Korea, has now written a concise and lucid account that is rich with lessons about U.S. relations with imperfect partners. Although he criticizes Carter and some of his colleagues on the withdrawal issue, he defends the administration's effort on human rights. Contemporary Korea watchers may especially enjoy reading the chapter on the man who became South Korea's president in 1997, aptly entitled "The American Effort to Save Kim Dae Jung's Life." A valuable memoir, written with care.

Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. BY CHALMERS JOHNSON. New York: Metropolitan, 2000, 268 pp. $26.00.

Johnson was an early revisionist who called attention to the special state-guided character of Japanese capitalism. He now brings this revisionism to a much wider canvas. In this book, he charges America with running a global capitalist empire—comparable to the Soviet Union in its foolish assumptions and overstretched reach and deserving a similar fate. Although he offers opinions about American policy everywhere, Johnson's particular focus is on Asia. He views allies like Japan as American stooges and equates Japanese prime ministers with the former leaders of East Germany. He finds American hubris responsible for practically everything he dislikes. For instance, Johnson asserts that the CIA installed former

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indonesian leader Suharto in Indonesia in 1965–66 and that the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency removed him in 1998. (Neither claim is true.) Nor does he give America credit for anything that has gone right, like progress toward democracy in states such as South Korea, Taiwan, or the Philippines. In contrast to a work like Gleysteen's, *Blowback* reads like a comic book. Even otherwise sympathetic academics will wince at how Johnson turns so many Asian leaders into caricatured marionettes.

Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War. BY ROBERT S. LITWAK. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000, 277 pp. $49.95 (paper, $18.95).

President Clinton and some of his leading officials, especially Anthony Lake and Madeleine Albright, have emphasized the critical challenge that "rogue states" pose to U.S. foreign policy. In response, Litwak makes two arguments. First, he finds the "rogue" label much too simplistic; it lumps together quite different countries and problems so as to satisfy the American appetite for exemplary villains. Although Litwak could have been more forgiving about the need to find some way to describe those closed, dictatorial states that reject American norms, his argument against oversimplification is persuasive. Second, he argues that the "rogue" category keeps Washington from fashioning the differentiated policies it needs for nations like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. This second point is less persuasive. Litwak's good case studies prove that U.S. policies toward these "rogues" already vary considerably to take account of differing circumstances. Since "rogue state" rhetoric does not seem to mean much in practice, Litwak's critique knocks down a straw man. Still, he was not the one who stuffed this scarecrow.

Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post–Cold War World. BY KARIN VON HIPPEL. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 224 pp. $49.95 (paper, $19.95).

Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era. BY MICHAEL E. LATHAM. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000, 328 pp. $18.95 (paper).

In her modest and useful book, Von Hippel summarizes recent U.S. efforts to use military intervention to rebuild nations. Of the case studies on Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, she finds qualified successes everywhere but Somalia—which she judges a resounding failure—and tries to draw out some lessons learned.

A good place to find such lessons is Latham's fine study of the nation-building struggles of the Kennedy administration. Social science hubris, especially among economists, is a constant then and now. Another constant is the impatience of American purveyors of modernity with local "traditional" ways of doing things. On the positive side, many Kennedy-era officials genuinely seemed to care about the gritty details of political and economic development in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Latham rightly argues that the Cold War does not fully explain this secular evangelism, which has much older roots. As America's civilizing mission continues, more disingenuously, into the twenty-first century, Latham's story hints at present foibles while evoking some nostalgia for the idealism of the past.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western Europe

STANLEY HOFFMANN

François Mitterrand: The Last French President. BY RONALD TIERSKY. New York: St. Martin's, 2000, 464 pp. $35.00.

A wonderfully informative, entertaining, and comprehensive study of Mitterrand. Tiersky describes a complex, seductive, and secretive man with enormous ambition, strong loyalty to often dubious friends, and considerable fondness for cunning (sometimes with disastrous results for his career). There was never anything unequivocal about him. In many respects Mitterrand was the opposite of de Gaulle, whose prestige and mythic authority he resented. Yet he used his presidency in a truly Gaullist manner, and his commitment to European integration was probably his greatest display of statecraft. After Mitterrand, Tiersky writes, no French president will ever again wield so much power, given the subsequent changes in French society and new European constraints on French sovereignty—and no future president will be able to use Machiavellian reasoning on governance as shamelessly. Tiersky's volume is the story of both the man and his country, covering an enormous amount of ground in both respects. Yet its greatest merit is that it unwittingly provides the reader with all the reasons necessary to render a verdict less admiring of Mitterrand than the author has.

The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union. BY KENNETH DYSON AND KEVIN FEATHERSTONE. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 859 pp. $135.00 (paper, $45.00).

This enormous, theoretically informed account of European economic and monetary union (EMU) is unlikely to be superseded. The authors stress the crucial role of beliefs and knowledge in shaping interests and the importance of successful political entrepreneurship and institutions—without burying the reader under endless detail. Downplaying the role of domestic interests, Dyson and Featherstone also highlight factors external to the process of negotiation, including the main actors' life experiences and commitments. Germany did play a key role in shaping EMU but did not create a German model writ large—because the German institutional context does not exist at the European level. Like so many previous European compromises, EMU is fuzzy and unfinished; although it stems from neoliberal inspiration, not every member has repudiated all the tenets of Keynes. Hence tensions remain between neoliberal ideologues, who fret that EMU is not strong enough to guarantee stability and rigor, and Keynesians, who fear that EMU will be deflationary and stifle growth. EMU's success, the authors conclude, depends on "a major economic revival in Europe" and "the absence of an early external economic shock."

Theories of European Integration. BY BEN ROSAMOND. New York: St. Martin's, 2000, 148 pp. $65.00 (paper, $22.95).

While European leaders have worked on compromises and bargains over the years, political scientists have produced a bewildering array of conceptual frameworks on European integration: intergovernmentalism, functionalism, transnationalism,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

neoinstitutionalism, and many more. This book focuses on the theory of European integration rather than its history and practices, but it tends to leave the reader bewildered about the gap between the complex and fluctuating reality of integration and the theoretical analyses that often leave it far behind. All the same, Rosamond offers a reliable guide through the jungle of theories in the field. He tries to explain how a strange new animal—the European Union—fits within the universe of traditional international-relations theory, which views the state as the main actor and international regimes as centers of interstate cooperation. In this framework, the EU is seen as a puzzle because it not a federation but is more than a regime; moreover, it clearly reduces the sovereignty of its member states. What nonspecialists will make of all of this is hard to guess, but Rosamond remains lucid, fair, and crisp throughout.

How to Democratize the EU... and Why Bother? BY PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, 172 pp. $17.95 (paper).

Like Rosamond, Schmitter prefers to look at the theory rather than the practice of European integration. This book offers a series of ingenious propositions aimed at making the European Union more democratic. Neither an incipient state nor a federation nor a classical intergovernmental organization, the EU represents something new that is evolving into "a plurality of polities and different levels of aggregation." Along with pitching sensible proposals concerning citizenship, Schmitter offers a system of representation that would make the European Parliament less of a conglomeration of national representatives and more of a forum for creating genuine European parties. He also addresses EU decision-making, arguing for dividing member states into three clusters and establishing a requirement of concurrent majorities. Europe-wide referendums, including those on the method of designing European institutions, are another suggestion. His argument about the EU's need for democratization is convincing, even if some of his proposals have little chance of being adopted soon.

Émigré New York: French Intellectuals in Wartime Manhattan, 1940–1944. BY JEFFREY MEHLMAN. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000, 214 pp. $38.00.

This book is neither a history of French émigrés in New York during the war years nor a study of the factions that developed among them. Instead, the author compares the French exiles to the aristocratic émigrés of the French Revolution and describes in a series of essays such distinguished figures as the poets Maurice Maeterlinck and Saint-John Perse, the novelist Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, the philosophers Denis de Rougemont and Simone Weil, the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, and the historian Louis Rougier. Mehlman, a professor of literature, is interested both in the attitudes of these personalities toward Vichy and de Gaulle and in their wartime works—however esoteric—in light of the traumatic events that were devastating France and the world. His interpretation is subtle, erudite, and often humorous. Previous attempts by literature professors to tackle culture have not always resulted in works as mind-stretching and entertaining as this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

account, which ranges from an analysis of a few verses of Racine's *Bérénice* to a coda on the story of the sinking of the great liner *Normandie* in the New York harbor.

Western Hemisphere

KENNETH MAXWELL

The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future. BY DONALD E. SCHULTZ. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000, 67 pp. Free of charge.

A hard-hitting, succinct, and comprehensive assessment of the security threats facing Latin America. Schultz cites considerable progress in market reforms and democratization but underscores the growing dangers posed by the disintegration unfolding in Colombia and Venezuela. In particular, Washington has woefully underestimated transnational security crises such as drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, immigration, and terrorism. Schulz is especially concerned about Colombia, where the momentum has favored the guerrillas and the paramilitaries. The country now risks becoming divided among regional warlords who seek to establish a narcostate, with the resulting violence spilling into neighboring nations. And without an increase in professionalism, Colombia's army is likely to use the recently approved U.S. aid package in ways that violate human rights and undercut the Colombian government's credibility. Schultz also sees danger ahead in increasingly unstable Venezuela—the leading supplier of petroleum to the United States—and Mexico, where drug syndicates threaten the state's viability and now reach deep inside the United States, corrupting American law enforcement agencies and even financial institutions.

Schultz follows up by suggesting a robust "anticipatory" approach to security that starts at the top of the chain of command. The United States, for example, should help strengthen civilian oversight of law enforcement and the army in order to redress the historical imbalance in Latin American civil-military relations. It could also help by lifting its Cuba embargo, and it should cease pushing Europe to end trade preferences for Caribbean bananas—an export activity that in fact reduces local involvement in drug trafficking. Finally, Schultz proposes a hemisphere-wide security relationship that treats Mexico and Canada as peers with the United States. Schultz is not arguing for greater U.S. military involvement; just the opposite. He fears that without a clear-headed strategy, unanticipated crises will drag U.S. armed forces unprepared into more engagement than is desirable. This powerful set of suggestions deserves debate if Washington is to define a set of achievable goals—and prevent crises rather than simply react to them.

The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation. BY GREG GRANDIN. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000, 336 pp. $54.95 (paper, $18.95).

A remarkable tour de force. It is one of the glories of American democracy that North Carolina is home to both Jesse Helms and the Duke University Press. This book describes a Latin America about as far away from the senator's conception of the place as can be imagined. Grandin, who worked with the Guatemalan Truth Commission in 1997–98, displays a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

powerful narrative style—touching on nationalism, state power, class and caste divisions, ethnic identity, and political violence—that remains free of heavy postmodern obfuscation. By examining the tortured historical relationship among the Mayan power brokers in the city of Quetzaltenango, the *ladinos* (non-Indians) who dominated the national government, and the poor indigenous campesinos, he brilliantly dissects how the Mayans defined their own national identity within the Guatemalan state. Under pressure from Cold War politics and peasant mobilization, the local Mayan elites' mediating role eventually broke down. In turn, this contributed to the viciousness of Guatemala's long civil war—when the Guatemalan state killed more than 200,000 of its own citizens—and ultimately provoked a powerful Mayan cultural and political resurgence. In its failure to devise an inclusive national identity and find effective mediators between the *ladino* oligarchy and the ostracized indigenous populations, Grandin writes, Guatemala's U.S.-backed military was able to launch a wave of repression against Mayans so severe that the Truth Commission termed it genocide.

The Judiciary and Democratic Decay in Latin America: Declining Confidence in the Rule of Law. BY WILLIAM PRILLAMAN. Westport: Praeger, 2000, 208 pp. $64.50 (paper, $22.50).

In this superb analysis of Latin America's judiciary, Prillaman disputes the conventional wisdom that successful reforms are incremental and best left in the hands of the courts. In fact, this approach has made progress in the region glacial and public opinion distrustful of the courts. Only Chile's courts can be considered a success in terms of independence and accountability, efficiency and access, and freedom from corruption—and that is because it took the opposite approach from what international development agencies recommended. Chile moved simultaneously across a broad front, establishing objective criteria for training and dismissing judges and enhancing the individual independence of lower-court judges; it also tackled rising case loads by promoting innovative forms of dispute resolution and integrating poorer citizens into the legal system. As a result, over time Chile's judiciary gained public trust. But Prillaman fears that other countries could deteriorate into semi-democratic rule, with executives unchecked by counterbalancing institutions, societies unable to cope with rising crime, and the public increasingly willing to rely on mob justice rather than the courts. If this occurs, Latin America's future will look remarkably similar to its past.

Cuba, the United States, and the Helms-Burton Doctrine: International Reactions. BY JOAQUIN ROY. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000, 328 pp. $55.00.

A useful analysis of the 1996 Helms-Burton Act that examines both its origins and its international repercussions. By allowing U.S. citizens to sue foreign nationals for dealing in Cuban property confiscated by the Castro regime, Roy argues, the bill has allowed the Cuban-American lobby to turn a bilateral dispute into an international wrangle with many of Washington's staunchest traditional allies. Although the law's most provocative elements were neutralized by Clinton's subsequent suspension of some key

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

provisions, it could still impose on a post-Castro Cuba conditions all too reminiscent of the past. Roy cites the role of New Jersey Representative Robert Menendez in helping formulate the Act's Title II, which legislates a blueprint for a new Cuba by imposing standards as to how Cubans "should go about governing themselves if they are ever to see the embargo lifted." In effect, Roy says, this is a reborn Platt amendment—the notorious assertion of extraterritorial power that gave the United States the right to interfere in Cuba unilaterally after the island won independence from Spain. Helms-Burton not only isolates the United States, Roy concludes, but confirms suspicions that U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War has become subordinate to the promotion of narrow commercial and ethnic interests.

Privatization South American Style. BY LUIGI MANZETTI. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 392 pp. $74.00.

A sophisticated deconstruction of Latin American privatization that puts politics at the center. In the 1980s, privatization remained piecemeal in Argentina, Peru, and Brazil—which all lacked the political will—while Chile forged ahead. In the 1990s, however, this began to change. In Argentina, President Carlos Menem promoted a remarkably successful privatization program that nevertheless produced a downside, including rampant rent-seeking and the manipulation of a weak judicial system. Even worse, a dysfunctional two-sector economy was created: the part of the private sector tied to the dollar faced ferocious foreign competition, while the "unpegged" private sector got to control former state monopolies, encountered little competition, and reaped high profits. Meanwhile, the cronyism between Menem and privatization's beneficiaries did little to improve the country's institutions and actually provoked opposition to privatization over time. In Peru, Alberto Fujimori's program started late but was as far-reaching—and personalized—as Argentina's. In contrast, Brazil saw privatization slowly gain momentum by 1998 as elites used it to tackle the state's chronic fiscal problems; yet the many hidden deals involved could come back to haunt the program. Manzetti concludes that durable and sound policies must be sheltered from pork-barrel politics by strong institutions and that economic reform must be reinforced by responsive legislatures and independent judiciaries.

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Repubics

ROBERT LEGVOLD

Political Culture of the Russian "Democrats." BY ALEXANDER LUKIN. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 336 pp. $85.00.

Lukin was a Russian democratic activist in the 1980s, an elected member of the Moscow city soviet, and later a student at Oxford. His period is the Gorbachev era; his subject is "democrats" in the big cities and beyond; and his sources are in-depth interviews, memoirs, internal documents from the movement, and limited survey data. He explains who his fellow "demo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scrats" were, what brought them to "democracy," and how they organized themselves. For most, he finds, they owed their conversion to the opening under Gorbachev, not to long-hidden convictions. Second, and more important, their democratic conversion turned out to be inverted Leninism—preserving many of its values while rejecting the system—and not the individualism normally associated with Western notions of democracy. Hence the quotation marks. An interesting and persuasive thesis, but not enough of an explanation for their eventual difficulties to justify his sweeping condemnation of virtually every other author who has dealt with the subject.

Unbroken Ties: The State, Interest Associations, and Corporatism in Post-Soviet Ukraine. BY PAUL A. KUBICEK. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000, 275 pp. $49.50.

Kubicek defines corporatism as a form of government under which the state opens itself to influence from privileged interest groups so long as they remain under its control. He argues that this model, not pluralistic democracy, characterizes Ukraine's political system. Rather than allowing a flowering of civil society, Ukraine remains stalled in a netherworld of traditional interests (agricultural bosses, old unions, and enterprise directors) who collaborate with the state to block change. Corporatism of this sort, it may be argued, offers stability in the chaos of transition, and it may be just a way station in the process of reform. Then again, as the author fears, it may sink roots that are not easily supplanted. A most useful, albeit scarcely cheery study, not least because it has a broad application to other post-Soviet states.



Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower. BY SERGEI KHRUSHCHEV. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000, 765 pp. $54.95.

Sergei Khrushchev is a serious biographer, a loyal son, and now an American citizen. This book is far more than a casual exculpatory portrait by a member of the family. For years, Khrushchev the younger has studied his father's leadership; in the late 1960s, he helped prepare the famous Khrushchev tapes. As a young man, he was even something of a confidant to the Soviet leader. Here he recounts the dramatic episodes from 1953 to 1964: his father's rise to power, the failed conspiracy to oust him in 1957, and his subsequent fall; the "secret" anti-Stalin speech; the violent intervention in Hungary; the Cuban missile crisis; and in particular the emergence of the country's strategic missile program (something he knew about firsthand and in which his father took great interest). He makes no excuses for his father and acknowledges

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his mistakes. Yet he also stresses the temper of the times, its mindset (including his own), and what the system permitted and required.

Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob Has Invaded America. BY ROBERT I. FRIEDMAN. New York: Little, Brown, 2000, 296 pp. $25.95.

Friedman's book, which reads like a series of vignettes from *The Godfather*, describes a vast octopus of organized Russian crime fanning out from Brighton Beach and managed by bosses more savage than any in the Italian mafia. He names names, describes in detail the criminal empires, and graphically recounts their extraordinary violence against each other and anyone who gets in their way. Ruled by some of the most ruthless figures from the Soviet and Russian underworld who transferred to North America, the "red mafiya," Friedman maintains, has long transcended normal scams, drugs, and weapons trafficking to infiltrate U.S. financial markets, the Canadian stock exchange, even the National Hockey League. The detail is stunning and the allegations staggering—although the most sensational among them are only rumors originating with his FBI contacts.

Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan. BY DOV LYNCH. New York: St. Martin's, 2000, 265 pp. $65.00.

Russia's approach to the violence in neighboring states produced some of the earliest doubts among outsiders over where the country's foreign policy was headed. Lynch argues that in fact a considerable evolution has occurred in Russian behavior over the last decade. After early instances of ham-handed interference, with the Russians often picking sides and meddling with military force, Russian policymakers have gradually come to see these conflicts as "costly and dangerous," better dealt with at arm's length through the more conventional means of political conflict resolution. Chechnya, the author argues, helped them to this conclusion. So did the growing realization that the most serious threats to Russia lay within its borders, not from the torn fabric next door. A sophisticated and measured argument grounded in a detailed study of three of the most revealing cases.

The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe. BY HERMAN SCHWARTZ. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000, 347 pp. $45.00.

One measure of the progress toward democracy in post-communist regimes is the extent to which the executive and legislative branches are subject to judicial review, for the notion of the separation of powers goes to the heart of the modern mechanics of democracy. An expert on judicial review, Schwartz examines five countries where constitutional courts now exist—Poland, Hungary, Russia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia—and finds that in all cases but one (Russia), the courts have come to play an important role in establishing the rule of law, protecting human rights, and giving meaning to constitutionalism. Some have even dismissed parliamentary statutes more frequently than the U.S. Supreme Court and their western European counterparts have done. But the courts' emergence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has been a struggle, marked by their own missteps and the stress of political upheaval affecting all these countries. Schwartz tallies the results optimistically, with a patient but critical eye.

Middle East

L. CARL BROWN

The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. BY SHAUL MISHAL AND ABRAHAM SELA. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, 244 pp. $49.50 (paper, $17.50).

The Palestinian Hamas is generally identified with terrorism and jihad against Israel. In this view, Hamas must be at least neutralized if peace between Israel and the Palestinians is to be secured. Here Mishal and Sela offer a revisionist argument: Although Hamas openly rejects the negotiated settlement still proceeding between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in fits and starts, its actual strategy is more ambivalent. In response to the Palestinian Authority's preference for co-opting rather than crushing its opposition, Hamas feels constrained by the need to maintain Palestinian unity. It has decided not to decide between remaining on the sidelines as a hard-liner (now that the Palestine Liberation Organization has gone for half a loaf) or joining the game of Palestinian state-building. As two chapter titles put it, it is "Coexistence Within Conflict" and "Calculated Participation." Thus Hamas might eventually be brought along, in stages, to support the peace process. This conclusion may seem shockingly sanguine, but the authors remind the reader of the evolution of Israeli-Egyptian relations in the 1970s and Israeli-PLO relations in the 1990s, concluding that what once seemed improbable might become inevitable.

A Changing Turkey: Challenges to Europe and the United States. BY HEINZ KRAMER. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, 304 pp. $18.95 (paper).

Turkey is changing. The secularist Kemalist model is eroding; political Islam, the Kurdish problem, and a bleak human-rights record are facts of life. *Étatisme* is confronting a private sector flexing its muscles and general pressures for a more participatory society. And with more than three million Turks living in Europe, Turkey remains awkwardly in but not *of* Europe. Turkey might be dubbed the quintessential "guided democracy," subject to military interventions that either eject elected governments or limit what those governments can do. Deftly balancing these diverse themes, Kramer also addresses the many different Turkish foreign-policy issues—Central Asia and the Caspian Basin, the Middle East (the Arab states, Iran, and those intriguing ties with Israel), the Balkans, Greece and the Cyprus problem, Europe, and overall Western security scenarios. The result is a clear picture of Turkish foreign policy and Turkey's political culture. Among Kramer's findings: a major Turkish role in post-Soviet Central Asia is no longer deemed likely; most Turks, including the Islamists, favor Turkey's entry into the European Union; and the existing division of Cyprus is less threatening to Turkey than most other options.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam. BY ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH, TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY MAHMOUD SADRI AND AHMAD SADRI. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 236 pp. $29.95.

In 1979, Soroush became the youngest member appointed to Iran's post-revolution committee to purge and "Islamicize" Iran's universities. By the late 1980s, however, he was challenging the hard-line clerical rule in his writings and lectures, championing democracy, and calling for a synthesis of reason (or science) and Islam. For his efforts he was roughed up by thugs and forced into exile—only to return to Iran soon after the 1997 election of the reformist President Muhammad Khatami. This selection of his writings reveals a genuinely liberal intellect rooted in Soroush's Iranian and Islamic culture but at home with Western thought, toward which he is neither aggressive nor apologetically defensive. Soroush, who has gained a following among Iranian students and even a few of the mullahs, cites the likes of Jalal al-Din Rumi, Muhammad Iqbal, Jürgen Habermas, and Alexis de Tocqueville as often as the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad. That might seem a recipe for a rambling, rootless philosophy, but his statements are penetrating and coherent. Although some observers have dubbed him the Luther of Islam, he is perhaps better seen as Islam's Erasmus, since he is carefully working within the system.

The Jewish State: The Struggle for Israel's Soul. BY YORAM HAZONY. New York: Basic Books, 2000, 432 pp. $28.00.

Hazony's thesis is that a small number of German-Jewish intellectuals, exemplified by Martin Buber, never really wanted Jewish empowerment or a Jewish state. Marginalized politically during the 1930s by David Ben-Gurion's brand of Zionism, they nevertheless found their niche in Israeli universities. There they educated those who have now emerged as the "post-Zionists," questioning Israel's foundational myths, considering territorial concessions, championing equal rights for Israeli Arabs, and rejecting the idea of Israel as the "guardian state" for all Jews everywhere. In this partisan reconstruction of Zionist and Israeli history, Hazony's heroes are Theodor Herzl (who dared to dream) and Ben-Gurion (who stayed the course). Chaim Weizmann, Ahad Ha'am, and other Zionist luminaries are disparaged. In the end, the author does not make the case for the importance of Buber and those few German-Jewish intellectuals in shaping later Israeli thinking. Nor does he address the other factors that might explain post-Zionism in Israel. Hazony's scanty and thoroughly negative coverage of Palestinians and other Arabs suggests his intellectual pedigree—Revisionist Zionism championing maximalist positions. Call it Jabotinsky redux.

Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land Since 1948. BY MERON BENVENISTI. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, 366 pp. $35.00.

Benvenisti zeroes in on the crucial issue that Hazony slights: the Zionist-Palestinian struggle over the same small plot of sacred land. Zionist mapmakers from the early Mandate days on, he writes, worked to give every village, shrine, and site a Hebrew name and a Jewish history—or failing that, a history unlinked to the existing Palestinian population (e.g., Roman, Crusader, or Mameluk). The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flight of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians during the 1948–49 war left the new Israeli government with territorial "white patches" that could then be filled in with Jewish people, names, and histories. Distancing himself from both Palestinian scholars and certain Israeli "new historians," Benvenisti absolves the Zionists of any "ethnic cleansing" plans before May 1948. In painstakingly documented accounts, however, he severely criticizes post-1948 Israel for working to erase the Palestinian heritage on the land and preventing Palestinians from coming back. Benvenisti accepts that there will be no significant return of Palestinians, but he urges a strong and secure Israel to respect the Palestinian as well as the Jewish nature of the shared landscape (and thus finance restoration of mosques, churches, and cemeteries) and provide genuinely equal rights for Israeli Arabs.

Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics. BY L. CARL BROWN. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, 236 pp. $27.50.

A balanced, scholarly assessment of Islamic politics. By placing Islam in its historical and comparative context, Brown (this magazine's Middle East book reviewer) convincingly demonstrates that "fundamentalist" thought is a radical deviation from Islam's earlier political quietism. Although he regrets this development and wishes that Islamists would display greater tolerance toward fellow Muslims, Brown's argument is far from polemical. Some readers might wish for more details on the upheavals of the past two decades, and some may argue that the author's focus on four influential thinkers—Hasan al-Banna, Abul Ala Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, and Ayatollah Khomeini—inadequately represents the range of current Sunni and Shi'a thinking. But his survey of Islamic ideas and practice is confident and lucid, making sense of the current invocations of jihad, the "Islamic state," and such movements as Hamas and Hezbollah. He is also instructive on the subject of Muslim political engagement, which he sees as not simply a matter of doctrine but also of evolving circumstance, shared history, and normative frameworks. The Islamic approach to politics is thus neither preordained nor unique but "distinctive." Such a nuanced view avoids the stereotyping of political Islam that has often skewed recent interpretations, and it provides a valuable lesson: Islam is not as determining as both Western critics and Islamists themselves would contend, yet it remains an important feature of the Muslim political landscape. A subtle and skilled rejoinder to the conventional schools of thought—and to fashionable assumptions about the "post-Islamist" era.

JAMES PISCATORI

A Little Too Close to God: The Thrills and Panic of a Life in Israel. BY DAVID HOROVITZ. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000, 312 pp. $26.00.

The author, a secularist and dove, edits *The Jerusalem Report,* a superb little Israeli magazine that might have been less likely to be pigeonholed as a liberal bastion if its chief's book had been a bit more temperate. But if Horovitz is too facile on Israel's social strains and its synagogue-and-state follies, he gets the darkest parts of recent Israeli history resoundingly right. The heart of this otherwise genial popular volume is two acrimonious chapters that amount to a howl of despair at the murder

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Yitzhak Rabin and the rise of Binyamin Netanyahu. Israeli society prefers not to dwell on the assassination, the killer's explicit attempt to derail the Oslo process by helping elect the right-leaning Likud Party, or the Israeli electorate's willingness in 1996 to give him his way. This book's bracing bitterness makes it an aching reminder of an assassination that came a little too close to consummation and a country that came a little too close to political shipwreck.

WARREN BASS

Africa

GAIL M. GERHART

Coming to Terms: South Africa's Search for Truth. BY MARTIN MEREDITH. New York: PublicAffairs, 1999, 392 pp. $27.50.

Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. EDITED BY CHARLES VILLA-VICENCIO AND WILHELM VERWOERD. New York: St. Martin's, 2000, 343 pp. $65.00.

Facing the Truth: South African Faith Communities and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. EDITED BY JAMES COCHRANE, JOHN DE GRUCHY, AND STEPHEN MARTIN. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1999, 256 pp. $18.95 (paper).

Written for different audiences at different levels, these three books explore the political, legal, and moral principles at play in South Africa's ongoing Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Meredith offers a lively journalistic description of the background and operation of the commission, its major dramatis personae, and the findings in its voluminous 1998 report. An afterword by Tina Rosenberg sets the South African exercise in the context of truth commissions in Latin America, eastern Europe, and elsewhere. Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd have assembled 28 essays that collectively survey the origins, philosophy, achievements, and weaknesses of the commission. Readers will need some prior familiarity with South Africa's history and the workings of the TRC to absorb the full import of many of these intellectual reflections, which are written mainly for a South African audience. The authors, some of whom are prominent figures, are drawn from all South African ethnic groups. The more specialized work edited by Cochrane and his colleagues illuminates how South African religious organizations sought to explain, apologize for, or in some cases justify to the TRC their actions and inactions during the apartheid era. All three books are important tools for understanding what some commentators have judged to be the world's most effective national truth commission to date.

The History of Islam in Africa. EDITED BY NEHEMIA LEVTZION AND RANDALL L. POUWELS. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000, 601 pp. $75.00 (paper, $26.95).

Going beyond the customary emphasis on West Africa as the region with the largest Muslim population, this encyclopedic anthology gives equal attention to eastern and southern Africa. The contributors trace the evolution and current influence of Islam in Ethiopia and Eritrea down through Swahili-speaking Africa to Mozambique, Malawi, and the diverse Muslim communities of South Africa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Several chapters consider the introduction of Islam into precolonial Africa via the gateways of North Africa and the Indian Ocean; others examine encounters between Islam and European colonialism and the postcolonial emergence of radical Islamic movements. The symbiotic relationships between Islamic and traditional African beliefs and practices are a theme throughout, as are the past and present attempts by Islamic reformers to purge African Islam of its unorthodox elements. The book's final section looks at the role of Sufi brotherhoods and Muslim women as well as surveying the development in Africa of Islamic law, education, healing practices, art, literature, and music. An elegantly produced and up-to-date reference work of high scholarly quality.

Home and Exile. BY CHINUA ACHEBE. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 128 pp. $18.95.

In December 1998, Nigeria's most acclaimed novelist delivered this series of lectures at Harvard, in which he reminisces with pith and poignancy about his life and his art. The unfinished task of writers from the developing world, he warns, is to reclaim the history and identity of their homelands, long despoiled and denigrated by colonial dispossession. He concludes that "after a short period of dormancy and a little self-doubt about its erstwhile imperial mission, the West may be ready to resume its old domineering monologue in the world." With Salman Rushdie, he urges that "the Empire write back."

The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960–98. BY EDGAR O'BALLANCE. New York: St. Martin's, 2000, 230 pp. $65.00.

Assembled almost entirely from media sources, this compact chronicle of the political history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo supplies quickly digestible background to today's chaotic conflict in central Africa. The story flows along swiftly, uninterrupted by footnotes or analysis, although the author does intrude an occasional quirky or clichéd opinion (for example, that the United States never gave mercenary leader Mike Hoare the credit he deserved, or that the Congo is where "tribalism and nationalism clash on the battlefield."). The limitations of media sources and the author's occasionally faulty memory produce some inaccurate names and dates, as well as the odd omission of the long-confirmed responsibility of the CIA for the 1961 murder of Patrice Lumumba, the country's first prime minister. Despite these shortcomings, however, the book usefully demonstrates how so many of the cracks now tenuously papered over in the Congo long predate its present crisis.

Imperialism, Race, and Resistance: Africa and Britain, 1919–1945. BY BARBARA BUSH. New York: Routledge, 1999, 412 pp. $24.99 (paper).

This exhaustively researched study by a British academic synthesizes a vast amount of material on British colonialism in West and South Africa in the interwar years and adds an extended look at racial attitudes and confrontations in Britain in the same era. The author aims to reveal the close two-way relationship between the racism of imperial practices and African anti-imperialist reactions. Although her analysis borrows heavily from earlier works on imperial history, it admirably weaves together numerous themes that are often treated separately, including

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

colonialist discourse and culture, attitudes towards gender, economic exploitation, the psychology of white liberals, and the effects of Britain's own "race problem" on its imperial retreat. The preponderance of sources by whites, however, means black views are less extensively represented. The author concludes that the African colonial experience was largely negative and that the principal lesson of the interwar years is still relevant today: resistance to foreign domination is the key to a better future. A densely fact-packed work, less an introduction to its subject than a resource for teachers and researchers.

Now in a new edition!

WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001

Attacking Poverty

World Bank

At the start of each decade the World Development Report focuses on poverty reduction. The *World Development Report*, now in its twenty-third edition, proposes an empowerment-security-opportunity framework of action to reduce poverty in the first decades of the twenty-first century. *World Development Report 2000/2001* shows how current global trends present extraordinary opportunities for poverty reduction but also cause extraordinary risks, including growing inequality, marginalization, and social explosions. The Report explores the challenge of managing these risks in order to make the most of the opportunities for poverty reduction.

(A World Bank Publication)

September 2000 full color illus., graphs & charts throughout
paper $26.00/ cloth $50.00

Now in a new edition!

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000

Human Development and Human Rights

United Nations Development Programme

Human Development Report, now in its eleventh edition, provides a thought-provoking analysis of two interrelated and intertwined issues: human rights and human development. *Human Development Report 2000* traces the history of the struggle for human rights as a common human experience and outlines the new frontier of the rights agenda for the 21st century. It examines how the current global economic rules and institutions address human rights issues and proposes strategies for promoting development that also protect and further human rights. The Report includes and updates the widely respected Human Development Indicators.

2000 240 pp.; 2-color illus. paper $22.95/ cloth $38.95

New edition!

THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2000

World Economic Forum, Michael Porter, Jeffrey Sachs, Andrew Warner, and Klaus Schwab

"*The Global Competitiveness Report* has great practical relevance for business people. It can be a good source of reference when making foreign investment decisions for the general business and investment reader. It can also be useful for concise information pertaining to world economic development."—Robert E. Hoskisson, *Michael F. Price College of Business, University of Oklahoma*

2000 320 pp.; 30 illus. paper $35.00

To request an examination copy, write on school letterhead giving course name, expected enrollment, and your decision date, to College Sales Coordinator at the address below:

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
198 Madison Avenue • New York, NY 10016

PLEASE VISIT OUR WORLD WIDE WEB SITE AT:
http://www.oup-usa.org/

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Letters to the Editor

Rwanda's ambassador on the silent West;
Robert E. Hunter lauds NATO expansion;
Natan Shklyar on Russia's regions; and others

HEAR NO EVIL

To the Editor:

Alan J. Kuperman's "Rwanda in Retrospect" (January/February 2000) and the subsequent responses debate the availability of information to Western decision-makers that could have allowed them to act expeditiously to prevent the 1994 Rwandan genocide or stop it once it began.

The basic problem was not the availability of information but rather that only information reported by Western sources was deemed credible. In Rwanda, both the preparations for genocide and the orders to kill were propagated in the extremist media, including the notorious Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines. Many Rwandans, the leadership of the Rwandan Patriotic Front included, shouted loud and clear warnings that large-scale massacres were in the offing, and when they occurred, that genocide had begun.

The world rarely listens, however, unless that same information is repeated by a "Western" source. These reports, in turn, are often clouded by underlying perceptions and presumptions that are sometimes completely at odds with the African experience. Therein lies the fundamental paradox of erroneous decision-making in the globalized world, as far as our continent is concerned.

RICHARD SEZIBERA
Ambassador of Rwanda to the United States

EAST IS WEST

To the Editor:

Richard N. Haass neglects one of the major achievements of U.S. foreign policy under President Clinton: the transformation of the NATO alliance to meet the critical challenges of European security for the twenty-first century ("The Squandered Presidency," May/June 2000). Haass sees NATO enlargement as only "a symbolic victory." He deprecates the overall strategic purpose of including fully within Euro-Atlantic institutions countries and peoples that had so long been under Soviet domination and treated as the playthings of great powers. He merely notes that "the hope of attracting support from Americans of eastern European descent was a crucial factor behind NATO enlargement."

There may be areas where the Clinton administration is open to criticism, but rebuilding NATO and opening a heretofore impossible prospect for European security is not one of them.

ROBERT E. HUNTER
Senior Advisor, RAND Corporation, and U.S. Ambassador to NATO, 1993–98

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"DA" MEN

To the Editor:

Sam Nunn and Adam N. Stulberg claim that Russian regions wield significant influence over Russia's policymaking ("The Many Faces of Modern Russia," March/April 2000). In fact, despite the regions' ubiquitous foreign activities, regional leaders have little say in setting the country's foreign policy.

One reason why regions have so little leverage is the nature of the Russian Federation: 89 relatively small members, each with an average population of 1.9 million. This fragmentation significantly hampers collective action, especially given the vast disparities in economic development among the regions. Governors do not "cultivate horizontal ties between regions, independent of Moscow," as Nunn and Stulberg claim. They spend their time in Moscow lobbying central agencies for parochial concerns instead of building relationships with each other or strengthening the Federation Council as an institution. Consequently, although the Federation Council is vested with some authority over foreign policy issues, it virtually never opposes the federal position. Even when Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov challenged the center's policy toward Ukraine from the council's pulpit, he found little support among his peers, and the government's policy passed overwhelmingly. Nunn and Stulberg's assertion that "the Federation Council gives regional leaders an important venue to act collectively and defend local interests in the making of Russian foreign policy" is largely baseless.

Another reason for the regions' weak role in foreign policy is the fragmentation of Russia's foreign policy process among various actors, mostly rival federal agencies (the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, etc.), but also powerful nonstate actors. These include, most crucially, the oil, gas, and electricity monopolies (like Gazprom, Lukoil, and United Energy Systems), which carry considerable weight in Moscow because of their large contribution to federal coffers. This is why these companies can promote their own foreign policy agenda and even use their extensive pipeline networks as instruments of Russia's foreign policy toward the resource-dependent former Soviet states. Russian regions wishing to influence actual foreign policy usually ally with these giants, jumping on their policy bandwagon and, at times, serving as those companies' puppets.

Russian regions have become much more visible on the international scene as the governors have begun promoting investment and trade opportunities in their districts with Moscow's blessing. But few regions attract serious foreign investors. The very few regions that issued Eurobonds in 1998 defaulted along with the federal government. As in the case of foreign investment, Moscow generally backs regions when their foreign policy initiatives fall in line with Russia's interests.

When the regions challenge Moscow on foreign policy, the center usually prevails. Nunn and Stulberg cite Primorski Krai's active opposition to the Russia-China border treaty but forget to mention that despite the region's militant campaign, Moscow sharply rebuked the krai's governor for exceeding his authority and proceeded with border delineation as scheduled. Similarly, the Foreign Ministry explicitly condemned the Turkic regions that signed a resolution recognizing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. (Realizing that this incident resulted not from a malicious intention to embarrass Moscow but from a lack of knowledge of the nuances of Russian foreign policy, the Foreign Ministry has instituted training courses for regional officials to teach them where Moscow stands on various international issues.) Often what looks like separatist pronouncements are in fact empty posturing with no follow-up, like the proclamation by Khakassia in August 1998 that it would not pay federal taxes in the face of the financial crisis.

Most regional leaders are pragmatic opportunists concerned with increasing their own political power. They realize that their dependence on federal money will persist in the foreseeable future, since foreign investment and assistance have so far failed to replace their ties to Moscow. Consequently, in their pursuit of foreign policy, the regions have been mostly concerned with economic issues and have steered away from sensitive political questions that might result in a confrontation with the center.

NATAN SHKLYAR
Research Associate, EastWest Institute

SHALL WE DANCE?

To the Editor:

Aurelia George Mulgan shows a keen knowledge of what is happening in Japan, as opposed to what people hope will happen there ("Japan: A Setting Sun?" July/August 2000). She deservedly underlines the extraordinary connection between the government and the business sectors that thus far has undermined any attempts at real recovery—just as in an earlier era, it proved a springboard for a different kind of economic success.

M. Diana Helweg's article in the same issue, "Japan: A Rising Sun?" pins hope on Japanese business' turning the country around—with only minimal attention paid to the political arm. Japan simply does not work that way. The political-business connection, regrettably, is for the time being as strong as ever, thanks to the pernicious Liberal Democratic Party. Helweg is also too optimistic in using the success of Sony, Toyota, and a few similar companies as augurs of a new recovery. They are international corporations that wheel and deal with a freedom not remotely enjoyed by the great majority of Japanese businesses, which are still feeding at the trough of government protection. Furthermore, the unraveling of Japan in the last decade deserves far more attention than Helweg's passing mention. She offers an all-too-tidy version of Japan's assumed twenty-first-century resurgence.

FRANK GIBNEY
President, Pacific Basin Institute, Pomona College

THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY

To the Editor:

Andrew Nagorski offers a morally and historically muddled prescription for the European Union (EU) in its dealings with Austria and the Freedom Party ("The Politics of Guilt," May/June 2000). Nagorski derides the "reckless oversimplification" that leads politicians and publics to see only "good guys," who use the conventionally right words when discussing barbarities, and "bad guys," who "raise troubling questions." But Jörg Haider and the Freedom Party are not merely raising questions in the manner of the novelist Martin Walser; they are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

offering, however disguised by later retractions, policy prescriptions that much of the rest of Europe, not to mention the United States, finds morally abhorrent.

The EU and the American press have certainly simplified the story of the rise of the Freedom Party. Austria's "grand coalition" shares the responsibility for the situation in which the country now finds itself. But a political party that comes to share power as a result of discontent with the political system—however legitimate and understandable—does not and should not automatically gain international legitimacy. Dangerous right-wing movements—and Nagorski does not suggest that the Freedom Party has really changed its stripes—frequently come to power because they combine racist or xenophobic appeals with a plausible attack on the real deficiencies of the system. The "excuse me" apologies that Nagorski seeks from the Freedom Party and Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel are unconvincing: if words were enough, then Haider's own disavowals should suffice.

Nagorski is quite right to assert that Austria's "failure to face its past is one reason why ... Haider gets away with open xenophobia." The significant contrast here is with Germany, where, despite the near-collapse of the Christian Democratic Union, the difficulties posed by the integration of the east, and a flagging economy, there is no prospect of a right-wing resurgence on the scale of the Freedom Party. Why? In part because, from the Nuremberg tribunals to the furor over the publication of Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners* in 1996, other nations and their citizens have repeatedly shown their unwillingness to sanction any re-emergence of Nazi ideology in Germany, even in an attenuated form. This is not to belittle the distinguished contributions of many Germans, from Theodor Heuss to Willy Brandt, to the destruction of the extreme right in Germany. But their courage would have been less effective if the spotlight of the world had not been trained on Germany for the past 55 years. Denazification was imperfect and partial; so is the EU reaction to the Freedom Party. But it is a start, and a long-overdue one, toward making Austria acknowledge its past.

TED R. BROMUND
Associate Director, International Security Studies, Yale University

IF YOU LOVE SOMEONE...

To the Editor:

Philip H. Gordon's excellent commentary on the EU plan for a unified military force ("Their Own Army?" July/August 2000) examines a range of unintended and unwelcome possible consequences.

Americans know well that their European friends have long been simultaneously pushed and pulled by ambivalent U.S. attitudes toward European integration and the self-assertion that it implies. The U.S. Defense and State Departments openly or privately denigrate European efforts, and with a very powerful, Euroskeptical, unilateralist Congress, the Europeans are generally (and not surprisingly) intimidated by American megapower.

Washington sees Europe's own divisions all too well. Paris, London, Berlin, and other capitals have different priorities and orientations. Even those who wish European integration well worry whether its leaders will have the political guts to face down American distrust and intimidation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Combined with those U.S. policymakers who for geostrategic and geoeconomic reasons do not want a healthy European competitor, the resulting American pressure demands a new generation of European leaders willing to take risks and ask their peoples for uneasy tradeoffs—in short, leaders who will push back against Washington. Establishing a unified European defense force will not necessarily require another de Gaulle. But it will require a generation of leaders willing to stand up even to allies.

European self-assertion, unfortunately, will in certain respects appear to be anti-American, as threatening to American interests if not to American security. Not all Americans will think this way, but those wedded to a view of the Europeans as troublemakers, free riders, and shifty partners certainly will.

Thus the next phase of European-American relations will require especially wise and liberal presidential leadership in Washington. If the Europeans are successful at continued renaissance, which is in the U.S. interest and which the U.S. should want for its friends and allies, the next administration must be prepared to explain to Americans and justify to a sincerely incredulous Congress how and why the post–World War II American intimidation of Europe, intended or not, must be consciously wound down. A better transatlantic equilibrium will ensure that the United States does not become an overpowerful, resented leviathan, as strong and influential as it is fragile and isolated.

A unified European defense force must be constructed not only in Europe but also in Washington.

RONALD TIERSKY
Professor of Politics, Amherst College

ERRATUM

In editing our review of *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967–1976*, ("Recent Books," July/August 2000) we introduced an error. The published text reads, "After the Palestine Liberation Organization was ejected from Jordan in 1970–71, Lebanon was the last available staging area for actions against Israel. Although other Arab governments had banned the PLO from their territories, they were content to have it based in Lebanon."

The text should have read, "After the Palestine Liberation Organization was ejected from Jordan in 1970–71, Lebanon was the last available staging area for actions against Israel—just what Arab governments had ruled out in their own territories but forced Lebanon to accept." The PLO had offices and a presence in all the Arab countries.

Our apologies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Advice for the Next President

Andrew J. Goodpaster

With complex issues of national security and foreign affairs on the horizon, the next president and Congress must replace piecemeal reactions with a discriminating, forward-looking perspective. To do so, they need to define national interests, devise appropriate policy, and build public support for the priorities, the policies, and the actions that flow from them.

A few security concerns, each in need of a fresh infusion of energy, form the core around which American policy should be reworked to meet evolving conditions. These priorities are cooperative relationships with Russia, China, and America's allies and a sharp reduction in nuclear weapons.

Additional interests, likewise carrying with them governmental responsibility to act, range from prevention of nuclear proliferation in Iraq or Iran to suppression of genocide in the Balkans, terrorism from Libya, or traffic in drugs from Colombia and Mexico. Beyond these immediate security issues are still further interests, such as discouraging human rights violations abroad, preventing violent conflict in areas of limited strategic significance, and encouraging democracy for its own sake.

Although viewed as intrinsically desirable, these latter interests have limited effect on American security and well-being. It is useful then to "tier" U.S. interests according to the likely need for using force and positioning force in forward areas. For lesser-tier challenges, the United States needs the effective collaboration that stems from strong alliances, regional mechanisms, and U.N. forces.

Fortunately, a collaborative network of Cold War institutions, policies, and commitments retains its value. These all focus U.S. interests while adapting themselves to new needs and objectives and drawing in former adversaries. Foremost among these institutions are NATO, U.S. treaties with Japan and South Korea, the United Nations, and an array of

ANDREW J. GOODPASTER, a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, was Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower. He was Chair of the George C. Marshall Foundation, the Eisenhower World Affairs Institute, and the Atlantic Council of the United States.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

international economic institutions. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) are essential to reducing nuclear arsenals to the lowest level that can be reliably verified. U.S. policy should aim to stem further proliferation and retain only enough nuclear weapons to dissuade their use or threatened use by others.

Able advisers and vigorous, informed debate can help a president define interests and implement policies. But only the chief executive can make the decisions and then build the necessary public and congressional support. Clarity is important for gaining public backing, and it is best achieved by matching the right policy concepts to each case requiring action. Although precise calculations of costs and benefits are not possible, experience can help policymakers determine likely outcomes and levels of support. Past failures in Cuba, Vietnam, Iran, Lebanon, and Somalia and the more recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, Senate rejection of the CTBT, and collapse of the Seattle World Trade Organization meeting show the heavy costs of faulty planning, poor preparation, inept execution, or inadequate public support.

Sustaining public support on the issues confronting the United States is demonstrably more difficult and uncertain now than in the era of a strategic bipolar contest. Coherent definitions of interests and clear development of policies may help convey a sense of priorities. But this may well prove insufficient. In today's politically charged, special-interest-dominated, sensationalized milieu, the crisis of the moment often pushes aside more important, longer-term matters.

A useful first step is to recognize some of the principal resistances and obstacles. The public at large has a natural reluctance to set priorities and pay attention to ill-defined matters, particularly foreign problems remote in distance or time. Congress is plagued by widely differing priorities among members and within the parties, unavoidable concern for members' own political fortunes, an unrelenting need to raise campaign funds, and constant pressures from influential contributors and special interests.

The resulting agenda too often fails to convey a clear and coherent focus on matters of longer-term payoff and enduring importance. Within the executive branch, the same kinds of pressures emphasize day-to-day issues at the expense of more fundamental needs. Modern media, serving as an interpretive (and often distorted) screen between government and the public, further complicates the building of trust and support. The "CNN syndrome"—instant portrayal of horrors and human rights violations around the world—skews perspective from the distant to the immediate and transforms short-term interests into priorities.

Surmounting such problems starts with honoring the principle of "telling it like it is." A second step is to draw the congressional leadership into early policy consultation to see that it is present at the takeoff as well as the landing. A useful third technique employed by past presidents is to test through trial balloons the chances of gaining needed public and congressional support for a given measure. Nongovernmental organizations can help mobilize understanding by encouraging analytical debate and fostering critical evaluation. Such nongovernmental activity

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will of course be marked by a degree of organizational self-interest, but the media can provide a countervailing dose of skepticism.

For the hard issues of the current international era, the United States requires a rigorous approach to the linked tasks of prioritizing interests, devising realistic policies, and executing well-thought-out actions. The next president must provide the leadership to accomplish these tasks and galvanize public and congressional support for them. Only then can American security and prosperity in a dangerous world be more ably served.

Foreign Affairs (ISSN 00157120), September/October 2000, Volume 79, Number 5. Published six times annually (January, March, May, July, September, November) at 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021. Subscriptions: U.S., $44.00; Canada, $54.00; other countries via air, $79.00 per year. Canadian Publication Mail–Mail # 1572121. Periodicals postage paid in New York, NY, and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to *Foreign Affairs*, P.O. Box 420235, Palm Coast, FL 32142-0235. From time to time, we permit certain carefully screened companies to send our subscribers information about products or services that we believe will be of interest. If you prefer not to receive such information, please contact us through Palm Coast Data at the address indicated above.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New publications from

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS



A New Beginning

Recasting the U.S.-Japan Economic Relationship
by Bruce Stokes

New governments in Washington and Tokyo have a unique opportunity to reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan relationship and to accelerate the pace and redirect the nature of change in the Japanese economy by creating a U.S.-Japan "open marketplace"—free of tariffs, with minimal regulatory impediments and an increasing freedom to do business.
ISBN 087609-273-3 / $10.00 / July 2000



China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control

Recasting the U.S.-Japan Economic Relationship
by Robert Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts

China has been largely overlooked in the global nuclear equation—for too long, argue the authors of this Council report, which provides the essential context for understanding China's modernization program and its impact on U.S. interests. It also offers some guidelines for U.S. policy and considers the alternatives ahead for China's force modernization.
ISBN 087609-272-5 / $10.00 / April 2000

Council books available through
Brookings Institution Press
www.brookings.edu
or 1-800-275-1447

Full text of recent papers available at www.cfr.org

- The United States, China, and Japan, *by Neil Silver*
- First Steps Toward a Constructive U.S. Policy In Colombia, *by Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft*

Promoting Sustainable Economies in the Balkans

Independent Task Force Report
Steven Rattner, chairman
Michael B.G. Froman, project chair

This task force report argues that economic reconstruction alone will not be sufficient to bring long-term peace and stability to the Balkans. The report offers a balanced assessment of what both the international community and the Balkan countries must do to build sustainable economies in the region.
ISBN 087609-267-9 / $7.00 / February 2000

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lurie's Foreign Affairs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED